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ABSTRACT  
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether there was a potential impact 
from privatisation on the financial and environmental performance of Port of 
Brisbane Proprietary Limited (PBPL). There are two motivating factors.  First, 
available literature has provided contradictions between the predictions from the 
theory of the firm and stakeholder theory when comparing the financial and 
environmental performance of a firm being operated by a government-owned 
organisation compared to a private enterprise. Second, there is a need to investigate 
the inconsistencies of findings and arguments when comparing public versus 
private ownership of an Australian port due to the paucity of such studies in 
Australia. 
There is also, limited literature which has evaluated the financial and environmental 
performance of privatised ports in Australia. A null hypothesis, therefore, was 
developed to evaluate the impact of ownership types on financial and 
environmental performance to address the inconsistencies of findings and 
arguments comparing public versus private ownership of an Australian port. 
The theoretical framework used was based on the theory of the firm and stakeholder 
theory.  Primary and secondary data for the Port of Brisbane’s financial and 
environmental performance operations was gathered across the pre-and post-
privatisation ownership conditions (between 2005 and 2017).  Six-year pre- and 
six-year post-privatisation periods were selected due to size and complexity.  Each 
6-year period was divided into two equal periods to account for the public 
ownership operations and the transitional period from public ownership as well as 
the transitional period into privatisation and the private ownership operations. 
Step 1 involved a one-way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) for 
twelve (12) performance variables ratios across the four periods to test the null 
hypothesis.  The MANOVA and ANOVA post-hoc tests significant results were 
used as an investigative analysis tool to frame the open-ended questions to gather 
reasons for such differences from interviewees in Step 2.  The findings collected 
by interviews is used to triangulate the results of Step 1. 
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The financial and environmental performances of PBPL were found to improve 
during private ownership (between 2012 and 2017) compared to state ownership 
(between 2005 and 2010). Further, interviews revealed that the operational 
effectiveness and efficiency had increased statistically during private ownership as 
they had heavily invested in new technology during 2014 and 2017. Also, the total 
energy consumption ratio and the total Emission of CO2 values of PBPL reduced 
significantly after privatisation.  A reason supplied was that the private 
management was strongly influenced by the terms and conditions of the PBPL 
privatisation agreement, corporate governance, accountability, competition created 
by the vicinity ports, the advantages of the geographical location of PBPL, and 
organisational mechanisms.  
Consequently, PBPL conducted its business affairs and operational activities to 
meet its financial, operational and environmental strategic goals with the objective 
of achieving long term sustainability, while also creating increased shareholder 
value through correct market anticipations. This was achieved while also practising 
significant environmental protection, conservation policies and procedures in their 
daily operations. 
This study provides a model for evaluating the impact of privatisation based on 
stakeholder theory. Further research could be conducted to determine the real 
purpose motivating the drive towards privatisation and establish if that motivation 
is driven by the desire for profit maximisation or to improve stakeholder 
satisfaction. Additionally, future research could perform a multi-port performance 
evaluation approach, which would enhance the appropriateness and significance of 
the research.  
Keywords: Port Privatisation, Ownership structure, Performance measures, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
CERTIFICATION OF THESIS 
 
This thesis is entirely the work of Jayasundara Mudiyanselage Upali Ranjith 
Jayasundara except where otherwise acknowledged. The work is original and has 
not previously been submitted for any other award, except where acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal Supervisor: Professor John Sands 
 
 
Associate Supervisor: Dr. Gregory Jones  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Student and supervisors’ signatures of endorsement are held at the University. 
  
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I would first like to thank my thesis advisors, Professor John Sands, and Doctor 
Gregory Jones of the School of Commerce, Faculty of Business, Education, Law 
and Arts at the University of Southern Queensland-Toowoomba as they 
consistently allowed this study to be my own work though they steered me in the 
right direction whenever they realised, I needed it. 
Further, I would like to thank my loving family; my wife Pathma and son Shaun 
for their constant support by all means until the day.  
Further, I would like to thank staff at the Port of Brisbane for their collegiality and 
willing assistance during the interview process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... II 
CERTIFICATION OF THESIS ......................................................................................................... IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................................ V 
TABLE OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. VIII 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... VIII 
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................IX 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................... 3 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................... 5 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION ....................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 NULL HYPOTHESIS ............................................................................................................ 6 
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY................................................................................................ 7 
1.7  COMPANY BACKGROUND OVERVIEW .................................................................................... 8 
1.8 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................ 9 
1.9  CHAPTER SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................ 11 
2. 0 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................ 11 
2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF TECHNICAL TERMS ........................................................................................... 11 
2.3 EVALUATION OF THEORIES BEHIND PRIVATISATION ........................................................................ 13 
2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................................. 19 
2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................... 29 
2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 30 
CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................ 32 
3. 0 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 32 
3.1 ONE-WAY MANOVA TEST..................................................................................................... 41 
3.2 MULTIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS................................................................................................ 44 
3.3 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS .................................................................................................... 46 
3.4 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 50 
3.5 INTERVIEWS ........................................................................................................................ 51 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 53 
CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................................ 55 
4.0 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES ................................................ 55 
4.1. QUANTITATIVE MANOVA ASSUMPTIONS TESTING ...................................................................... 55 
4.2 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 63 
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 64 
 
 
vii 
 
CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................................ 65 
5.0 RESULTS & DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................... 65 
5.1 ONE-WAY MANOVA RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ......................................................................... 65 
5.1.1 Multivariate tests results- Table 8 ............................................................................. 65 
5.1.2 Levene’s test of Equality of Variances results- Table 9 ............................................... 71 
5.1.3 Tests of Between-Subjects effects results- Table 10 ................................................... 78 
5.1.4 Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests results- Table 11 ............................................................. 87 
5.2 INTERVIEW RESULTS .............................................................................................................. 93 
5.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 112 
CHAPTER 6 .............................................................................................................................. 115 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 115 
6.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY................................................................................................... 118 
6.2 SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................. 119 
REFERENCE ............................................................................................................................. 122 
APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEW LINES OF ENQUIRY .......................................................................... 132 
APPENDIX 2- Q-Q PLOTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCES ................................................. 149 
APPENDIX 3 TRIMMED MANOVA TESTS (FINCEA &  FINTEUS) ........................................... 166 
APPENDIX 4- TRIMMED MANOVA TESTS (FINCEA) AND TESTS FOR CHANGES IN LEVELS OF 
OPERATIONS CONTROLS ......................................................................................................... 189 
APPENDIX 5. PORTS OF AUSTRALIA ........................................................................................ 214 
APPENDIX 6. A LIST OF PRIVATISED SOES IN AUSTRALIA SINCE 1987 TO 2017 ........................ 215 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Box plot 1…………………………………………………………59 
Figure 2: SCATTER PLOT 1………………………………………………….  63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 LIST OF TABLES  
 
 
 
ix 
 
TABLE 1- DIVISIONS OF OWNERSHIP PERIODS OF PBPL ........................................ 38 
 
TABLE 2- FINANCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE RATIOS ..................... 40 
 
TABLE 3 - OPERATIONALISING FINANCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RATIOS ............. 48 
 
TABLE 4- TEST OF NORMALITY........................................................................... 57 
 
TABLE 5- RESIDUALS STATISTICS -MAHALANOBIS DISTANCE .............................. 58 
 
TABLE 6-A  PEARSON CORRELATION -DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS .......................... 60 
 
TABLE 6-B PEARSON CORRELATIONS (R) ............................................................ 61 
 
TABLE 7- TESTS OF BETWEEN-SUBJECTS EFFECTS............................................... 67 
 
TABLE 8- MULTIVARIATE TESTS ......................................................................... 67 
 
TABLE 9- LEVENE'S TEST OF EQUALITY OF ERROR VARIANCES ........................... 68 
 
TABLE 10- TESTS OF BETWEEN-SUBJECTS EFFECTS ............................................. 74 
 
TABLE 11- TUKEY HSD POST-HOC TEST -MULTIPLE COMPARISONS .................... 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABC News-Australian Broadcasting Corporation News 
 
 
x 
 
ABS-Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ANOVA-Analysis of Variance 
ASIC-Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
BAA -British Airport Authority 
BMT- Brisbane Multimodal Terminal 
CAMEL-Capital Adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earning, and Liquidity 
DEA-Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEHP-Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
DIRD-Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development 
DMUs-Decision Making Units 
DV-Dependent variables 
EBIT-Earning Before Interest and Tax 
EBT-Earning Before Tax 
IV-Independent Variable 
MANOVA-Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
NSWNMA-New South Wales Nurses and Midwives’ Association 
PBC-Port of Brisbane Corporation 
PBPL-Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited 
QNU-Queensland Nurses Union 
SOEs- State Owned Enterprises 
SPSS-Statistical Package for Social Science 
TAFE-Technical And Further Education 
TBL-Triple Bottom Line 
UNCATD-United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Privatisation is not a new phenomenon, as even the government in ancient Greece, 
contracted most of its services to the private sector, during the reign between the 
9th and the 12th centuries (Parker & Saal 2003). Later, during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, privatisation became more prominent around the world. Between 1950 
and 2000, Great Britain had privatised almost all of its State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) into the private sector enterprises. As a result of emerging Western 
liberalised economic policies, in the 1980s, privatisation flourished in Latin 
America (Parker & Saal 2003). By 1990s, Russia, Eastern and Central Europe 
engaged in extensive privatisation programmes. In 1987, involving the largest 
public share offering in the financial history of the world at the time, Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) was privatised by the Japanese government 
(Sueyoshi 1998). According to the Reserve Bank of Australia (1997) and Abbott 
and Cohen (2014), even though there were some early examples, privatisation of 
public enterprises became common in Australia in 1980s. 
Whether a country has a capitalist or socialist political basis, or a developed or 
developing economic basis, each society has some forms of beliefs for and against 
privatisation (Garcia 2013). From employees’ perspective, they are in fear of losing 
their jobs due to privatisation, and therefore, they may protest against any 
restructuring programmes (ABC news 2013, Skynews 2017, Telford 2015, and 
WSWS 2017). Queensland Nurses Union (QNU) recently protested against the 
privatisation decisions of Wide Bay Hospital and Health Services (Busch 2013). 
Also, New South Wales nurses have more recently resolved to take all necessary 
actions to conduct a campaign against the privatisation of NSW public hospitals 
and services (NSWNMA 2016). Recently, Sydney bus drivers walked off the job 
over privatisation plans announced by the state transport minister (Rourke 2017). 
According to the theory of the firm and to the other associated theories such as 
shareholder, ownership, private interest, property rights and agency, firms owned 
by private ownership exist primarily to maximise profits. This positive relationship 
 
 
2 
 
between the structure of ownership and the performance of a firm has been 
researched for many decades.  Meanwhile, during the past 20 years, there has been 
an emerging change of emphasis of a firm’s responsibility, from the primary 
shareholders to the other stakeholder groups including Triple Bottom Line (TBL) 
aspects such as; Profit, Planet, and People (The Economist 2009). 
According to Dr. Edward Freeman; a philosopher and an academician, the current 
dominant scenario of businesses is about the money and profits. Further, he 
explains that there are three major flows of business. The first purpose of business 
is money. The second is that there is a contradiction between business and ethics. 
The third is that people are not simply beings motivated by self-interest. Therefore, 
he suggested that to improve business practices, there is a need for a conceptual 
revolution about business practices. Businesses should be about both the purpose 
and creating value together (Freeman, 2010). He stated as businesses should have 
the right purpose, profits follow. Moreover, business is about creating value for all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders. It is about dealing it without making trade-off 
(Freeman, 2010). 
Therefore, it has been suggested that there is a need to consider the 3Ps within a 
business sustainability focus. This may then have an impact on the traditional 
proposition of profit maximisation posited by the theory of the firm, ownership, or 
shareholder theories. These factors need to be considered in today’s business 
environment which has been emphasised by Freeman’s application of stakeholder 
theory. This therefore suggests that the impact of privatisation of a public sector 
service organisation, should not only be focused on changes in the financial 
performance, but also non-financial performance factors such as social and 
environmental issues.  
Consequently, in addition to investigating the impact of the change of ownership 
of PBPL on its financial performance, this research has also focused on the changes 
to their environmental performance under private ownership. This approach has 
been based on the use of stakeholder theory, which has proposed that shareholders 
of a firm would concern about the social responsibility activities of the company, 
in addition to the conventional motivation of profit maximisation.  
 
 
3 
 
The next section of chapter one has discussed the importance, the purpose and the 
motivation for this study followed by the research question, the null hypothesis, 
and the limitations of the research.  
1.1 Importance of the study 
 
Privatisation is a significant area of interest for researchers, economists, 
governments and even to the public in many aspects. During the three decades prior 
to 2000, many countries globally have shifted their State-Owned-Enterprises 
(SOEs) from the state ownership to private ownership. This phenomenon has 
generated for governments, total global revenue in excess of US$1 trillion by 2000 
(Megginson & Netter 2001). In the Australian context, the total revenues from the 
privatisation process (sale of SOEs) between 1987 and 2013, were AUS$ 142.59 
billion (Abbott & Cohen 2014). Therefore, as a revenue generator, privatisation is 
a significant activity which needs to be studied. 
Australia, as an island nation, depends largely on shipping for both the local and 
international freight trades. Therefore, major ports and related infrastructure 
provisions are vital for supply chain activities. However, at present, almost all the 
major Australian ports have been privatised. Port of Newcastle, Port Botany, Port 
Kembla, Port of Adelaide, Port of Melbourne, Port of Geelong, Port of Portland, 
Port of Darwin, Port of Brisbane, Port of Gladstone and Townsville represent some 
of the privatised ports. The move towards the privatisation has not finished and is 
focused not only on ports but also on the other SOEs such as housing, land and 
property information, out of home care services, trustee and guardian, sport and 
recreation, Technical and Further Education institutes (TAFEs), trains, corrective 
services, powerhouse museums, courts reporters, public works and even 
government records which are yet to be privatised (The Lamp 2016).  
From the financial perspective, PBPL was the second highest asset sale in 
Queensland’s privatisation history which accounted for AUS$ 2.3 billion to the 
treasury (Trade Statistics, Ports Australia 2015). This port is significant as it plays 
a vital role in the development of the State’s economy. The location is very 
important for mining and other exporters, buyers, entrepreneurs, and shipping 
companies as accessibility and proximity are critical factors for everyone. Hence, 
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the ownership of the firm and its performance are determinants not only for the port 
users but also for the port management.  
National security is one of the prime considerations of any country. Some argue 
that having Australian ports in foreign hands could harm the nation’s long-term 
security (Duyn 2015). Also, Australians need to be aware of the implications that 
the important State-Owned asset sales, their change of ownership and ramifications 
of these ownership changes have on the public and the local trades. Perhaps, the 
main drive for foreign investors, considering investing in formerly State-Owned-
Enterprises is to maximise return on their investments. Possibly, the new owners of 
privatised firms may avoid tax liabilities when operating in Australia. It is, 
therefore, timely to analyse the impact of changes of ownership of Australian SOEs 
and to evaluate their subsequent financial and environmental performances.  
Brisbane port is close to the world heritage area of ‘The Great Barrier Reef’ and 
most of its major shipping routes are in line with the coral reef (Garcia 2013). 
Therefore, incidents such as bow waves from ships’ wake, dirty water, ship breaks 
and oil spills are known to have occurred in the area. These incidents threaten the 
balance of the ecosystem in the area. Also, being located in a known major flood 
affected area, the activities in Brisbane River lagoon, Moreton Bay, and the 
surrounded environment are critical to the State. The results of general port 
operations such as dredging, sediments, and land reclamation have the potential to 
affect the quality of water, shallowness, flora and fauna, mangroves and species 
which live in the area (Garcia 2013). Dredging, land reclamation operations and 
water footprints observations are some essential daily port operations, and these 
have become more crucial, as Moreton Bay silts up too quickly. As a result, in 
2011, 2013 and 2014, fuel supply to the Brisbane city was delayed for almost five 
days by the silted Moreton Bay (Moore 2014). Also, the volume of dredging from 
the Brisbane River in 2013, was almost five times which for maintenance during 
an average year (Moore 2014). According to Moore (2014), approximately 1.4 
million cubic metres of slits and sediments accumulated in the channels and berths 
due to multiple flooding and dam water releases within the catchments.  
In Australian literature, however, there are few cross-country and case studies 
related to privatisation and those that have been conducted have demonstrated 
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mixed results related to performance. It is, therefore, important to know the actual 
procedures and prevention measures in place. Typically, the Department of 
Infrastructure and Regional Development seriously considers the activities of ports 
and their impact on the environment as indicated below.   
‘Commonwealth responsibilities regarding ports include an environmental 
assessment of port developments where matters of the national environmental 
significance are concerned, safety and security matters, customs, and implementing 
Australia's international maritime obligations relate to ports’ (DIRD 2017). 
Lastly, to be an efficient and well-performed company, a firm should manage and 
maintain its financial, social, and environmental risks, as well as its obligations and 
opportunities to achieve levels of sustainability. Energy and water savings, 
application of more energy and water efficient appliances, water recycling, 
reduction of CO2 emissions, and equal employment opportunities are prominent 
activities of sustainable firms. Also, a sustainable port supports the economy, 
education, marine security and environment, leading to a better collaboration and 
supply chain management (The Economist 2009). Therefore, it is important to 
research the performance of PBPL to evaluate its sustainable achievements.  
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
 
1.3 The purpose of this study is to evaluate how the privatisation process has 
affected a State-owned port’s financial and environmental performance by 
conducting a study of the privatisation of the Port of Brisbane Corporation 
operations, which is known as the Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited 
(PBPL). Motivation of the study 
 
Based on the theory of the firm and stakeholder theory, the prime motivation of 
conducting this research has been to answer the question of whether privatisation 
of a firm has an impact on its financial and environmental performance. Moving a 
step forward from conventional research findings which were heavily based on the 
theory of the firm, describing ‘the private ownership impacts on a firm’s financial 
performance than to the State ownership’, this research has focused further on any 
created value for other stakeholders of PBPL as a result of privatisation, not just for 
shareholders. When referring to the business goal in the mission statement of PBPL, 
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it was obvious that there was a need to investigate how and if, a privatised firm 
attempts to maximise profits in a sustainable manner.  
1.4 Research Question  
 
This research is based on the evaluation of the impact of privatisation of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In the light of the purpose of this study, and the 
expected impact of a change in ownership as postulated by the theory of the firm 
and stakeholder theory, the discussion about the impact argued by a research 
question has been developed based on the reviewed literature and the theoretical 
discussion in chapter 2.  
Research Question 1 (RQ1): To what extent has privatisation impacted upon the 
financial and environmental performance of PBPL? 
1.5 Null hypothesis  
 
A null hypothesis has been developed based on the paucity of literature on the 
contradiction between the theory of the firm and stakeholder theory. The null 
hypothesis (H0) is as below; 
 
1 H0- There is no mean difference in the financial and environmental 
performance of Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited under either private or 
State ownership.  
H0: μ1 = μ2 
Where,  
H0 = the null hypothesis, 
μ1 = the statistical mean of the financial and environmental performance under 
State-owned 
μ2 = the statistical mean of the financial and environmental performance under 
Private owned. 
 
The null hypothesis (H0) stated above represents both the theory of the firm and 
stakeholder theory as they are believed to be true and have been used as a basis for 
argument, though they have not been consistently proved.  
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1.6 Limitations of the study 
 
The research has investigated a single firm through two ownership structures. It is 
possible that other ports in Australia may be subjected to the same political and 
environmental situations. In such cases comparing the findings of this study with 
studies of those ports may generate more significant findings though, it is 
acknowledged that as this study has examined and compared the financial and 
environmental performance of PBPL, the results may not be necessarily generalised 
to all privatised ports in Australia. This limitation is due to geographical, financial 
and time constraints, which are outside the scope of this study. Additionally, there 
are some possible disadvantages created by selecting a case study approach for this 
study. Firstly, case studies by their nature take a narrow field of investigation and 
the results cannot be generalised or extrapolated to fit an entire population.  
To counter the listed limitations, the research problem has permitted an approach 
that was more flexible and enabled an in-depth gathering of knowledge about the 
research problem. Also, non-accessibility of some data of PBPL after privatisation 
was an issue which impacted on the methodology and conclusion. To overcome 
this limitation, company financial reports, obtained from the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC), were used to gather relevant information. 
Also, data were obtained from BIRTE and Water Line reports, Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), Ports Australia, the Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection (DEHP) and the Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development (DIRD). Additionally, raw data were gathered from interviews.  
To overcome inherent negatives, this research implemented prioritised formulae 
and parametric MANOVA tests. The selected port operational performance criteria 
used for this research are recognised by UNCTAD. A parametric analysis was the 
best suit as this study made assumptions and hypotheses about parameters, by 
defining properties of the distribution of the population from where the data were 
gathered. Some have argued that a conclusion drawn from a non-parametric 
analysis is not as strong as a conclusion drawn from a parametric analysis. This 
issue has been addressed through the selection of combined methods of analytical 
tools. The qualitative analysis was a non-parametric thematic tool as there were not 
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any assumptions before the test. The financial and non-financial (descriptive and 
inferential) statistics were compared and bring a more realistic conclusion to the 
research. 
1.7  Company background overview 
 
Private ports are not a new phenomenon to Australia as many bulk ports have been 
built and owned by the end user mining companies. Publicly owned ports such as 
Portland, Geelong, and Adelaide had been privatised before the port of Brisbane. 
The corporate mission of Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited has been presented 
below. 
“Our goal is to grow trade through the port in a sustainable manner which 
optimizes stakeholders’ satisfaction and shareholders’ returns by retaining and 
developing qualified employees, providing world-class infrastructure to satisfy 
customer demand and working cooperatively to ensure a safe and secure 
workplace” (portbris 2017). 
Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited, located at the mouth of the Brisbane River in 
South East Queensland, was formed on the 6th December 1976, under the Port of 
Brisbane Authority Act-1976. Originally, it was known as the Port of Brisbane 
Authority though in 1994, the firm was incorporated under the Government Owned 
Corporation Act-1993 and became known as the Port of Brisbane Corporation 
(PBC). On the 1st July 2007, PBC became a limited liability company under a 
statutory to a State-Owned Company and listed with the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC). While PBC was responsible for the management 
of the port of Brisbane, the company reported to the Ministers in Treasury and the 
Minister for Employment and Economic Development.  
Timber, sugar, meat, mining output and oil were some of the early exported goods 
by the port. Also, shipping operations, pilotage, port development through new 
infrastructures, land reclamation and development, maintenance of existing 
facilities and dredging operations were the port management duties initially.  
Under the ‘Renewing Queensland Plan,’ the sell-off of PBC was announced in 
2009. The port land and infrastructure including wharves, buildings, terminals, and 
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roads were leased in 2010 while ownership was retained. Also, the port of 
Bundaberg was transferred to the Gladstone Port Corporation (GPC). The 
Queensland government restructured PBC as the Port of Brisbane Proprietary 
Limited (PBPL); a fully owned subsidiary of PBC. PBPL acted as the port manager 
and the lessee of the port land, buildings, infrastructure and other port assets.   
Through a competitive bidding process, on the 1st July 2010, PBPL was leased to 
Q-Port Holdings for a 99-year period and the total proceedings from the 
privatisation were AUS$ 2.1 billion.  Q-Port Holdings; comprised of four of the 
largest and most experienced infrastructure investors in the world, have owned 
PBPL since the 1st December 2010. Global Infrastructure Partners, Industry Funds 
Management, Queensland Investment Corporation, and Tawreed Investment; a 
fully owned subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority are the major 
shareholders of PBPL. Operating 29 berths with over more than 7.5kms of quay 
lines, PBPL provides interstate connected rail and road access logistics network to 
the port.  The 24-hour operated Brisbane Multimodal Terminal (BMT) performs as 
the interface between rail, roads and container terminals at the port.  In 2014, PBPL 
became the first Australian port where all stevedores used automated container 
handling equipment at berth 11 and 12 by Hutchison Port Holdings. Under the Land 
Use Plan (LUP) PBPL owns, manages, and develops a total of 1828.5 hectares of 
wet and dry Brisbane core port lands for industrial, commercial, environmental and 
buffering purposes. These lands include Fisherman Island and Port Gate, Lindum 
(Port West), Pinkenba and Bulwer Island (Port North), and Colmslie. By 2017, the 
port had 187 of full-time employees. 
 
1.8 Organisation of the study  
 
The rest of the thesis has been organised as follows. Chapter 2 has defined the 
technical terms of the study and has been followed by the literature review and 
theoretical discussion. Chapter 3 has described the methodology and the research 
methods, rationales for the selection of methods and the limitations of the research.   
Quantitative analyse of the assumptions underpinning MANOVA test method has 
been addressed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 has presented the results and findings of the 
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study.  Chapter 6 has provided a discussion about the results particularly for 
implications of these results for future practice and research purposes, the study’s 
limitations, and conclusions. 
1.9  Chapter Summary 
 
According to literature, privatisation is not a new phenomenon and it has a long 
history dated back to the ancient Greek government. The importance of this study 
is that privatisation is significant to the public, the policy makers and the entire 
economy because, financial, economic, academic or management importance of the 
port privatisation is immense.  Also, when privatising a port, it is important to 
concern national security. Further, ports activities impact the environment. Also, 
the lack of port privatisation research in the literature, inconsistency of findings and 
the contradiction between the theory of the firm and stakeholder theory are some 
of the major factors which influenced the study. 
As set out in the mission statement, the business goal of PBPL is to maximise 
shareholders’ profits through sustainability. According to behavioural economics 
theories which were described above, it is important to study how does PBPL 
maximise profits in a sustainable manner. With reference to the arguments of 
literature and the inconsistent results of prior studies, a null hypothesis (H0) has 
been developed based on that inconsistency and the contradiction between the 
theory of the firm and stakeholder theory predictions of financial and 
environmental performance of a firm being operated by a government-owned 
organisation or a private enterprise. Meanwhile, this study accepts some limitations 
of the study especially being a case study, the results cannot be generalised or 
extrapolated to fit an entire population. Also, non-accessibility of some data of 
PBPL after privatisation would be an issue for the methodology and conclusion 
though, the study gathered data from numerous sources in order to minimise the 
negatives.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. 0 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The rationale behind privatisation is based on the premise that State-Owned 
Enterprises are highly inefficient, and they grow sluggishly due to the reasons such 
as government intervention, bureaucracy, poor decision making, changes in 
administration and workers’ union activities (Veljnovski & Bentley 1987).  Thus, 
relying on the belief that private ownership is superior to public ownership, which 
is supported by the theory of the firm, many researchers have argued that 
privatisation brings financial success to loss generating State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). This belief is supported by some other theories such as shareholder theory, 
public/ private interest theory (public/private choice theory), agency theory (agency 
problem), and property right theory.  
The first part of this chapter has discussed the theories behind this study. This 
discussion involved examining the core theory and the subsequent theories which 
have been developed by different researchers and the insights that those theories 
may have on privatisation activities. Also, this chapter has discussed how 
privatisation may affect the performance of a firm. Finally, analysis of the 
importance of the financial and environmental performance of a firm has been 
discussed. 
The following section has defined the meanings of relevant technical terms and 
their inter-relation prior to the literature review.  
2.2 Definitions of technical terms  
 
According to Aktan (1995), the broader meaning of privatisation is to restrict the 
role of government by applying some methods or policies in order to strengthen a 
free market economy. This study has defined the privatisation as a process of 
transferring the ownership of State-Owned-Enterprises to private ownership.  
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Efficiency has been defined as the percentage of output related to the input of a 
firm. Usually, changes in efficiency will result in a change in the level of 
productivity.  If a firm is more efficient and productive then as a result, its 
performance would be improved. Productivity has been defined as the efficiency 
with which companies as a whole, convert inputs such as labour, capital and raw 
materials into output.  
Generally, the performance of a firm has been defined as the quality of output of 
the process. This study has defined the performance of PBPL as the quality of 
output of both the financial and environmental operations of PBPL. The 
relationship between efficiency and performance is demonstrated when a firm’s 
efficiency increases while at the same time the productivity of the firm also 
increases. The resultant increased productivity then leads to improvements in the 
firm’s performance.  
Profitability has been defined as the comparison of the firm’s ability to achieve an 
overall profit performance relative to other firms in the industry or within the same 
firm in different periods. When profitability measures how much profits a firm has 
generated within a specified context, efficiency measures how efficient a firm has 
been in utilising its resources to generate those profits. 
According to The Economist (2009), business sustainability has been defined as the 
process of managing the triple bottom line (The 3 Ps) - Profits, People, and Planets. 
An efficient and well-performed company is able to manage and maintain its 
financial, social, and environmental risks, as well as meet its obligations and take 
advantage of opportunities while still being able to achieve high levels of 
sustainability. Energy and water savings, application of more energy and water 
efficient appliances, water recycling, reducing CO2 emissions, and equal 
employment opportunities are prominent mechanisms to reduce emissions and 
consumption of resources in firms which are considered to be sustainable. A 
sustainable port should be able to support the sectors such as economy, education, 
marine security and the environment, which would then lead to a better 
collaboration and a strong supply chain management (The Economist 2009). 
Before moving onto the evaluation of theory, this study rephrases as the common 
belief of the ultimate goal of privatisation is to enhance the performance and 
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efficiency of state-owned enterprises and this has been discussed by chapter two 
until now. This argument of privatisation has assumed that companies under private 
ownership would be able to perform better than when under state ownership. Some 
theoretical arguments support the idea that firms produce a superior performance 
under private ownership than under state ownership. These arguments have been 
explained in detailed under each theory below.  
2.3 Evaluation of theories behind privatisation 
 
The following discussion of various theories provides a range of views behind the 
theory of privatisation.  These theories have been developed over time and reflect 
the advancement of knowledge through a cycle described by Kuhn (1962), (Thwink 
2014) as the revolution of thought that occurs within an area of research.  The 
discussion with initially begin with the more traditional theories (agency theory to 
the theory of the firm) and transition into a discussion about theory that reflects the 
multidimensional stakeholder theory, which influences the modern business 
environment through legislation requirements, case precedent judgements, as well 
as public and political expectations of legitimise the activities of any business 
(Deegan 2013, Du Plessis et al. 2018). 
Agency theory (Agency problem) 
Agency theory outlines that the separation of ownership and control is the main 
source of the relative inferior performance of public firms. This theory suggests 
that managers in private firms may, receive stronger incentives to reduce waste and 
to maximise performance. Conversely, it has been suggested that shareholders in 
public sector firms have fewer opportunities to monitor the behaviour of managers 
while managers’ in private firm are more professional and disciplined. Also, their 
actions are controlled by many external control mechanisms such as recognition for 
their achievements, and incentive schemes as a motivation. 
As mentioned above, shareholder theory proposes that an agent has a fiduciary duty 
to the owner of a firm. When the agents (the managers) of a firm act in principals’ 
(shareholders’ or owners’) best interests, there is an inherent conflict of interest 
between the management and the firm’s shareholders as the shareholders’ needs 
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may not align with the interests of the managers. The managers who act as the 
agents for the shareholders or the principals are supposed to make decisions which 
maximise principals’ wealth, though it is in the managers’ best interest to maximise 
their own wealth. This conflict is called the agency problem. The relationship 
between the agent and the principal, the conflict between them, and the issues 
concerned with resolving that conflict are explained by agency theory. Vickers and 
Yarrow (1991) introduce as the behaviours of the agents (managers) can be 
monitored and influenced by the shareholders through their votes at general 
meetings.  
Property rights theory 
Property right theory explains that managers in public firms do not suffer from 
economic consequences of their decisions they have made and even such decisions 
may not affect to reduce their incentives to maximise profits and reduce waste. In 
contrast, private firm managers are prevented by the threat of bankruptcy and 
takeover from making selfish decisions which benefit themselves. However, the 
availability of soft budget constraints prevents public firms from the risk of 
bankruptcy, provided that the gap which exists between income and expenditure is 
balanced by the state budget. If a firm can survive without covering its costs, the 
price mechanism does influence the behaviour of managers encouraging economic 
wastes such as overstaffing, political patronage, excessive salaries, and earning 
illegitimate commissions. 
Kornai (1980) states that property rights theory focuses on the agency problem 
under two forms, which are more acute under public ownership structures. 
Accordingly, managers would not perform well unless they are monitored. When 
managers in the public sector are poorly monitored, they lack incentives to perform 
competitively. Such poor monitoring could happen when the firms are not publicly 
traded, and then there is no risk of takeover of their organisation. Therefore, 
ownership is diffused. As a result, SOEs are inefficient until property rights are 
clearly assigned publicly. This could be worse if the monitoring system is 
performed by politicians and bureaucrats for the public’s interest. This inefficiency 
would occur because they are not efficient and productive in designing or 
monitoring incentive systems that are performed by shareholders of private sector 
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companies. The other reason the managers in SOEs lack incentives to perform 
competitively is these managers do not have a fear of bankruptcy; as long as the 
soft budgets would cover the deficits (Kornai 1980).  
The control right which State-Owned-Enterprises have can be used to manage 
assets in order to achieve set objectives such as to create employment opportunities 
and provide basic needs to the public while privately-owned enterprises have the 
need to maximise profits (Alchian 1965). This standard approach to public and 
private ownership stresses the agency problem in all forms of ownership. However, 
the theory claims that managing by owners (shareholders) would be more efficient 
than monitoring by political processes (Alchian 1965).  
Public/ Private interest theory (Public/ private choice theory) 
Public interest theory describes and predicts the actual behaviour within the public 
sector. This theory proposes that the government supports the public interests 
through State-Owned-Enterprises participating in activities such as maximising 
social welfare and fostering country’s economy while maintaining a high level of 
employment (Carter 2013). The core element of this theory is that politicians and 
government bureaucrats are likely pursuing their own interests rather than the 
public interest (Buchanan and Tollison 1984).  
Shleifer et al. (1996) claimed that, unlike the managers in private sector, SOEs’ 
managers are expected to pursue different objectives rather than the objectives of 
maximising profits. This is because the managers in SOEs are responsible for 
various constituents, such as legislators, ministers and civil servants, who have their 
own objectives with SOEs. Typically, politicians who are responsible for 
unemployment would tend to influence the managers in SOEs to employ their 
constituency voters, which in turn the cost of labour in SOEs would increase. Migue 
and Belanger (1974) argue that in order to maximise state public political objectives 
such as seeking votes to retain political power, policies and regulations can be 
manipulated. Both property rights and public choice theories suggest that the 
behaviour and performance of the managers in SOEs would differ from the 
managers in the private sector because each has different objectives and constraints.  
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On the other hand, private interest theory primarily focuses on profit maximisation 
(profitability) and shareholder wealth (high return for investment). These 
conflicting and competing interest as well as the responsibility preferences of 
public and private interest theories create a vacuum about the real responsibility of 
a privatised firm. Therefore, to address concerns, private interest theory suggested 
an emphasis on complete contracts; law and regulations which can be used to 
adequately protect the public interest and prevent private sector’s opportunistic 
behaviours (Carter 2013).  
As mentioned above, public officials, bureaucrats, and politicians are more 
concerned in maximising their own objectives such as elections, votes, or power 
than protecting the public interest and the efficiency of their decisions. This may 
encourage trade union activities to safeguard such interests, particularly for certain 
stakeholders. As a result, transferring the public ownership of a firm to private 
ownership is seen as the most productive measure to avoid the inefficiency 
generated by public ownership.  
Despite the theoretical arguments, the impact of privatisation on a firm’s 
performance in practice is far from conclusive and instead has produced mixed 
results. 
The theory of the firm 
The theory of the firm is used to explain the nature of a firm and predict the 
existence, structure, behaviour and relationships of a business entity with the 
market forces. It is clustered with several other economic theories which are used 
to explain the existence, behaviour, structure and relationship of a firm to the 
market (Spulber, 2009).  Simply, this theory explains that firms exist and make 
decisions in order to maximise their profits. To achieve that goal the firms, interact 
with the market-price mechanism in determining price and demand/supply and then 
allocate scarce resources in the most profitable manner (Spulber, 2009).  However, 
recently, this theory has been debated and expanded to consider whether a firm’s 
goal is to maximise its profits in the long-term or short-term. This theory works 
side by side with other theories, such as stakeholder theory and the theory of 
consumers.  These other theories distinguish between short-term motivations, such 
as profit maximisation, and long-term motivations, such as sustainability. 
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Therefore, today’s firms must consider not only maximising shareholders wealth 
through dividends but also, public perception, social responsibilities, 
environmental protection and long-term investments in the firm’s viability. 
Shareholder theory 
Shareholder theory presents the traditional view of a firm, which expresses the view 
that only the owners or the shareholders of an entity are important, and that the 
firms, therefore have a binding fiduciary duty to put their needs first in order to 
increase value for them. This theory was introduced by economist Milton Friedman 
in 1970 and according to him, the owners or the shareholders (the principals) of a 
firm legally authorise the management (the agents) to supervise or to protect the 
principal’s wealth or property on behalf of them in which agents owe a fiduciary 
duty to the principals to maximise the profits (Friedman, 1970). The essence of 
shareholder theory is that a business exists to maximise profits (profitability) for 
the benefit of the shareholders. Primarily, privately owned firms run businesses 
under this shareholder theory as their prime motive of running a business is profit 
maximisation. This study evaluated the performance of a privately-owned port, 
which has been regulated by the government through policies, procedures and 
privatisation agreement. Therefore, the contradiction of the aims of running the 
business of the Port of Brisbane must be evaluated in both private and public 
ownership aspects. Shareholder theory is relevant here in order to evaluate the 
achievements of private ownership from privatisation.  
Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory, introduced by Dr. Edward Freeman in 1984, relates to 
organisational management and business ethics, which can then be used to address 
issues such as the morals and values needed to be considered when managing a firm 
(Freeman, 2010). In 1983, stakeholders have been broadly defined by Freeman and 
Reed (1983, p.91) as any identifiable group, or individuals, who either can affect 
the achievements of a firm’s objectives or are affected by the achievements of a 
firm’s objectives. Moreover, Freeman (2010) suggested that shareholders are just 
one of many stakeholders of a firm. Additionally, all employees, vendors, 
government agencies, environmentalists, suppliers, investors, and communities 
who have interconnected relationships and a stake in a firm should be valued by a 
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well-performing firm. Also, he argued that a firm’s real success relies on satisfying 
all the above-mentioned stakeholders of the firm, not just the shareholders who 
provide capital and then make profit from the company’s success. Therefore, 
stakeholder theory questions the content of shareholder theory which focuses just 
on the shareholders’ wealth as the main objective of a business.   
However, the revolution of thought that has occurred within stakeholder theory 
reflects societal expectation over time.  2.4 Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and Stakeholder theory 
As discussed above, stakeholder theory distinguishes the accountability of a firm 
and the equal rights of its stakeholders, when performing its business activities. As 
Mulgan (1997) stated, the term ‘accountability’ is derived from ‘responsibility 
concept. In that sense, accountability is the responsibility of a particular party to 
another who has entrusted the said particular party to perform some assigned duties. 
During this process of performing its accountability to a firm’s stakeholders, the 
disclosure of information in accounting is vital. As Gray et al (1996) stated, 
disclosure of information includes not only financial and regulated information, but 
also nonfinancial and unregulated information. This has been emphasised by 
Stakeholder theory as the community has the right to know the aspects of any firm’s 
operations and their consequences. Therefore, it is the duty of a firm to disclose its 
information in a responsibility-driven way rather than in a demand-driven way.  
Disclosure of information in a responsibility-driven way is the role of Corporate 
Social Responsibility/ Reporting (CSR), which provides society-at-large 
(Principal) with information (Accountability) about the extent to that a firm (Agent) 
has met the responsibilities imposed on it (Gray et al 1996). The principal or the 
society at large represents a firm’s stakeholders. Unlike the ethical branch, often, 
the managerial branch of stakeholder theory related to CSR has been empirically 
tested by various researchers. Roberts (1992) studied on the ability of a firm’s 
stakeholders to impact on its CSR disclosure and found measures of stakeholder 
power and their related information needs, which can provide some explanation of 
levels and types of CSR disclosures. Similarly, Neu et al (1998) stated that firms 
are more responsive in terms of corporate environmental disclosure, to the concerns 
of financial stakeholders and government regulators than to environmentalists. 
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Also, Bhattacharyya (2015) found that the prime motivation of CSR disclosures 
relies on the desire to manage the most powerful group of stakeholders. 
In summary, the paradigms within the current branches of stakeholder theory, 
which encompass the theory of the firm, are the motivational influences on the 
financial and environmental performance of PBPL; the privatised operations of the 
formerly publicly owned Port of Brisbane Corporation (PBC).  
2.5 Literature review As literature has emphasised, SOEs’ performances are 
considered to be slow and inefficient mainly due to the government bureaucracy, 
poor decision-making practices, political intervention, labour trade union activities 
and changes in administration. Further, various theories have been posited to 
emphasise the commitment of private ownership to maximise profits and reduce 
cost than the commitment of state ownership. The theories mentioned above have 
described the reason why the structure of company ownership has an influence on 
the performance of a firm (Shleifer 1998). For example, private interest theory 
proposes that private owners are motivated by profits and therefore wish to engage 
in profit maximisation, and that suggests the shareholders are therefore less 
interested in the provision of public interests, especially in protecting the 
environment (Parker 1998, Shleifer 1998). Similarly, shareholder theory explains 
that a firm’s sole responsibility is profit maximisation for its shareholders. 
Additionally, theories such as property rights and agency problem, have further 
explained that there is a relationship between the ownership structure and a firm’s 
performance. Most studies based on such theories have demonstrated that the 
ownership structure influence a firm’s performance. These theories propose that 
private ownership leads to an increase in the performance of firms when compared 
with state ownership. The reason proposed for this phenomenon is that shareholders 
of privately-owned firms are driven by the profit maximisation whereas the State-
owned firms are more likely to be driven by a social welfare motivation 
(Megginson and Netter (2001), Parker and Saal (2003)).  
However, some alternative studies have revealed factors which influence a firm’s 
performance are not only the structure of ownership but include the competition, 
the degree of autonomy and the rewards management receive from the owners of 
firms (Nickell, 1996). However, a considerable amount of research findings in the 
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literature are in favour of the increased performance of private ownership. 
Therefore, Zraiq and Fadzil (2018) maintain that the studies wouldn’t reveal any 
further significance between the ownership structure and a firm’s performance and 
what the most needed in future research in the privatisation is that a new dimension 
to the conventional relationship between ownership and performance.  
Also, the perception that privately-owned firms have superior performance when 
compared to State-Owned-Firms has been researched extensively to find the 
relationship between the change of ownership and company performance (Parker 
1998, Shleifer 1998, Poitras, Tongzon & Li 1996). Some studies have indicated 
that privatisation has positively impacted on the performance of firms. For instance, 
having compared pre-and post-privatisation conditions of 61 firms from 32 
different industries in 18 countries, Megginson et al (1994) suggested that output, 
profitability and operating efficiency of their sample population was increased by 
privatisation. Again, in 2001, Megginson and Netter demonstrated that 
privatisation significantly and dramatically improved the financial and operating 
performance of divested firms. They concluded their study with thoughts on the 
current literature at the time. They stated that, by 2000, the role of the State-Owned-
Enterprises had been reduced significantly by privatisation programmes, especially 
in developing countries. Further they summarised by stating that most studies 
supported the proposition that privately-owned firms were more efficient and 
profitable compared to the state-owned firms. They concluded that it was true that 
privatisation beneficial to the divested firms, as they become financially healthier, 
although there were costs for the workers of the SOEs as their jobs were unresolved. 
The most interesting conclusion was that there was little empirical evidence on how 
privatisation affected stakeholders except shareholders. 
Some researchers (Megginson & Netter 2001, Guriev & Megginson 2005, 
Boardman & Vining 1989), however, theorise that even though privatisation has 
led to improvements in company performance, the change of ownership itself is not 
the only reason for it, but there are some other factors which possibly increase the 
efficiency; i.e. competition, change of technology, and regulation reforms. Further, 
to the conclusion of the meta-data analysis of Bachiller (2015), the method of 
privatisation also a determinant of the performance of privatised firms. However, 
previous researchers have not suggested a world-wide accepted methodology to 
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evaluate the performance of a privatised firm. Accordingly, it is evident that there 
is no consensus on how to analyse performance improvements of SOEs after 
privatisation.  
According to the literature, most of the time, government operates enterprises at a 
loss. Therefore, when ownership changes to the private sector, there is an 
expectation of improving fiscal efficiency and capacity to generate profits. Critics 
against privatisation, especially related to the provision of services, argue that profit 
motive would cause a privatised State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) to provide 
stakeholders with inferior services (Carter 2013). The reason behind is that the 
services may be provided at a low quality under a maximum profit margin.  
However, some researchers have argued that the proper administration of a 
privatised firm would still facilitate quality services and protect stakeholders’ 
interests (Bowyer & Chapman 2014).  
Other than being a political decision, theoretically, privatisation is an option for the 
government to restructure policies and regulations (structural adjustment) for the 
provision of better services to the public by eliminating loss generating SOEs. The 
main debate in the literature about privatisation is whether it improves the 
performance of previously State-Owned-Enterprises. This argument ranges from 
improved efficiency, lack of political interference, increased competition to the 
natural monopoly, public interest, industry fragmentation and regulating private 
ownership (from positives to negatives of privatisation) (Boussofiane et al. 2010; 
Megginson & Netter 2001; Nagorski 1972). While having a doubt about the 
increased performance by privatisation, some argue about the best method for 
privatisation(Havrylyshyn & McGettigan 1999, Sozzani 2001). However, this 
research is based on the first argument to keep the study concise.   
Globally, the port industry has been analysed in various perspectives. Measuring 
port privatisation efficiency and productivity is the common endeavour. Until 
recent time, technical and economic efficiency measures are more popular among 
academicians (e.g., Liu, 1995; Coto-Millan et al., 2000; Notteboom et al., 2000; 
and Cullinane et al., 2002). These example studies are some of the benchmark 
studies in technical and economic efficiency in the literature. Some of the other 
researchers (e.g., Talley, 2007; Saygili & Taymaz, 2001; Parker, 1998; Cowie, 
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1999; Boussofiane, Martin, & Parker, 2010) who assessed the impact of 
privatisation from a technical and productivity aspect using the following frontier 
efficiency measurement techniques. Stochastic Production Frontier approach, or 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are used to evaluate a firm’s technical and 
productive impact of privatisation.  Most of these studies have produced mixed 
results (Boussofiane, Martin, & Parker, 2010). Some of them have returned 
significant outcomes (Cowie, 1999), while others have insignificant outcomes 
related to improved performance of former State-Owned-Enterprises (Saygili & 
Taymaz 2001). 
However, the impact of port privatisation on the sustainability, environment and 
social responsibility has been less weighted in the literature. With the advancement 
of technology, different objectives and diverse operational activities plead new 
measures of performance analyses not only in the port industry but also, in any 
industry as a whole.  Currently, this is more due to the conceptual advancement in 
the fields of economics and management in environmental protection, 
sustainability, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Therefore, the modern 
studies urge better criteria in analysing environmental performance, sustainability 
and CSR of port activities when evaluation port privatisation performance. 
Another significance of the measuring process of the impact of port privatisation is 
the methodology which a study implemented. Often, researchers use either 
quantitative or qualitative method separately in their studies to evaluate the impact 
of privatisation.  Quantitative approach concerns with discovering facts about port 
privatisation while assuming fixed and measurable realities. Data are collected 
through measuring tools and also, are analysed through numerical comparisons and 
statistical inferences. Quantitative approaches are dominated by ratio analysis 
(ROE, ROA, ROS), non-parametric analysis (Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA) 
and parametric analysis (Stochastic Frontier Analysis SFA).  
Ratio analyses often represent financial and operation proxies and they seldom 
represent environmental and sustainability ratios. Djankov and Murrell (2002), 
Megginson (2002), Megginson and Netter (2001), Parker and Saal (2003), and 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003) are some prominent researchers who followed 
the statistical ratio approach. For example, Megginson et al. (1994), focused on 
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financial and operating ratios such as profitability, sales, labour productivity, debt, 
investment, employment, and dividends. Subsequently, widely cited studies such 
as of Boubakri and Cosset (1998), DeWenter and Malatesta (1997), and D’Souza 
and Megginson (1999) followed the same approach, concluding that privatisation 
was associated with gains in a company’s profitability and labour productivity 
whereas, the other performance indicators produced mixed results.   
DeWenter and Malatesta (2001) concluded that a firm’s profitability could be 
increased by the government through effectively restructuring the firm without 
privatisation. However, most of these studies (Boubakri et al. 2005, D’Souza & 
Megginson 1999) did not consider the influence of other factors (such as 
sustainability measures, the conditions of a privatisation agreement, regulations and 
economic changes), which also influence the privatisation process. Further, 
Verbrugge et al (1999) found that the performance of 65 selected banks of their 
study was moderately improved after the privatisation. Using a panel of 60 banks, 
Beck et al (2003) also concluded that privatisation had a positive impact on 
efficiency. One thing common from all above studies was that those studies 
revealed that profitability of the selected sample companies was improved after 
privatisation, though the studies did not focus on the changes in the overall value 
of the selected firms. 
According to Arocena and Oliveros (2012), some studies contain two broad 
limitations which have been often exposed by the authors themselves. The primary 
criticism is that the majority of studies focus on partial financial and economic ratio 
analysis or single factor productivity measurements without estimating productive 
efficiency. Further, their study depicts profitability is an inappropriate variable to 
measure performance or efficiency as higher profit margins may exist due to an 
increase in price rather than from an increase in marginal profit which can be a 
result of market power. The second set of studies as they identified as having 
limitations, failed to properly compare the performance level of a SOE before and 
after its privatisation, with what was achieved by private owners in the same 
economic environment. 
Non-parametric approaches (stochastic linear programming) do not consider 
random noise and they do not allow statistical hypothesis to be contrasted. Also, 
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they do not carry out assumptions on the distribution of the inefficiency term while 
they exclude error terms. Additionally, they are sensitive to the number of 
variables, measurement errors and outliers. Further, these approaches do not require 
specifying a functional form and they are just mathematical programs. Prior studies 
(e.g., Roll and Hayuth, 1993; Tongzon, 2001; Culliednane et al., 2004; Park and 
De, 2004; Barros and Athanassiou, 2004) are some of the benchmark non-
parametric approach researchers in the literature. All of these researches have used 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. Also, the selection of the sample for the 
above studies consisted of cross-sectional and panel data.  
In practice, some researchers have found through non-parametric approaches that 
a change of ownership did not necessarily improve a firm’s performance, or it had 
a mixed impact on the performance. Parker (1998) concluded in his performance 
analysis of the British Airports Authority (BAA) that there was no evidence to 
claim that BAA’s performance improved after privatisation. Using a non-
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), he maintained that technical 
efficiency was expected to rise over time due to the change of Decision-Making 
Units (DMUs) both before and after privatisation. However, it is questionable the 
accuracy of his findings as DEA cannot be used to evaluate the performance of a 
single firm. Talley (2007) asserted that frontier statistical models that utilise DEA 
technique are for the technical efficiency evaluation of multi-port performance. It 
is, therefore, difficult to rely on the results of Parker’s study, because he used one 
set of data (one year’s data) as one set of DMUs (as one firm’s efficiency) to 
achieve a score of 100, which may mislead the efficiency ratings. In addition to this 
technical issue, the study had also not considered the environmental impact of the 
privatisation of BAA.   
Using non-parametric DEA method, Cullinane et al (2006) examined a panel data 
of 57 international ports and the impact of their privatisation on the technical 
efficiency. However, it is doubtful the accuracy of the outcome of that multi-port 
analysis because, ports have complex operations, different regulations and different 
levels of technology and competition. Therefore, a comparison of different ports 
and different port activities using a multi-port approach is dubious.  Instead, a 
single-port approach is far more accurate than to the multi-port approach. 
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Further, many researchers compare the performance of firms under public and 
private ownership using cross-sectional regression with the assumption of the effect 
of ownership controls on the other determinants of performance. Boardman and 
Vining (1989) argued a regression analysis should be considered to be 
inappropriate because ownership is endogenous (having an internal cause or origin) 
in a cross-section and it is therefore, difficult to control for all possible determinants 
of performance at the firm level. According to Bachiller (2015), Dimensional 
Balanced-Scorecard method, Time Series Cross-Sectional Analysis, Wilcoxon t-
test, and Mann-Whitney Test, are some other approaches widely used as non-
parametric statistical tools to analyse changes to ownership and performance.  
On the other hand, parametric approaches (econometric) do consider random noise 
and allow statistical hypothesis to be contrasted. Parametric approaches usually 
carryout assumptions on the distribution of the inefficiency term and they include 
compound error terms; for instance, one of one side and the other is symmetrical-
as two queues. Nevertheless, these approaches require specifying a functional form 
and also, they can also, confuse inefficiency with a bad specification of the model 
because they are econometrics. Liu (1995)- (SFP), Coto-Millan et al. (2000)- 
(SFC), Notteboom et al. (2000)- (SFP), Cullinane et al. (2002)- (SFP), and 
Cullinane and Song (2003)- (SFP), are some of the prominent parametric studies of 
efficiency analyses in the port sector which have been used Stochastic Frontier 
Production (SFP), Stochastic Frontier Cost (SFC) and Distance Function (DF) and 
Cost Share (CS) models. The common functionality of all above-mentioned studies 
is that they have focused only on technical efficiency with the use of cross-sectional 
and panel data. However, the frontier approach is consistent with the economic 
theory of the optimising behaviour of companies. Also, the deviations from the 
frontier can be directly interpreted as measures of the efficiency through which 
companies achieve their objectives.  
Tongzon and Heng (2005) studied the quantitative relationship between a port’s 
ownership structure, port size and technical efficiency with reference to a cross-
sectional data panel of 25 international ports. They used a Stochastic Frontier (SF) 
model which incorporates the inefficiency effect to demonstrate the importance of 
port privatisation as a necessary strategy to gain a competitive advantage. The study 
also investigated the determinant factors of port competitiveness. The outcome of 
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the study was that port privatisation can improve port operation efficiency to some 
extent which will, in turn, increase the port competitiveness. However, one 
disadvantage of the SF model is that there is no prior justification for the selection 
of any particular distributional form for the technical inefficiency effects. Also, the 
study concentrated only the relationship between the ownership structure, and 
technical inefficiency but not the environment and sustainability. 
Qualitative approach concerned with understanding human behaviour towards 
privatisation from the informant’s perspective. As the methodology, qualitative 
approach collects data through participant observation and interviews and then data 
are analysed by themes from descriptions by informants. Data are reported in a 
descriptive manner. This method is more suitable to analysing human behaviours 
which are unable to capture successfully through scientific methods. Mixed 
methods (both quantitative and qualitative) approach for the performance 
evaluation of a privatised port is rare in the literature.  
According to a qualitative study performed by Tsamenyi, Onumah and Tetteh-
Kumah (2010), the evaluation of post-privatisation performance of two selected 
firms in Ghana was positive. Using a five-dimensions balanced scorecard, they 
conducted interviews on five perspectives of the selected companies such as 
accounting-financial, customers, internal business process, learning, and growth 
and community aspects, and then they rated those five perspectives. However, it 
can be arguable that relying on perceptions of the interviewees for the purpose of 
generalising the findings to the wider community may be biased. The views 
expressed may represent the personal viewpoint and sentimental values towards the 
success of the privatisation process that may not reflective of the privatisation 
process in general.  
.  
In the Australian context, McKenzie and Keneley (2011) highlighted that their main 
hypothesis which proposed that “performance is different after privatisation” was 
not found to be supported by the evaluation of four Australian finance institutions. 
Further, they demonstrated that some of the sample institutions were performing 
well before their privatisation. Therefore, they concluded that privatisation was not 
the key factor in improving performance. Using a CAMEL analysis (Capital 
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adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earning, and Liquidity) the researchers 
initially evaluated the financial performance of the selected firms and then, the 
result of the ratio analysis was tested through the non-parametric Wilcoxon small 
sample test. The selection of those statistical tools was similar to the quantitative 
structure of this study though, it differs from McKenzie and Keneley’s as this study 
used both parametric testing and qualitative thematic analysis.  
King and Pitchford (1998) have studied privatisation in Australia to understand the 
incentives operating in public and private firms. They applied a simple framework 
to the ownership approach in Australian prison, airports, Telstra, water and gas 
distribution and ambulance services. This study explained the relationship between 
incentives and ownership policies although, there were no concerns related to the 
financial and environmental performance and the change of ownership. According 
to Chen et al. (2017), privatisation has a positive effect on SOEs ‘balance sheets in 
the short term though, it may result in a risk of undervaluing port assets. Also, the 
change of ownership may have resulted in increased port charges, fewer port 
investments, impeded port competition, and less concern about the public interest 
in the long run (Chen et al. 2017). However, their study did not address the 
significance of the changes in ownership nor the financial and environmental 
performance of the selected firms. 
 
As already discussed under stakeholder theory in section 2.3, findings of 
Chakravarthy (1986) confirmed the inadequacy of traditional strategic performance 
evaluation measures which are based on a firm’s profitability (financial data). To 
be an important discriminator of strategic performance evaluation, therefore, he 
emphasises the requirement of having the sophisticated measures which assess the 
quality of a firm’s transformation and the satisfaction of all of the firm’s 
stakeholders. For this, he analysed seven excellent firms (firms were from the 
computer industry, featured in a book published by Peters and Waterman) in 
contrast with seven other non-excellent firms from the same industry. However, the 
study could not distinguish key performance measures of excellent firms. Also, the 
profitability measurements do not seem capable of discriminating excellence and 
accounting data which the study used to construct the proxies captured historical 
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performance of trends. Financial ratios such as ROE, ROI and M/B (Book to 
Market value) are necessary for a firm’s excellence though they are not sufficient, 
therefore, Chakravarthy (1986) suggested the need of futuristic measures.   
Predominantly, Ullmann (1985) proposed that inconsistent findings from the 
studies of the relationship among social disclosure, social performance, and 
economic performance of American firms were majorly due to lack of theories, 
inappropriate definitions of key terms, and deficiencies in the empirical databases. 
Therefore, one of his suggestions was the improvements in methodology in 
analysing a firm’s social and economic performance. Accordingly, research attempt 
to correlate social disclosure, social performance, and economic performance 
should include additional variables based on a contingency approach (situational 
approach). The situational approach suggests the most appropriate analytical 
method is dependent on the context of the situation, rather than an inefficient single 
and rigid method.  Typically, selected firms in the sample should have to have 
different strategic postures. Longitudinal studies should have to address how 
management strategies change over stakeholder power and economic performance. 
Also, differentiation between mandated and voluntary social performance and 
related disclosure activities is suggested. However, Ullmann accepts the difficulties 
of having complex social performance measures in measuring the performance of 
a firm. Lastly, also, he accepts the existence of considerable shortcomings among 
social performance criteria. In conclusion, Ullmann (1985) emphasises the best 
consideration in analysing a firm’s performance is the relationship between social 
performance, economic performance and social disclosure performance until an 
adequate theory arises.  
The other factor when considering the evaluation of a port’s privatisation is the 
selection of a single-port approach or multi-port approach. Most of the benchmark 
port performance analyses are multi-port analyses while single-port evaluations are 
inferior (different categories of the evaluation of port privatisation have been 
discussed in section 3.0 Methodology in Chapter 3).  
Having sought the existing literature, this study, therefore used both quantitative 
analysis and qualitative interview analysis adequately to find out the factors which 
may have affected the performance of PBPL. Thus, the main contribution of this 
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study is to add to the literature from a perspective which examines the financial and 
environmental performance of a privatised port in Australia, using a mixed methods 
(both qualitative and quantitative) approach, which the quantitative analysis 
consists of parametric MANOVA analysis than using traditional non-parametric 
Stochastic Frontier Models or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Also, the 
quantitative method is different here from the traditional parametric regression 
analysis approaches. The justification for the use of a mixed-methods approach has 
been discussed later in chapter 3. 
2.6 Theoretical framework  
 
The theoretical framework of this study has been based primarily on the theory of 
the firm and the stakeholder theory. The significance of these two theories is that 
while the former emphasises a firm exists to maximise shareholders profits, the 
latter stresses a business entity should create value for not only shareholders but all 
stakeholders.  
 
Stakeholder theory proposes that a firm has responsibilities to all stakeholders such 
as employees, customers, competitors, vendors, contractors, community members, 
institutes and shareholders. Accordingly, when States transfer their ownership of 
loss-generating enterprises to private ownership the needs of all stakeholders need 
to be considered. The conceptual intention of the privatisation should be the 
provision of better, quality goods and services to address the needs of the public. If 
not so, then the purpose of the privatisation of government may be just to make 
profits of selling state-owned assets while reducing the costs to the State and 
realising the money tied up in the SOEs.  
 
The significance of the privatisation using stakeholder theory is contradicted by the 
theory of the firm as the latter states that a business exists and makes decisions to 
maximise profits (fiscal improvement). Further, private interest theory, agency 
theory, shareholder theory, property rights theory and ownership approach, assert 
that the prime motive of private ownership is profit maximisation. Firms engage in 
the market to determine price and demand and then to allocates resources for the 
goods and services the company produces. The scarcity of resources, the 
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opportunity cost, and the risk of investments are some drives for private ownership 
to maximise profits. The profit maximisation concept goes along with the theory of 
property rights and describes the allocation of property rights into private or public 
affects the efficiency of resource in use (Kim & Mahoney 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, shareholder theory explains that private ownership engagement in 
business is motivated by a narrow concept of self-interest including wealth, fame, 
and power (Schenk 2017). However, researchers have argued that proper contracts 
with clear laws and regulations would eliminate the contradiction of stakeholder 
and private interest theories (Carter 2013). Therefore, the interviews conducted for 
this research were focused mostly on the new regulations and laws which affected 
PBPL’s financial and environmental performance after privatisation.  
 
According to Bowyer and Chapman (2014), stakeholder theory implies that a 
firm is compelled to make profits, to satisfy its stakeholders and to continue 
positive growth. A firm’s stakeholders consisted of shareholders, employees, 
customers, community members, competitors, and contractors. One reason for 
the privatisation of ports may be to position them as a more competitive firm 
while catering for their stakeholders. Thus, it is important to explore both the 
impact of privatisation on the financial and environmental performance and 
the perceptions of key stakeholders and what benefits have been achieved from 
privatised port operations. According to the study of Bowyer and Chapman 
(2014), Sydney airport privatisation has led the airport operations to increased 
profitability, while also attracting criticism about the commercial orientation of 
the airport operations, overall business growth, and land development. Though 
the outcomes after privatisation are seen as more accountable to the public and 
its stakeholders. Transferring the ownership and management of Sydney 
airport into private hands has generated more value and efficiencies (Bowyer & 
Chapman 2014). Additionally, legitimacy theory also describes the importance 
of the employees’ views on the change of ownership of a firm and its impact on 
the society (Mares and Musil 1994).2.7 Chapter summary  
 
The determinant factors of privatisation are varied. Continuous losses made by the 
state have been seen as the main reason. Also, state-owned firms are regarded as 
slow and inefficient. Moreover, there is a belief that firms which are privately 
owned perform better than state-owned firms. This has been supported up by 
several theories and some of them are as the theory of the firm, private interest 
(choice) theory, shareholder theory, agency theory, and property rights theory. 
However, there has been no consensus to whether there is an increase in 
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performance by privatised firms or the best methodology to evaluate the 
performance of a privatised firm. This study has been based on the theory of the 
firm and then utilised stakeholder theory as the privatised business goal stated by 
PBPL, is profit maximisation through sustainability.  Therefore, a mixed-methods 
(qualitative and quantitative) approach has been used to evaluate the performance 
of PBPL.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. 0 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study has focused on the impact of privatisation on both the financial and 
environmental performance of PBPL and the evaluation has been performed in two 
stages. The first stage was a quantitative analysis and the second stage was a 
qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis was performed by a one-way 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) which used the outcomes of 12 
selected performance analysis ratios. The qualitative analysis was performed by 
interviews. The questions asked of the interviews related to identifying why there 
were significant differences in the performance of the two types of ownership. 
 
The sample population was Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited in Brisbane 
(PBPL). Therefore, the study operated as a mixed methods case study. These 
methods, techniques, and proxies have been selected according to the research 
variables (the nature of the data gathered), the nature of the research question, the 
assumptions the study has stipulated, and the gap in the literature. 
As the majority of literature describes, change of ownership (privatisation) 
improves a firm’s performance. This has been researched extensively and the 
percentage of improving performance under private ownership after privatisation 
is immense. Also, the theory of the firm explains, the private ownership operates a 
business to maximise profits and therefore, the function that describes the 
relationship between the change of ownership (privatisation-the response) and its 
impact on the performance (explanatory variables) most of the time, is positive (as 
literature describes). One thing is certain that private ownership would perform to 
increase the financial performance of a firm though, they would not operate to 
improve the environmental performance as it needs heavy investments to enhance 
environmental performance which decreases the firm’s profits. According to the 
vision and mission statement of PBPL, the firm operates its activities to maximise 
profits in a sustainable manner. Evidently, to be operated in a sustainable manner, 
PBPL should adhere to the steps revealed by stakeholder theory.  
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There is a positive function between the change of ownership and performance 
derives from the theory of the firm and the existing literature. Also from moral 
consideration that private ownership is superior to that state ownership. This study, 
therefore, attempted to verify this phenomenon in a scientific way followed by 
positivism research philosophy. Consequently, this study, therefore needed to 
distinguish the magnitude of profits maximisation procedures and sustainability 
maintenance procedures of PBPL (i.e., the extent of profit maximisation activities 
and sustainability maintenance activities of PBPL). Therefore, this study 
implemented a parametric One-way MANOVA approach as the quantitative 
method and a qualitative interview technique with an assumption of ‘no change of 
financial and environmental performance after privatisation of PBPL’. 
 
Confirming to the empirical evidence provided by literature, Mohan (2000) 
classified the entire privatisation process into three categories as;  
1. Case study- A single firm as pre and post-privatisation or a selected 
privatised firm with another firm which was already privatised nor not 
2. Cross-sectional comparison of public-private ownership performance 
3. Econometric analysis of before and after the privatisation of firms  
 
A case study focuses on the performance of a single firm, in comparing its 
performance under its pre and post-privatisation conditions. As an extension to the 
case study, a selected privatised firm’s performance can be compared to another 
firm which is either in the stated sector or in the private sector (Mohan 2000). 
Adams et al (1992) had used the case study method to evaluate single firm 
privatisation performance from eight developing countries and had found that 
improvements in efficiency in some Malaysian privatised companies. Also, Bishop 
and Kay (1989) compared the performance of selected set of UK infrastructure 
firms in the shipping, gas, oil, telecommunication and automobile industries with 
another set of firms in the rail, coal, postal and steel industries and found improved 
performance in revenue, employment, total factor productivity, profit and profit 
margins indicators in both set of firms. 
 
Using a cost-benefit analysis, Galal, et al (1994) performed a case study of 12 
privatised companies in four countries to inquire the net change in the welfare of 
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consumers, labour, competitors and enterprise profits in those twelve firms and 
concluded that there were significant changes in the welfare of the selected sectors. 
Foreman-Peck and Manning (1998) is another milestone study for a case study 
approach. A cross-sectional study compares the performance of a set of privatised 
companies to their industry peers either in the same country or across countries 
which is known as a head-to-head comparison.  
 
According to the literature, Boardman and Vining (1989) presented a landmark 
cross-sectional comparison of 500 firms (409 private-owned, 57 state-owned and 
23 both state and private owned firms) to evaluate their performance using criteria 
such as return on assets, return on equity, return on income and sales, sales per 
employee productivity, sales per asset productivity and assets per employee and 
concluded that private sector performance is superior to the government sector. One 
finding of this study is that while private ownership of the selected firms 
represented in all industries, state-ownership most frequently performed in metal, 
petroleum and transportation industries whereas, mixed-ownership performed 
worse compared to private and state ownership. It is noteworthy that the selection 
criterion of firms was biased.  
 
Picot and Kaufman (1989) also, carried out a similar cross-sectional study on 
analysing the improved performance of selected 500 firms in six different countries 
in fifteen different industries. They concluded that the rate of return and 
productivity measures in SOEs were lower to private-owned firms. Yunker (1975), 
Meyer (1975), Caves and Christensen (1980), Finsinger (1984), Grosskopf and 
Logan (1985), and Martin and Parker (1997) were the other renowned researchers 
who did benchmark cross-sectional analyses in evaluating the performance of 
privatised firms.  
 
Econometric analysis of the performance of firms under pre and post-privatisation 
conditions investigates a large sample of privatised firms in a country or across 
different countries over a long period. The study of Megginson et al (1994) is one 
of the most sophisticated examples for this category. Having compared the financial 
and operational performance of 61 firms under pre and post-privatisation 
conditions, they found the increased profitability, efficiency, employment, real 
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sales after privatisation and capital spending of the sample. The sample firms were 
selected from 18 different countries and 32 industries during the period 1961-1990 
(29 years). Also, they found that the increased profitability in regulated industries, 
for instance banking and utilities was insignificant. However, in addition to the 
problem of selection bias in SOEs, changes in the economic environment after 
privatisation which may contribute to improving a firm’s performance had not been 
controlled during the study.   
 
Later, Frydman et al (1997) researched about the improved performance of 190 
firms in transition economies Eastern Europe, using the same approach and in their 
study, they addressed the issues in Megginson et al (1994) study which mentioned 
above. The study covered the period from 1990 to 1994 (4 years) with reference to 
the proxies such as revenue, cost-revenue ratio, employment and revenue per 
employee. To avoid the selection bias, Frydman et al (1997) used non-privatised 
firms as the control group and broke the analysis into two parts. First, they 
compared the post-privatisation performance of the selected privatised firms with 
the selected SOEs. After, they compared the pre-privatisation performance of the 
selected privatised firms with the same set of selected SOEs to find any differences 
in the performance. If any differences found only in the first step, this means the 
ownership has made a difference in the performance. Their regression equation 
which was based on the growth of each performance variable against the pre-
privatisation performance value and a dummy variable which represented the 
nature of the ownership (if privatised 1, otherwise 0)  captured two effects including 
the effect of the transition economy to a market economy and the effect of 
privatisation of the selected group. Some conclusions of the study were that the 
impact of privatisation on revenue, employment and revenue per employee were 
statistically significant whereas, the impact of privatisation on cost-revenue ratio 
was statistically insignificant. The most prolific finding of the study was that the 
effects of transition economies and privatisation behaved in the opposite direction 
while the 4 selected proxies were unfavourably impacted by transition and the 
privatisation process boosted the selected variables.  
 
However, Talley (2007) divided the evaluation of port privatisation into two main 
categories as,  
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1. Single-port performance evaluation approach 
2. Multi-port performance evaluation approach 
 
The single-port performance approach evaluates a selected port’s performance over 
time comparing the port’s actual throughput to its optimum (engineering or 
economic) throughput. Optimum throughput is the maximum goods or services 
physically a port can handle under certain conditions.  Optimum throughput is also 
called as the port’s capacity which can be measured theoretically or empirically 
(Talley, 2007).  
 
According to Talley (2000), the single-port performance evaluation can be done by 
either Throughput Performance Evaluation or Indicator Performance Evaluation. If 
a selected port’s actual throughput reaches to its engineering or economic (port’s 
capacity) throughput over time, it can be concluded as its performance has 
improved. Chadwin et al (1990) have defined extensively a port’s engineering 
production optimum throughput and the methods of calculating it. Studies 
performed by De Neufville and Tsunokawa (1981), and Kim and Sachish (1986) 
are two other renounced examples of the throughput performance evaluation 
method.   
 
Indicator performance evaluation can be divided into two contrasting methods as, 
operating objective specification and criteria specification (Talley, 2007). The 
former method requires the specification of an operating objective in order to select 
the performance indicators whereas the latter specifies the criteria which selected 
performance indicators must satisfy. Variables which the port management can 
control of their values in order to optimise the operating objectives, are considered 
to be in the operating objective specification method. The values of those variables 
which optimise the operating objectives are treated as the standard or the 
benchmark. If the actual values of the variables which were treated as the standard 
values, increase over time, then the port’s performance which relevant to the given 
operating objectives, is considered as improved. (Talley, 2007). On the other hand, 
criteria specification method consists of criteria such as data availability, data 
collection time and cost, consistency with objectives, conciseness, measurability, 
robustness, and minimisation of uncontrollable factors (Talley, 1994).  
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Multi-port comparison defines a comparison of one port’s performance to that of 
other port and generally, researchers use frontier statistical models to compare 
multi-port performance. However, such a comparison can be misleading as ports 
operate in different social, economic and fiscal environments. For instance, it is not 
always the same the economic objective of maximising annual optimum throughput 
subject to a profit constraint of the ports in the comparison, and it can differ from 
port to port. One port may have a negative profit constraint which is to be subsidised 
whereas another may have a break-even or positive profit constraint.  Tongzon 
(2001) therefore, recommends using similar ports in a multi-port comparison as 
some port may have different economic objectives. Suykens (1986), Tongzon 
(1995), Tongzon (2001), Coto-Milan et al (2000), Cullinane et al (2002), 
Notteboom et al (2000) some of the benchmark multi-port performance evaluation 
studies which have utilised stochastic frontier models in the literature.  
 
When considering into above two studies of Mohan (2000) and Talley (2007), each 
approach has its own requirements such as the size and the number of the sample, 
time frame, the accessibility of data, and the cost of conducting each approach. 
Therefore, due to time, data availability and cost constraints factors, this research 
follows the single-port case study approach and this selection has already been 
justified in depth under the limitations of the study in section 1.6 in chapter 1.  Also, 
the focus of this study was divided into two sectors. The main focus of this study 
was to evaluate and compare the financial and environmental performance of PBPL 
under both private and public ownership with reference to the theory of the firm. 
The second part investigated how PBPL managed their social responsibility in 
creating overall value, with reference to stakeholder theory. 
 
Next, this study needs a methodology to use with the case study approach in 
measuring the impact of privatisation of the selected firm. Different researchers 
have used various qualitative and quantitative techniques such as interviews, 
questionaries or statistical tools in measuring the impact. According to Talley 
(2007) traditionally, ports have been evaluated by the single-port approach of 
comparing its actual and engineering optimum throughputs such as the maximum 
throughputs or cargo tonnage which a port can physically handle under a certain 
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condition. Over time, if actual throughput of a port is approached or departed from 
its optimum throughput, this means that its performance has improved or 
deteriorated respectively (Talley 2007).   
 
 
 
  
The variables of the analysis of this study are as below;  
1. One categorical independent variable (IV)- Privatisation (change of 
ownership) with two levels- before and after privatisation (State ownership 
and Private ownership) 
Literature has indicated that progressing towards and from a change of ownership 
structure involves a transitional period, both from the old structure and the new 
structure (Psarouthakis, 2013).  Therefore, the categorical independent variable has 
been intersected into four periods of three years.  Two “three-year periods” of 
transition prior to the change of ownership and two transitional periods of three 
years subsequent to the change of ownership (see table 1). The selected data pool 
consisted of 12 financial years; from 2005 to 2017. The pre-privatisation period of 
PBPL represented from 2005 to 2010 (6 financial years) whereas the post-
privatisation period represented from 2012 to 2017 (6 financial years). The 
financial year; 2011 has treated as the transitional period because in that year both 
types of ownership traded (seven months by public ownership and five months by 
private ownership). For a better analytical and conclusion process, both pre and 
postprivatisation periods are divided into 4 periods and these four periods 
performed as the interceptions in MANOVA. 
Cohen (1988, 1992), Pallant (2007), and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) stated that 
MANOVA needs more cases in each cell than the available dependent variables 
Table1.                                         Divisions of ownership periods of PBPL 
Pre-privatisation State 
Ownership 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Period 1 
 
Period 2 
Post-privatisation 
Private Ownership 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Period 3 Period 4 
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and therefore, the division of state and private ownership of PBPL into four periods 
is important as it creates more duplicate cases running MANOVA accurately.  
2. Two continuous/ numerical dependent variables (DV)- financial 
performance and environmental performance  
These two dependent variables have been operationalised using the following 
financial ratios as detailed in table 2 below. 
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Table 2          financial and environmental performance ratios 
Financial performance 
Profitability- 
          1. Return on Assets (ROA) % EBIT/total assets 
          2. Return on Equity (ROE) % EBIT/equity 
Leverage-  
          3. Debt to Assets % 
Investment Intensity-  
          4.Capital Expenditure to Total Assets (CEA) 
             Capital (i.e., net assets) to Total Assets (CEA) 
Port Operational-  
          5.Total Container Throughput-TEUs 
          6. Total Trade Throughput-Tonnes 
          7  N b  f hi  h dl d 
 
 
 
 
Environmental performance 
Employment- 
          8. Total Employment (TE) (Full Time Employees) 
Energy-  
          9.Total Energy consumption-Gigajoule 
         10. Total Emission-CO2 Tonnes 
 
The study used MANOVA firstly, to test the null hypothesis.  Secondly, and 
conditional upon the results of MANOVA rejecting the null hypothesis, the analysis 
was investigated. The rejection of the null hypothesis enabled the purpose of the 
study to identify the differences in the financial and environmental performance 
before and after the privatisation of PBPL.  For this, initially, the study explored 
the statistically significant differences in the financial and environmental 
performance before and after the change of ownership of PBPL through a one-way 
MANOVA analysis. However, this study did not explore the relationship between 
the selected variables. Secondly, where MANOVA found any significant mean 
differences of performance in samples, then the purpose of interview sessions was 
to ascertain reasons for such differences in order to draw conclusions about the 
impact of privatisation on the financial and environmental performance of PBPL.  
 
 
 
41 
 
 
3.1 One-way MANOVA test 
 
MANOVA is an extension of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for use when there 
is more than one dependent variable (DV) which are related in some way (Pallant 
2007). As a theoretical construct, this was developed by Samual S. Wilks in 1932. 
Accordingly, MANOVA identifies;  
• Any significant effect of different levels of independent variables (IVs) on 
a linear combination of each of the dependent variables (DVs) 
• Any interactions between the independent variables and a linear 
combination of the dependent variables (DV) 
• Any significant univariate effects for each of the dependent variables 
separately 
The purpose of having a one-way MANOVA in this study was to test if the 
performance of PBPL during State ownership significantly differed from the 
performance of private ownership after privatisation in financial and environmental 
characteristics (table 2). In this study, change of ownership (two groups-State vs 
Private or pre vs post-privatisation) was the independent variable whereas, 
financial and environmental performance were the two dependent variables. The 
null hypothesis was that both DVs together were not affected by the change of 
ownership of PBPL which was tested by MANOVA. As shown in table 2, the two 
DVs were represented by twelve financial and environmental indicators. One 
reason of having twelve indicators to represent two DVs was that the study was 
aware that MANOVA is a highly sensitive analytical tool and if one or a few of the 
indicators violated the assumptions1 of MANOVA, still the study might be able to 
reach for a conclusion with the help of the behaviour of the rest of the indicators of 
DVs. However, this study occasionally had removed and trimmed out some data 
from the sample to maintain the MANOVA assumptions.   Pallant (2007) asserted 
                                               
1 As a case study (single firm analysis) the study acknowledged any possibility of a violation of 
MANOVA assumptions. 
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that MANOVA performs well in situations where there are moderate correlations 
among the dependent variables.  
Creating new summary dependent variables (DVs), MANOVA simultaneously 
compares the groups and then states the mean differences (equality of means) 
between the groups on the combination of each of original dependent variables and 
the P values in MANOVA test tables for each term to the relevant significance level 
(alpha-α). The standard significance which is 0.05 indicates a 5% risk of concluding 
which an association exists when there is no actual association.  
If the Multivariate Tests analysis of MANOVA (Pillai’s Trace value) calculates a 
P value which is less than or equal to the threshold significance level (α-0.05), this 
concludes that that differences between the means are statistically significant. 
Therefore, the outcome is as; 
If,  P-value ≤ α: Mean differences are statistically significant, -Reject the null 
hypothesis 
If the P-value is greater than the threshold significance level (α-0.05), mean 
differences are statistically insignificant. Then the study does not reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, the outcome is as; 
If,  P-value > α: Mean differences are statistically insignificant, -Fail to reject 
the null hypothesis 
There are many quantitative techniques that can be used to test for the significant 
differences among levels/ groups and also, to test the relationship of variables 
(Pallant 2007). It is possible to conduct a series of ANOVAs separately for each 
dependent variable, however, it would then run the risk of an ‘inflated Type 1 error’ 
with more significant results through a number of ANOVAs, even if there are no 
differences between selected groups in reality. The advantage of using MANOVA 
is that it controls and adjusts for this increased risk of Type 1 error (Pallant 2007). 
Therefore, this study used MANOVA, because the nature of this research problem, 
research variables, and the nature of data, satisfied MANOVA requirements.  
In order to use MANOVA, the following assumptions must be satisfied. Also, 
different sources have different number of assumptions and this study, therefore 
 
 
43 
 
used the most common assumptions. (Landau & Everitt 2004, Minitab 2017, 
Pallant 2007, Tabachinick & Fidell 2007). 
Assumption: 1- Adequate number of dependent variables- Selected Dependent 
Variables (DVs) should consist of two or more than two variables and they should 
be continuous and measured at the ratio or interval level. Typically, there were two 
DVs; financial performance and environmental performance.  
Assumption: 2- Adequate number of categorical and grouped independent 
variables- Selected Independent Variable (IV) should be categorical and it should 
consist of two or more than two groups. Here, the IV is ‘ownership’ which was 
divided into two groups as ‘State ownership and Private ownership’ (pre-
privatisation and post-privatisation/ before privatisation and after privatisation).  
Assumption: 3- Independence of observations- The observations should be 
statistically independent, randomly sampled from the population, and there should 
not be any relationship between the observations in the IV and each group or 
between groups themselves. According to Pallant (2007), this cannot be tested as it 
is about the study design. This study analysed a single firm’s performance though, 
it had two different periods of observations as pre and post-privatisation periods 
(State and Private ownership).  
Assumption: 4- Adequate sample size- The sample size should be adequate for a 
one-way MANOVA and typically, there is no standard minimum or maximum 
sample size for the MANOVA test. Pallant (2007, p. 277), stated MANOVA needs 
more cases in each cell than the number of dependent variables the tests involves. 
Researchers such as Cohen (1988, 1992), and Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) 
suggested a better sample size between 15 to 20 though there is no consensus about 
the size of the sample for MANOVA. This study contained 12 observations which 
represented two dependent variables of a single firm. Therefore, 12 observations 
were adequate to run MANOVA tests.  
Assumption: 5- Multivariate Normality- The sample should have multivariate 
normality. Dependent variables have multivariate normality distribution (bell-
shaped) within each group of the categorical independent variables. This can be 
tested by Shapiro-Wilks test of normality. 
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Assumption: 6- Absence of univariate and multivariate outliers- The sample should 
not have any (univariate) outliers in each group of the IV for any of the DVs and 
multivariate outliers such as an unusual combination of scores on the DVs. 
MANOVA is sensitive to outliers which may produce Type I or Type II errors 
without giving an indication as to which is occurring. Univariate outliers are 
detected by boxplots whereas, multivariate outliers can be detected by Mahalanobis 
Distance. 
Assumption: 7- Absence of multicollinearity- The selected DVs should be 
moderately correlated with each other. Both low and high correlations (greater than 
0.9) create multicollinearity issue. This was tested by Pearson Correlations Test and 
Q-Q Plots. 
Assumption: 8- Linearity-Dependent variables (DVs) should be measured at the 
interval level and all DVs should have a linear relationship. Unless the variables 
are not linearly related, then it reduces the power of the test. This can be tested by 
Scatterplot matrices for each group of the IV. 
Assumption: 9 - Homogeneity of error variances- As an extension, univariate 
ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variance of each group is equal (variances of 
each group are similar). This is tested by Levene’s test of MANOVA.  
3.2 Multivariate test statistics 
 
Multivariate test statistics assess for statistically significant differences among the 
levels of the independent variables for a linear combination of dependent variables. 
The overall f test, named in honour of the statistician Sir Ronald Fisher, calculates 
the f value (statistic) ratio of two variances with the equality of means. Variance is 
a measure of how far the specific data are scattered from the mean (dispersion). 
The larger the values the greater the dispersion (Tabachinick & Fidell 2007). 
Statistically, the variance is the square of the standard deviation (σ); a measure 
which is used to quantify the degree of variation or dispersion of a selected data set 
(Pallant 2007). Instead of a univariate f value, MANOVA obtains multivariate f 
value based on a comparison of the error variance matrix and the effect variance 
matrix. Wilk’s λ (Lambda) is the most popular though Pillai’s Trace is the best 
when the robustness (possible assumptions violated) is in question (Tabachinick & 
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Fidell 2007). Hotelling’s Trace and Roy’s Largest Root are the other two tests that 
the overall f test assesses for a statistical significance in the sample.   
If there were significant differences among the ownership groups (state and private 
ownership/ pre and post-privatisation periods which were divided into four periods) 
on a linear combination of the two dependent variables (financial and 
environmental), then the f value of Pillai’s Trace test (or f value of Wilk’s λ) in the 
multivariate test of MANOVA is significant.  As mentioned above, to test any 
violation of the assumptions of homogeneity of variance, the study used the Pillai’s 
Trace test as it is very robust and not highly linked to the assumptions about the 
normality of the distribution of the data.  
Provided that the multivariate test statistics of overall f value for MANOVA is 
significant, then the analysis needs to examine the Test of Between-Subject Effects 
for each of the dependent variables. This test performs as a two-way ANOVA to 
check the interactions of the variables. Simply, the test reveals the effect of 
statistical significance on the dependent variables created by the interactions of the 
independent variables. If the ‘Sig’ column of the tests indicates any statistically 
significant interactions less than P < .05, then it needs to be interpreted and 
reported. 
MANOVA analysis consists of Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances. When 
analysing the differences between groups, those subsets of samplings or multiple 
groups of data should be compatible or roughly equal. If such multiple data sets are 
not compatible then they have sampling bias such as different times, early or late 
responds, different reasons, multiple waves or groups. Therefore, the homogeneity 
of variances should be tested prior to the analysis and the test default outcome needs 
to be non-significant. Non-significant outcome depicts the variances of the sample 
data sets are not different, and they are compatible (equally distributed). If the data 
sets are different (variances are unequal) this can affect the Type 1 error rate 
(Pallant 2007).  Levene’s test provides an F statistic and a P significant value. P 
significant value is considered to be the prime and if the P value is greater than 0.05 
(P > .05) then the group variances of the data sets can be treated as equal. Contrary, 
if the P value is less than 0.05, then it is considered as a violation of the assumption 
of homogeneity of variances. 
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This study used Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances to test the assumption 
of MANOVA that the variances of each dependent variables were equal across the 
two groups. Provided that the outcome of the test is significant, then the assumption 
is violated. Under such circumstances, theoretically, then data should be viewed 
with cautions and transformed them as to equalise the variances. However, the 
available alternatives have been discussed situationally.   
The last test of MANOVA is Multiple Comparison Tests (a post-hoc) and this study 
used the Tukey Honestly Significant Difference Test as this study involved a simple 
linear model. Tukey HSD t-test estimates the population parameters, i.e population 
mean when the population standard deviation is unknown. 
3.3 Performance indicators 
 
This study involved 12 selected port performance indicators/ratios (see table 3 
below) which are widely used and accepted by the previous researchers and even 
recommended by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). The data items or the variables of this research and the outcome of all 
proxies were financial values, numbers, or units. Therefore, they were numerical 
variables. Also, some of them were continuous variables (profit, income, revenues), 
and others were discrete variable (number of containers, ships, and employees). 
Numeric variables are quantitative variables and therefore, this research used one-
way MANOVA tables to analyse the first part of the study.   
As shown in Table 3 below, this study had 7 financial ratios and 3 environmental 
ratios of PBPL. The ratios were selected on the basis of the availability of data of 
PBPL. This study used one or multiple ratios per variable. Profitability, leverage, 
and capital investment variables were measured in percentages. Also, energy and 
carbon footprints (total Carbon Dioxide emissions) were measured in percentages. 
Port operations and employment variables were respectively measured in Twenty-
Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), Mass tonnes and in the number of ships. It is 
important to mention that this study had two dependent variables (financial and 
environmental performance) and those two DVs are represented by 12 indicators. 
Unless not  altogether, when one or a few indicators violate any assumptions of 
MANOVA tests, this study still counted the behaviour of the majority of the 
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indicators to reach for a conclusion. To justify this, this study accepted the 
possibility of any violation of MANOVA assumptions as the assumptions and the 
test itself have been introduced to fit in general conditions where there is more than 
one participant.   
Further, this study calculated Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) 
ratios for Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) and Earnings Before Tax (EBT). 
This was necessary to remove if there were any pre-privatisation operational 
expenses that did not exist in the post-privatisation operational expenses to 
demonstrate a consistent application of the ratios in both pre and post-privatisation 
periods. For example, the pre-privatisation operations had been funded by external 
loans whereas, the post-privatisation operations had been funded by equity.  
Therefore, the use of EBIT as the numerator for one of the ROA and ROE ratios 
removed the impact of the source of funding from the pre- and post-privatisation 
operational performance. The higher the EBIT numerator the ratio the better the 
performance and this difference in the ratio would be associated with income 
growth and efficient operations.  The other two ratios without removing interest 
will highlight the impact of different funding sources (funding efficiencies), while 
the EBIT numerator-based ratios provide some insight into the efficiency of 
operations. 
Debt to Assets (DA) ratio shows the proportion of the firm’s assets financed 
through debts. A proportion of DA less than 0.5 would indicate the firm internally 
funds its assets (e.g. financed through equity) whereas a proportion of DA greater 
than 0.5 indicates the firm has assets financed through external debt. When a firm 
is highly leveraged it means that the firm has more debt than equity. Such a firm 
carries a great level of risk and it may increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. Also, 
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a highly leveraged firm may have to pay considerably high interest expenses on its 
debts because it has a higher debt and probably the lender charged a higher interest 
rate commensurate with the level of business risk. 
Investment intensity is a fund used by a firm to maintain, upgrade, and acquire 
assets such as property, plant or equipment, new projects or investments in order to 
maintain or increase the scope of its operations. Firms such as ports require large 
amounts of investments to produce goods or services. Therefore, a port may have 
a high percentage of fixed assets classified as Property, Plants & Equipment 
(PP&E). Firms in the capital-intensive sectors are often marked by high levels of 
depreciation. As investment intensity is a long-term investment indicator and it will 
not bring immediate retunes. Generally, the lower the ratio the better. However, 
lack of investment intensity could undermine a firm’s ability to operate properly, 
resulting in negative effects. While a larger ratio should indicate a higher level of 
investment intensity, there may be changes within the firm’s asset values that relate 
Table 3.   Operationalising financial and environmental performance using ratios  
Performance Variables Proxies (ratios) Null hypothesis* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
 
 
 
 
 
Profitability 
 
Return on Assets (ROA1) = Earnings 
Before Interests & Tax/Total Assets 
 
Return on Assets (ROA2) = Earnings 
Before Tax/Total Assets 
 
Return on Equity (ROE1) = Earnings 
Before Interests & Tax / Total Equity 
 
Return on Equity (ROE2) = Earnings 
Before Tax / Total Equity 
ROA1A = ROA1B 
 
 
ROA2A = ROA2B 
 
 
ROE1A = ROE1B 
 
 
ROE2A = ROE2B 
Leverage 
 
 
Debt to Assets = Total Debt/ Total 
Assets  
DTAA = DTAB 
Investment 
Intensity 
 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets 
(CEA)= Capital Expenditure/Total 
Assets 
 
CEAA = CEAB 
 
Port 
Operations 
 
Total Container Throughput-TEUs 
 
Total Trade Throughput-Mass 
Tonnes 
Number of ships handled 
TEUsA = TEUsB 
 
TonnesA = TonnesB 
 
NOSA = NOSB 
 
Environmental 
Employment 
 
(TE)=Total number of Employees 
 
TEA = TEB 
Energy 
 
Total Energy consumption--
Gigajoule 
TECA = TECB 
Carbon 
Footprints 
Total CO2 emission- Tonnes TECO2A = TECO2B 
Source- varied,   *A is pre-privatisation & B is post-privatisation 
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to revaluation (which are paper increases) or devaluation (a paper decrease) and not 
physical investment increase or decrease through, respectively, the purchase or sale 
of fixed assets.  In situations where the total assets (denominator) has increased 
disproportionally to the increase in capital expenditure (numerator), the ratio may 
decrease but the cause of the decrease is not the investment intensity but an 
accounting revaluation adjustment.  The impact of such a revaluation (paper value) 
may be identified by a 5-year horizontal trend analysis and the horizontal indices 
used to adjust the disproportional change in the numerator and the denominator. 
Therefore, this ratio varies from industry to industry. 
Total Container Throughput defines as the number of containers handled by the 
port throughout a financial year and it is measured by Twenty-foot Equivalent Units 
(TEUs). The higher the unit number the better the port operations. Total Tread 
Throughput defines the total exports and imports of goods in tonnes by the port 
over a financial year. The higher the number the better the operations of the port. 
The number of ships handled shows the number of ships facilitated by the port over 
a financial year. The higher the number of ships served the better the operations of 
the port. 
Total employees of the PBPL was the number of full-time equivalent employees of 
the firm. From a firm’s perspective, the lower the number the better the productivity 
and efficiency. However, from the employees’, social or welfare perspective, 
lowering the number of total employments would indicate a negative impression.  
Total energy consumption (TEC) indicates the number of gigajoules of energy 
sources the port has used over a financial year. Such sources can be diesel, petrol, 
oil, wind or gas. One major issue revolves around the fact that any increase or 
decrease in the level of consumption in the energy consumption measure may be 
attributed to a number of factors.  For example, the increase (or decrease) level of 
operations (e.g., total container throughput, number of ships handled or the number 
of full-time equivalent employees). That is, the level of energy consumption may 
increase (decrease) due to increase (decrease) of any of these three example factors. 
To control for these potential spurious effects, additional ratio measures controlling 
for these two example factors were calculated and analysed using a MANOVA. 
(see Appendix 4, pp. 194-196).  
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Total Emissions of CO2 indicates the tonnes of Carbon Dioxides the firm emitted 
into the air over a financial year. Similarly, to energy consumption, one major issue 
revolves around the fact that any increase or decrease may be attributed to any of 
these three previously identified example factors.  To control for these potential 
spurious effects for CO2 emissions, additional ratio measures controlling for these 
three factors were calculated and analysed using a MANOVA. Lower TE, TEC and 
TE CO2 values, controlling for total container throughput, number of ships handled 
or the number of full-time equivalent employees, indicate better environmental 
performance by the firm. 
The first stage of the analysis addressed the questions “is there any difference in 
the financial and environmental performance between pre and post- privatisation 
periods and if so, what are the differences and why have they occurred?” The study 
gathered PBPL’s data from relevant sources before and after the privatisation to 
process related to the selected ratios. Table 3 above showed the predicted outcomes 
(relationships) of the ratio analysis. MANOVA analyses of these outcomes were 
conducted to distinguish any differences in the financial and environmental 
performance between pre- and post-privatisation. If any mean differences were 
found at this stage, (any significance in Pillai’s Trace test, p< 0.05)) then the null 
hypothesis of ‘no mean difference in the financial and environmental performance 
of Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited under either private or State ownership’ 
would be rejected. The second stage was consisted of interviews to uncover what 
these changes were and how they have affected the company’s financial and 
environmental performance.   
If there were not any significant differences found during the quantitative analysis, 
(any insignificance in Pillai’s Trace test, p>0.05) then the null hypothesis would 
not be rejected (if fail to reject the null hypothesis) and still the qualitative analyses 
would be used to frame the open-ended questions to interviewees, “then tell us 
about any changes in the financial and environmental performance measures before 
and after the privatisation of PBPL”. 
 
 
3.4 Documents and records analysis 
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The study gathered continuous/numerical secondary data from documents and 
records of PBPL and forms into two sets as pre-privatisation data (from 2005 to 
2010) and post-privatisation data (from 2012 to 2017). These data sources primarily 
consisted of publicly available company annual reports and other financial and 
environmental reports published by the ‘Ports Australia’. Additionally, BITRE 
publications and Waterline reports published by the Department of Infrastructure 
and Regional Development (DIRD), and some environmental research reports 
prepared by various organisations were analysed. Different financial reports and 
documents from various sources which contain similar information (usually, the 
previous year’s financial details were available in the following year’s financial 
report), were used as a data cross-reference and were expected to enhance the 
quality, rigour and the credibility of data rather than depending on a single source. 
To compile the documents relevant to the evaluation question, it was important to 
understand how and why the documents were produced. This added to the validity 
and reliability of the documents.  
Gathered data were summarised into two sets as pre-privatisation and post-
privatisation and then processed through selected ratios such as profitability, 
leverage, capital investment, port operations, employment, energy consumption, 
and annual carbon footprints. Finally, the outcomes of the ratios were used as 
the inputs of MANOVA analysis to distinguish if there is any significant 
difference in the financial and environmental performance between pre and 
post-privatisation periods of PBPL. 3.5 Interviews 
 
In accordance with the research design, method, the problems, variables, and 
assumptions, this research collected primary data from semi-structured face to face 
interviews that included open-ended questions, which were introduced into the 
interview where it was considered necessary to gather more descriptive answers. 
The purpose of the interviews was to evaluate “the difference” (differences) 
between the financial and environmental performance before and after the 
privatisation of PBPL. This was to address the questions; what is the difference 
(differences)? What is the impact of such difference (differences)? Why did the 
difference (differences) occur? Or how did the difference (differences) happen? If 
there no differences were found out at the first stage, then the interview rounds 
would have addressed the reasons for the absence of any difference. The interview 
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questions consisted of “tell us about any differences in practices before and after 
the privatisation of PBPL”. This was adequate as theoretically the change of 
ownership (privatisation) expected a difference. If the quantitative analysis showed 
a state of a difference of the financial and environmental performance of PBPL, 
then it would be an indication of the progress and achievements of the privatisation 
process.  
The interviews were semi-structured, and 4 interviews were conducted with 
randomly selected employees who have been working in different departments of 
PBPL. Due to the time and cost constraints and the availability of the staff of PBPL, 
the number of interviews concluded into four interviewees. These four interviews 
provided a representative group which enabled the researcher to gather a good 
understanding of the company operations. The participants were from four different 
departments which provided an excellent overview of the company’s activities 
these were; community relations, financial trade, infrastructure and environment, 
and port operations and pollution (oil and marine). Research questions started from 
easy to answer questions, designed to develop repour and to set the background and 
context, through to more difficult and controversial questions with probes and 
prompts (Creswell 2014). Questions on the interview guide were expanded upon 
with follow-up questions to gain more in-depth understanding. The length of an 
interview was a maximum of 45 minutes. Information obtained here will be treated 
strictly confidentially and the interviewees’ names will not be used in any 
publications or reports. Interview lines of enquiry and the details of the 
interviewees are provided in Appendix 1. 
The interviewer and PBPL employees engaged in formal discussions based on an 
‘interview guide’ which consisted of a list of questions and topics to be covered 
during the discussion. This guide was prepared to elicit information related to the 
firm’s financial and environmental changes, trends and impacts, energy 
consumption, water consumption, annual carbon footprint activities, and other 
environmental policies and procedures. However, the interviewer was able to 
follow trajectories brought up during the discussions which may have been out of 
the guidelines where the researchers felt it is appropriated. The open-ended 
questions prompted participants to talk openly about the research problem without 
predetermined answers. All the questions were focused on evaluating the changes 
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in the financial and environmental management before and after the privatisation 
of PBPL.  
The participants were sent the consent and information sheet prior to the interviews 
and they were acknowledged about the nature, topic, purpose, and the risks of the 
research. Development of dialogue and rapport is essential in semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews (Crabtree & Cohen 2006). The investigator did not capture 
notes of respondents’ answers during the interviews because it was likely to result 
in poor conducting of the interview and detract from developing a rapport between 
the interviewer and the interviewee.  
3.6 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has explained the methodology for the research. The research has been 
based on both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The independent 
variable forming the basis for this study was the change of ownership or the 
privatisation, whereas the dependent variables were the financial and 
environmental performance of PBPL. The financial performance represented 7 
indicators namely, ROA, ROE, leverage, investment intensity, the total TEUs 
loaded and unloaded, the total throughput tonnes and the number of ships served 
by the port. The total number of employees, the total energy consumption and the 
total Carbon footprints were used as the environmental performance indicators for 
this study. Here, the ROA and ROE ratios were calculated with and without EBIT 
to identify pre- and privatisation funding expenses. Also, EBTI was used in order 
to remove any pre-privatisation operational expenses that did not exist in the post-
privatisation operational expenses. This use of EBIT was used to demonstrate a 
consistent application of the ratios in both the pre and post-privatisation periods. 
Any conclusion was driven by the behaviour of the majority of indicators which 
satisfy the assumptions of MANOVA and if some of the indicators did not meet 
the requirements of MANOVA then such variances were reported while running 
the tests with trimming or removing of data.  
First, the quantitative analysis was performed by a One-way MANOVA. If the 
MANOVA outcome was significant, then the study would show that there was a 
difference in the financial and environmental performance between pre and post-
privatisation. Then the qualitative analysis via the interviews would investigate 
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the reasons for the differences the study found in the quantitative analysis. If there 
was no difference, then still the qualitative interviews would find reasons for the 
absence of no difference in the financial and environmental performance of 
PBPL. The qualitative analysis was supported by relevant documents and records 
issues by various institutes.   
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
 
4.1. Quantitative MANOVA assumptions testing 
 
This study used the Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) to compare the 
mean differences in multivariate data. Financial and environmental performance of 
pre and post-privatisation periods (the difference of financial and environmental 
performance under state and private ownership or the difference of performance 
after the change of ownership) were the four multivariate periods in this study.  
The first two periods relate to the under state-ownership and reflect two three-year 
periods; one three-year period for under state ownership and one three-year under 
state ownership however in the transition to private ownership. The second two 
periods relate to the under private ownership and reflect two three-year periods; 
one three-year under private ownership however in the transition from state 
ownership and a one three-year period for under private ownership. Literature 
recognises that a change of ownership involves a transition period that can range 
between six and eighteen months depending on the size and complexity of the 
company (e.g. Psarouthakis, 2013) 3-years pre- and post-ownership transitional 
period was selected due to the size and operational complexity of the of the Port of 
Brisbane operations. 
Before the use of MANOVA, this study examined the fitness of running the test 
with the selected data. To test the feasibility, the study performed the SPSS tests 
for five most important MANOVA assumptions; normality of distribution, 
multicollinearity, multivariate outliers, and homogeneity of variances between 
groups.  Meeting the first four assumptions which had been discussed in chapter 
three above is not crucial in running MANOVA as this study was an analysis of a 
single-firm performance with four three-year periods. (Pallant 2007, Landau & 
Everitt 2004).  
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Assumption: 5- Data should be normally distributed (multivariate normality) 
This assumption emphasises that the dependent variables (DVs) of the data set are 
normally distributed and they have multivariate normality within groups.  
According to Pallant (2007), the acceptable and most common significance value 
to pass the normality test is P =0.05. For instance, if the probability is significant 
(P <0.05) then the data set does not pass the normality test. Therefore, it should be 
insignificant in order to maintain the assumption ‘normal distribution of data’ 
(P>0.05). However, Pallant (2007) distinguishes that this cut-off is totally arbitrary. 
There are two tests on SPSS to check the normality; Shapiro Wilks and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov. This study selected the Shapiro Wilk because, it is a 
parametric test, which specified for testing normality. Also, it is more powerful 
than non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov. On the contrary, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov is comparatively more general and less powerful than Shapiro-Wilk 
(Razali & Wah 2010, Landau & Everitt 2004). 
The null hypothesis of Shapiro-Wilk is that the sample is drawn from a normal 
distribution (H0=Sample is normally distributed) whereas, the alternative 
hypothesis is that the sample is not drawn from a normal distribution (H1=Sample 
is not normally distributed). If the P< α=0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected at a 
5% level of significance and also concluded as the random sample is not drawn 
from a normal distribution. For a normal sample, if the P> α=0.05, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected (fail to reject) for the normality at a 5% level of 
significance because there is not enough evidence to conclude as the data set is non-
normal (it means the data set is normally distributed). Table 4 below, indicated the 
SPSS results of the selected data for the significance levels of a normal distribution 
in Shapiro-Wilk test.  
As shown in table 4 below, the sample data set was not violating the assumption of 
normality as the P values of Shapiro-Wilk above were always as P>0.05. Therefore, 
the study did not reject the null hypothesis as there was not enough evidence to 
conclude that the data was non-normal. Therefore, it was concluded as the data set 
was normally distributed, and the null hypothesis of normality was satisfied.  
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    Test of Normality 
Table 4 
Ownership 
Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. 
FinROA1 Gov-05/06/07 .993 3 .843 
Gov-08/09/10 .952 3 .578 
Pty-12/13/14 .990 3 .804 
Pty-15/16/17 1.000 3 .959 
FinROA2 Gov-05/06/07 .889 3 .350 
Gov-08/09/10 .974 3 .689 
Pty-12/13/14 .990 3 .804 
Pty-15/16/17 1.000 3 .959 
FinROE1 Gov-05/06/07 .953 3 .583 
Gov-08/09/10 .963 3 .629 
Pty-12/13/14 .997 3 .899 
Pty-15/16/17 .780 3 .067 
FinROE2 Gov-05/06/07 .806 3 .129 
Gov-08/09/10 .978 3 .716 
Pty-12/13/14 .998 3 .905 
Pty-15/16/17 .777 3 .061 
FinDTA Gov-05/06/07 .964 3 .637 
Gov-08/09/10 .923 3 .463 
Pty-12/13/14 1.000 3 1.000 
Pty-15/16/17 .923 3 .463 
FinCEA Gov-05/06/07 .964 3 .637 
Gov-08/09/10 .923 3 .463 
Pty-12/13/14 1.000 3 1.000 
Pty-15/16/17 .964 3 .637 
FinTEUs Gov-05/06/07 .895 3 .368 
Gov-08/09/10 1.000 3 .995 
Pty-12/13/14 .981 3 .737 
Pty-15/16/17 .958 3 .605 
FinTonnes Gov-05/06/07 .838 3 .208 
Gov-08/09/10 .844 3 .226 
Pty-12/13/14 .791 3 .094 
Pty-15/16/17 .992 3 .833 
FinNoS Gov-05/06/07 .925 3 .471 
Gov-08/09/10 .789 3 .087 
Pty-12/13/14 .986 3 .773 
Pty-15/16/17 .858 3 .261 
EnvoTE Gov-05/06/07 .932 3 .497 
Gov-08/09/10 .999 3 .948 
Pty-12/13/14 1.000 3 .962 
Pty-15/16/17 .871 3 .298 
EnvoTEC Gov-05/06/07 .955 3 .590 
Gov-08/09/10 .984 3 .760 
Pty-12/13/14 .866 3 .285 
Pty-15/16/17 .995 3 .865 
EnvoTECO2 Gov-05/06/07 .781 3 .069 
Gov-08/09/10 .992 3 .829 
Pty-12/13/14 .997 3 .902 
Pty-15/16/17 .978 3 .714 
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Assumption 6- Absence of multivariate outliers 
This study used two methods to test the multivariate outliers of the sample data set. 
The first method was the Mahalanobis Distance (provided in table 2) and the second 
method was the Boxplot. 
Table 5  Residuals Statisticsa -Mahalanobis Distance 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .97 4.04 2.50 1.168 12 
Std. Predicted Value -1.309 1.320 .000 1.000 12 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.063 .075 .072 .004 12 
Adjusted Predicted Value .11 6.05 2.57 1.819 12 
Residual -.042 .030 .000 .023 12 
Std. Residual -.551 .395 .000 .302 12 
Stud. Residual -1.000 1.000 .000 1.044 12 
Deleted Residual -2.054 1.889 -.074 1.014 12 
Stud. Deleted Residual . . . . 0 
Mahal. Distance 6.749 10.068 9.167 1.115 12 
Cook's Distance .209 67.145 15.030 22.913 12 
Centered Leverage Value .614 .915 .833 .101 12 
a. Dependent Variable: Ownership 
 
The standard Mahalanobis Distance Critical value for two dependent variables is 
13.82. This value is based on the Chi-Square Distribution, assessed using P< .001. 
The critical Chi-Square value for two degrees of freedom at a critical α: .001 is 
13.82. The outcome of the study above showed the maximum Mahalanobis 
Distance value as 10.086. Therefore, the outcome of the Mahalanobis Distance of 
this study was as 10.068 < 13.82 and there were no outliers suggested by this 
statistic.  
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Figure 1: Box plot 1.
 
In addition to the Mahalanobis Distance for the absence of multivariate outliers, the 
Boxplot-1 above represents the test of multivariate outliers on SPSS. If there is any 
outlier exists, then there is a circle/ asterisk mark and a number on top of the 
Boxplot tails. As seen on the above Box plot, there is no evidence that the data set 
has outliers. As tested by both Mahalanobis Distance and Boxplot test, on the 
absence of multivariate outliers, the study is allowed to use MANOVA. 
 
Assumption 7- Absence of Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity refers to a situation where one independent variable in a multiple 
regression model is highly linearly related to another independent variable than 
with the dependent variable (Gravetter & Wallnau 2014).  However, this would not 
affect the regression equation when a dependent variable needs to be predicted from 
a set of independent variables. In order to examine the absence of multicollinearity 
of the selected data set of PBPL, this study checks the correlation (r) of the 
dependent variables through the SPSS. The absence of multicollinearity was tested 
by Pearson Correlation test and outcome is as below in Table 6-B. 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient is a measure to show the strength of a linear 
association between two or more variables which is denoted by r. This test draws a 
line through the data of variables (two or more) which fit them the best and the test 
r indicates how far away the data are to the line of best fit. (how well the data points 
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of variables fit this line). This test can take a range of values from + 1 to -1 (Pallant 
2007, Ratner 2009). Values of 0 (zero) indicate as no association between the 
variables (no linear relationship). Values greater than 0 indicate positive 
associations where the value of one variable increases, the value of the other 
variable also increases. Values less than 0 indicate positive associations where the 
value of one variable decreases, the value of the other variable also decreases.  
 
Theoretically, the correlation coefficient receipts any value in the interval between 
+1 and −1, which includes the end values +1 or -1 (Ratner 2009, p.139). According 
to the guidelines for interpreting the correlation coefficient presented by Ratner 
(2009) and even Field (2009), +1.00 indicates a perfect positive linear relationship 
where the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable also 
increases across an exact linear rule. In contrast, a -1.00 indicates a perfect negative 
linear relationship where the value of one variable increases, the value of the other 
variable decreases through an exact linear line. A value between (±) 0.00 and 0.3 
indicates a weak positive/ negative linear relationship across an unsteady linear 
rule. Also, a value between (±) 0.3 and 0.7 indicates a moderate positive/ negative 
linear relationship through an ambiguous-firm linear rule. 
 
 Table 6-A                 Pearson Correlation -Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
FinROA1 13.4067 10.90135 12 
FinROA2 12.7942 11.49854 12 
FinROE1 19.2750 13.69618 12 
FinROE2 18.0917 14.86832 12 
FinDTA .3908 .09462 12 
FinCEA .0417 .03927 12 
FinTEUs 980607.25 145653.684 12 
FinTonnes 32087338.92 3872484.107 12 
FinNoS 981.42 60.626 12 
EnvoTE 248.33 53.140 12 
EnvoTEC 211357.58 51315.938 12 
EnvoTECO2 15544.58 2968.219 12 
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Table 6-B                                                                                                      Pearson Correlations (r) 
 FinROA1 FinROA2 FinROE1 FinROE2 FinDTA FinCEA FinTEUs FinTonnes FinNoS EnvoTE EnvoTEC EnvoTECO2 
FinROA
1 
Pearson Correlation 1 .999** .986** .985** -.957** -.605* .820** .785** .127 -.926** -.791** -.803** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .037 .001 .003 .694 .000 .002 .002 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinROA
2 
Pearson Correlation .999** 1 .986** .987** -.960** -.608* .836** .795** .107 -.922** -.805** -.800** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .036 .001 .002 .740 .000 .002 .002 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinROE
1 
Pearson Correlation .986** .986** 1 .999** -.969** -.607* .829** .757** .172 -.952** -.793** -.810** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 .036 .001 .004 .593 .000 .002 .001 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinROE
2 
Pearson Correlation .985** .987** .999** 1 -.972** -.610* .851** .774** .139 -.942** -.812** -.804** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 .035 .000 .003 .667 .000 .001 .002 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinDTA Pearson Correlation -.957** -.960** -.969** -.972** 1 .552 -.876** -.710** -.112 .955** .822** .826** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  .063 .000 .010 .728 .000 .001 .001 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinCEA Pearson Correlation -.605* -.608* -.607* -.610* .552 1 -.577* -.634* .147 .529 .734** .756** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .036 .036 .035 .063  .049 .027 .647 .077 .007 .004 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinTEUs Pearson Correlation .820** .836** .829** .851** -.876** -.577* 1 .737** -.089 -.751** -.896** -.718** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .001 .000 .000 .049  .006 .782 .005 .000 .008 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinTonn
es 
Pearson Correlation .785** .795** .757** .774** -.710** -.634* .737** 1 -.331 -.571 -.826** -.635* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .002 .004 .003 .010 .027 .006  .294 .052 .001 .027 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
FinNoS Pearson Correlation .127 .107 .172 .139 -.112 .147 -.089 -.331 1 -.371 .328 -.059 
Sig. (2-tailed) .694 .740 .593 .667 .728 .647 .782 .294  .235 .298 .855 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EnvoTE Pearson Correlation -.926** -.922** -.952** -.942** .955** .529 -.751** -.571 -.371 1 .685* .831** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .077 .005 .052 .235  .014 .001 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EnvoTE
C 
Pearson Correlation -.791** -.805** -.793** -.812** .822** .734** -.896** -.826** .328 .685* 1 .839** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .002 .002 .001 .001 .007 .000 .001 .298 .014  .001 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EnvoTE
CO2 
Pearson Correlation -.803** -.800** -.810** -.804** .826** .756** -.718** -.635* -.059 .831** .839** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .002 .001 .002 .001 .004 .008 .027 .855 .001 .001  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Moreover, a value between (±) 0.7 and 1.0 indicates a strong positive/ negative 
linear relationship across a firm linear rule. Accordingly, the Pearson Correlation 
results above showed a correlation (r) between the dependent variables in this study 
as the values ranged from +1.0 to -0.957 (between +1.00 and -1.00). Therefore, the 
sample data set was perfectly correlated with positive and negative linear 
relationships.   
In addition to checking the absence of multicollinearity by Pearson Correlation test, 
this study used the Q-Q plots to check the positive correlation between variables 
between the dependent variables. Those Q-Q plots were enclosed in Appendix 2 
and as seen on those graphs all the dot points were along the line. Therefore, there 
were both positive and negative correlations between the dependent variables 
(financial and environmental) of the sample. In order to maintain a positive 
correlation among variables, both variables should move in tandem. A positive 
correlation exists when one variable increases as the other variable increases or one 
variable decrease while the other decreases. A perfect positive correlation is 
represented by 1, whereas 0 and -1 indicate respectively, no correlation and 
negative correlation (Field 2009). As shown in Appendix 2, the correlations 
between the variables of the selected data set were perfect as the data were scattered 
along the lines. 
Assumption 8 - Linearity  
Linearity refers to a linear relationship (straight approach) between the dependent 
variables and an independent variable/s (Field 2009). Below scatterplots depicted 
the straight relationship of dependent variables with the two groups of independent 
variables (4 periods). As per the plots, the DV data were distributed systematically 
and evenly in all four plots. These patterns described the linearity of the data set.  
As shown below, these plots did not depict any obvious evidence of non-linearity 
within the variables of the selected sample: therefore, the assumption of linearity 
was satisfied.  
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Figure 2: Scatter Plot 1 
 
 
Assumption 9-Homogeneity of error variances was not performed at this stage as 
the SPSS performed Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances during 
MANOVA analysis.   
In conclusion, as all the assumptions above were satisfied and not violated any 
assumption, MANOVA was considered to be an appropriate analysis for the 
selected dataset. In chapter 5, the One-Way MANOVA test results of PBPL were 
conducted. MANOVA test consisted of the Multivariate test of hypothesis, 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances, Test of Between-Subjects Effects for 
the significance of IVs and the Multiple Comparisons Test (Post-hoc Tukey HSD).  
 
4.2 Qualitative Interview analysis 
 
The purpose of conducting MANOVA tests is to test the null hypothesis. If 
MANOVA found any non-significant mean differences, then the null hypothesis is 
accepted. The qualitative interview analysis would focus on the questions about the 
reasons for the non-significance of the performance of PBPL under different 
ownership types.  Alternatively, if the MANOVA tests produce any significant 
mean differences in performance, the Null hypothesis cannot be accepted.  
Therefore, the interviews should produce rich data to help explain the impact of 
privatisation on the financial and environmental performance of PBPL. The 
answers provided by the interviewees are in Appendix 1.  
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4.3 Chapter summary  
 
Chapter 4 was reserved for pre-analysis sections of MANOVA of the study. The 
first section of chapter 4 examined the fitness of the MANOVA analysis. For that, 
the assumptions of the MANOVA were tested. Multivariate normality was tested 
by Shapiro-Wilk and the sample data set was not violating the assumption of 
normality as the P values of Shapiro-Wilk above are always as P>0.05. Therefore, 
the study did not reject the null hypothesis as there was not enough evidence to 
conclude that the data was non-normal. Therefore, the data set was normally 
distributed.  
Next, Mahalanobis Distance and the boxplot represented the test of multivariate 
outliers. Mahalanobis Distance indicates as 10.068 < 13.82 and this concluded as 
there were no outliers of the sample data set. Also, the result of the Boxplot 
indicated nonexistence of outliers as if there was any outlier exists, then there was 
a circle/ asterisk mark and a number on top of the Boxplot tails. Here, the selected 
sample maintained the absence of multivariate outliers.  
The absence of multicollinearity was checked by the correlation test and the Q-Q 
plots (Appendix 2). The Pearson Correlation test results showed that the correlation 
(r) between the dependent variables in this study ranged from 1.0 to -0.957. Further, 
Q-Q plots showed all the dot points were along the line. Therefore, there was a 
positive correlation between the dependent financial and environmental variables.  
Linearity indicated the linear relationship between DVs and IVs in the sample. The 
Scatter Plot 1 which depicted the DV data were distributed systematically and 
evenly in all four plots while maintaining the linearity of the selected sample. 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances was done in the MANOVA tests section 
in Chapter 5.  
As all the assumptions above were satisfied and not violated, MANOVA was 
considered to be an appropriate analysis for the selected data set. Lastly, the level 
of the significance of MANOVA tests in chapter 5 decided which type of approach 
did the qualitative interview analysis need in this study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 One-Way MANOVA results and discussion 
 
5.1.1 Multivariate tests results- Table 8 
 
Table 8 in chapter 5 below, showed the four multivariate tests results of MANOVA. 
The purpose of MANOVA is to test the null hypothesis of no group mean difference 
in the sample. The Multivariate Tests consisted of four group tests (see table 7) and 
they provide the F values for the four different multivariate tests to distinguish any 
significant effect of the four groups (Fixed factors) on all the considered DVs.    
Consequently, the tests conducted by a MANOVA are the significant effect of each 
of the four groups (fixed factors) on each of the 12 DVs. Therefore, the highly 
correlated DVs in table 6-B in section 4.1 is not relevant for a MANOVA because 
the DVs are not concurrently explaining the proportional variance in the DVs.  The 
Partial Eta squared measure provides information about this relationship. As 
explained in MANOVA introduction section in chapter 3, this study considered 
only the Pillai’s Trace test value for multivariate test significance because it was 
the least sensitive to the violation of the assumption of the covariance of the 
matrices.  
 
According to the Multivariate Tests results, the Pillai’s Trace value for the 
independent variable; ownership was 2.84 with an F value of 6.55. This was 
significant at 5% level as Pillai’s Trace is P=0.003 <0.05= α. Also, the Partial ETA 
squared result is 0.954, which represents 95.4% of the variance is explained by the 
four periods of time (fixed factors). 
  
 F (24, 9) = 6.55, P<0.05; Pillai’s Trace =2.84, Partial η2 0.95.  
 
The significance level P of Wilk Lambda was P=0.004 < 0.05= α. Also, the   F 
value of Wilk Lambda was as;  
 
F (24, 3.5) = 29.97, P<0.05; Wilks Λ = 0.001, partial η2= 0.994.  
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Further, Roy’s Largest Root test indicated a P=0.001<0.05= α of the multivariate 
significance of the sample. The interpretation was as;  
 
F (8, 3) = 11878.3, P<0.05; Roy’s Largest Root=31675.4, partial η2=1 
 
Essentially, all three tests were statistically significant (P<0.05= α) except the 
Hotelling’s Trace test. Accordingly, after the change of ownership, the one-way 
MANOVA revealed a statistically significant multivariate main effect on 
performance.  Based on the statistical results therefore, the study cannot accept the 
null hypothesis that there were no differences in the financial and environmental 
performance of Port of Brisbane under either private ownership or state ownership. 
As seen above, the significance value of Pillai’s Trace had a substantial difference 
between groups. This result emphasised that the four groups (two periods for the 
state ownership (normal and transitional periods) and two periods for the private 
ownership (transitional and normal periods)) differ on that linear composite.  
However, it was still unclear where the difference lies. Therefore, the study at this 
stage revealed that there was a difference in the financial and environmental 
performance values of PBPL across these before and after privatisation four 
periods. The post-hoc test in this chapter would reveal where that difference lies 
and what indicators have been impacted by the change of ownership allowing for 
each ownership type to have a transitional period. 
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Table 7.           Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Ownership 1 State-05/06/07 3 
2 State-08/09/10 3 
3 Pty-12/13/14 3 
4 Pty-15/16/17 3 
Table 8.                                                                   Multivariate Testsa 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerd 
Intercept Pillai's Trace 1.000 7255.174b 8.000 1.000 .009 1.000 58041.388 1.000 
Wilks' Lambda .000 7255.174b 8.000 1.000 .009 1.000 58041.388 1.000 
Hotelling's Trace 58041.388 7255.174b 8.000 1.000 .009 1.000 58041.388 1.000 
Roy's Largest Root 58041.388 7255.174b 8.000 1.000 .009 1.000 58041.388 1.000 
Ownership Pillai's Trace 2.838 6.551 24.000 9.000 .003 .946 157.226 .990 
Wilks' Lambda .000 29.966 24.000 3.502 .004 .994 601.878 .993 
Hotelling's Trace . . 24.000 . . . . . 
Roy's Largest Root 31675.378 11878.267c 8.000 3.000 .000 1.000 95026.134 1.000 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownership; b. Exact statistic; c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level; 
d. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Table 9.                         Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
FinROA1 Based on Mean 3.432 3 8 .072 
Based on Median 2.114 3 8 .177 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.114 3 2.921 .281 
Based on trimmed mean 3.345 3 8 .076 
FinROA2 Based on Mean 3.108 3 8 .089 
Based on Median 1.955 3 8 .199 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.955 3 3.046 .296 
Based on trimmed mean 3.032 3 8 .093 
FinROE1 Based on Mean 2.586 3 8 .126 
Based on Median .951 3 8 .461 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.951 3 5.520 .478 
Based on trimmed mean 2.447 3 8 .139 
FinROE2 Based on Mean 2.350 3 8 .149 
Based on Median 1.059 3 8 .419 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.059 3 5.204 .442 
Based on trimmed mean 2.253 3 8 .159 
FinDTA Based on Mean .978 3 8 .450 
Based on Median .204 3 8 .891 
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Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.204 3 6.000 .890 
Based on trimmed mean .894 3 8 .485 
FinCEA Based on Mean 5.463 3 8 .024 
Based on Median 1.257 3 8 .352 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.257 3 2.457 .448 
Based on trimmed mean 4.988 3 8 .031 
EnvoTE Based on Mean .359 3 8 .784 
Based on Median .182 3 8 .905 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.182 3 6.323 .905 
Based on trimmed mean .345 3 8 .794 
FinTEUs Based on Mean 4.385 3 8 .042 
Based on Median .937 3 8 .467 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.937 3 2.905 .523 
Based on trimmed mean 3.995 3 8 .052 
FinTonnes Based on Mean 2.328 3 8 .151 
Based on Median 1.276 3 8 .347 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.276 3 4.563 .385 
Based on trimmed mean 2.259 3 8 .159 
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FinNoS Based on Mean 1.494 3 8 .288 
Based on Median .330 3 8 .804 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.330 3 4.965 .805 
Based on trimmed mean 1.358 3 8 .323 
EnvoTEC Based on Mean 1.607 3 8 .263 
Based on Median .837 3 8 .511 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.837 3 4.603 .533 
Based on trimmed mean 1.551 3 8 .275 
EnvoTECO2 Based on Mean 1.699 3 8 .244 
Based on Median 1.055 3 8 .420 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.055 3 4.339 .455 
Based on trimmed mean 1.659 3 8 .252 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownership 
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5.1.2 Levene’s test of Equality of Variances results- Table 9 
 
Levene’s test of Equality of Variances (table 9 in chapter 5) was used to examine 
any equal variances between the independent variable groups to prove the null 
hypothesis that the population variances were equal. This was also known as the 
homogeneity of variances (Pallant 2007). Precisely, homogeneity of variance 
means that the variance in the groups is of the same nature or that the two groups 
have the same kind of variability. According to Pallant (2007), the variance does 
not have to be precisely equal and just close is enough. Levine's test tests whether 
the variances of the two samples are approximately equal.  
Levine's test started with a null hypothesis which was  
H0: σ12 - σ22 = 0 (the population variances of pre and post-privatisation were equal)  
Or the alternative hypothesis was as; 
H1: σ12 - σ22 ≠ 0 (the population variances of pre and post-privatisation were not 
equal) 
This implied that if the null hypothesis of Levene's test was rejected, the variances 
of the two groups were not equal; i.e., that the homogeneity of variances assumption 
was violated.  In this case, the null hypothesis was that there was no difference 
between the variance of the financial and environmental performance of PBPL 
before and after its privatisation. Again, if the P value of the Levene’s test is less 
than P<0.05, then the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected concluding that 
there is a difference between in the variances in the population. Because the 
obtained differences in the sample variances are unlikely to have happened based 
on random sampling from a population which has equal variances. 
Based on the test result mean values, here is the summary of P values of Levene’s.  
FinROA1   P =0.072; (P>0.05),   FinROA2   P=0.076; (P>0.05),  
FinROE1   P=0.126; (P>0.05),   FinROE2   P=0.149; (P>0.05),  
FinDTA   P=0.45; (P>0.05),    FinCEA   P=0.024; (P<0.05),  
EnvoTE   P=0.784; (P>0.05),   EnvoTEUs   P=0.042; (P<0.05),  
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FinTonnes   P=0.151; (P>0.05),   FinNoS   P=0.288; (P>0.05),  
EnvoTEC   P=0.263; (P>0.05),   EnvoTECO2   P=0.244; (P>0.05). 
Since there were more than one dependent variables, this test examined the equality 
of variance or the interconnection between variables. If there was any equal 
variance between groups, (If the differences were equal in both samples/ periods) 
then Levene’s test indicates non-significant P values. Contrary, non-equal 
variances between groups indicate significant P values. Accordingly, out of twelve, 
ten proxies here had insignificant P values. In other words, the majority of the ratios 
satisfied the assumption of homogeneity of variances. 
The two financial performance indicators above (FinCEA, FinTEUs) showed 
differences of variances with statistically significant (P) values than the standard 
significant value of P=0.05 α (as FinCEA; P=0.024<0.05 α and FinTEUs; P=0.042 
<0.05= α).  This means that FinCEA and FinTEUs ratios had mean differences 
(absence of homogeneity of variances) between pre and post-privatisation periods 
and these two ratios did not meet the assumption of homogeneity of variances. Even 
though the assumption was violated by two proxies, it should be mentioned that the 
sample sizes for each group did not differ and therefore the P values of the other 
ratios were trustworthy.  As Pallant (2007) and many other statisticians explained, 
this is possible when the samples have less than 20 observations. This study had 
one sample with two ownership periods (two groups) and 12 observations.  
The alternatives for unmet homogeneity of variances of variables exist in the 
literature. One alternative is that homogeneity of variances can be assessed in 
different ways. Instead of Levene’s Test, one can use a different test such as 
Bartlett's Test, Games-Howell Test, or Brown & Forsythe Test (Modified Levene’s 
Test). Also, as per Pallant (2007) even, adjusting the standard confidence alpha 
level (probability level) from 0.05 to 0.025 or 0.01, any significant P value of 
equality of variances can be fixed. Minitab (2017) suggested that if the equality of 
variances is significant then the multiple comparisons method can be used. If the P 
value for the multiple compression method is significant, then the study can use the 
box plots to identify the specific populations with different standard deviations 
from each other. Then the conclusion can be delivered based on the multiple 
comparisons method, if the sample has less than 20 observations and the 
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distribution for one or more of the populations is heavily tailed or extremely skewed 
(Minitab, 2017). 
Moreover, trimming off the non-equal variances which indicate significant P values 
and run the MANOVA analysis without those variables is another way to maintain 
the equal variances assumption. Following this method, This study has performed 
a complete set of tests of MANOVA without FinCEA and FinTEUs (the variables 
with significant P values in the first analysis). The new tests outcome was shown 
in Appendix 3 section and the tests still showed similar results as above.  Further, 
the multivariate normality tested by Shapiro-Wilk test above showed that the 
sample data set was not violating the assumption of normality (normal distribution) 
as the P values of Shapiro-Wilk above were always as P >0.05. This was also 
another way to consider the sample data were drawn from a normal distribution. 
Finally, the null hypothesis; the four-period groups’ population variances (group 
variances) were equal, can be accepted as 2 out of 12 indicators were significant 
and therefore non-equal of variances while the majority of ratios were insignificant 
and equal of variances2. Therefore, the study concluded the equality of variances 
across four-period groups’ in the data set was maintained. 
 
 
 
                                               
2 When a research has subject-matter reason for combining the variables in some way, other than 
letting MANOVA find the best linear combination, based on the theoretical considerations, the 
research can trim off some variables and rerun the test. This process of reducing the number of 
random variables in order to obtain a set of principal variables is called as dimensionality reduction 
technique. Accordingly, this study has done additional tests in the Appendix section with trimmed 
variables when they are necessary. Therefore, the sum of the study variables outcome is suggested 
to be better measurement than the pure MANOVA results.   
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Table 10.                                                                Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerm 
          
Corrected 
Model 
FinROA1 1260.794a 3 420.265 72.396 .000 .964 217.189 1.000 
FinROA2 1406.177b 3 468.726 77.788 .000 .967 233.365 1.000 
FinROE1 2030.346c 3 676.782 163.599 .000 .984 490.798 1.000 
FinROE2 2391.476d 3 797.159 158.406 .000 .983 475.218 1.000 
FinDTA .096e 3 .032 106.769 .000 .976 320.306 1.000 
FinCEA .008f 3 .003 2.398 .144 .473 7.194 .400 
EnvoTE 29970.000g 3 9990.000 73.142 .000 .965 219.426 1.000 
FinTEUs 219127807118.250h 3 73042602372.750 41.043 .000 .939 123.130 1.000 
FinTonnes 146979120589987.530i 3 48993040196662.510 21.801 .000 .891 65.403 1.000 
FinNoS 25116.250j 3 8372.083 4.373 .042 .621 13.120 .658 
EnvoTEC 26250821016.917k 3 8750273672.306 25.776 .000 .906 77.329 1.000 
EnvoTECO2 72237538.917l 3 24079179.639 7.807 .009 .745 23.420 .898 
Intercept FinROA1 2156.865 1 2156.865 371.549 .000 .979 371.549 1.000 
FinROA2 1964.288 1 1964.288 325.988 .000 .976 325.988 1.000 
FinROE1 4458.307 1 4458.307 1077.712 .000 .993 1077.712 1.000 
FinROE2 3927.701 1 3927.701 780.487 .000 .990 780.487 1.000 
FinDTA 1.833 1 1.833 6110.028 .000 .999 6110.028 1.000 
FinCEA .021 1 .021 18.657 .003 .700 18.657 .964 
EnvoTE 740033.333 1 740033.333 5418.182 .000 .999 5418.182 1.000 
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FinTEUs 11539086945030.746 1 11539086945030.746 6483.933 .000 .999 6483.933 1.000 
FinTonnes 12355167825036366.0
00 
1 12355167825036366.0
00 
5497.800 .000 .999 5497.800 1.000 
FinNoS 11558144.083 1 11558144.083 6037.686 .000 .999 6037.686 1.000 
EnvoTEC 536064336390.083 1 536064336390.083 1579.121 .000 .995 1579.121 1.000 
EnvoTECO2 2899608852.083 1 2899608852.083 940.057 .000 .992 940.057 1.000 
Ownership FinROA1 1260.794 3 420.265 72.396 .000 .964 217.189 1.000 
FinROA2 1406.177 3 468.726 77.788 .000 .967 233.365 1.000 
FinROE1 2030.345 3 676.782 163.599 .000 .984 490.798 1.000 
FinROE2 2391.476 3 797.159 158.406 .000 .983 475.218 1.000 
FinDTA .096 3 .032 106.769 .000 .976 320.306 1.000 
FinCEA .008 3 .003 2.398 .144 .473 7.194 .400 
EnvoTE 29970.000 3 9990.000 73.142 .000 .965 219.426 1.000 
FinTEUs 219127807118.250 3 73042602372.750 41.043 .000 .939 123.130 1.000 
FinTonnes 146979120589987.600 3 48993040196662.530 21.801 .000 .891 65.403 1.000 
FinNoS 25116.250 3 8372.083 4.373 .042 .621 13.120 .658 
EnvoTEC 26250821016.917 3 8750273672.306 25.776 .000 .906 77.329 1.000 
EnvoTECO2 72237538.917 3 24079179.639 7.807 .009 .745 23.420 .898 
Error FinROA1 46.440 8 5.805      
FinROA2 48.205 8 6.026      
FinROE1 33.095 8 4.137      
FinROE2 40.259 8 5.032      
FinDTA .002 8 .000      
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FinCEA .009 8 .001      
EnvoTE 1092.667 8 136.583      
FinTEUs 14237145408.000 8 1779643176.000      
FinTonnes 17978344131321.332 8 2247293016415.167      
FinNoS 15314.667 8 1914.333      
EnvoTEC 2715759954.000 8 339469994.250      
EnvoTECO2 24676018.000 8 3084502.250      
Total FinROA1 3464.099 12       
FinROA2 3418.670 12       
FinROE1 6521.748 12       
FinROE2 6359.436 12       
FinDTA 1.932 12       
FinCEA .038 12       
EnvoTE 771096.000 12       
FinTEUs 11772451897557.000 12       
FinTonnes 12520125289757680.0
00 
12       
FinNoS 11598575.000 12       
EnvoTEC 565030917361.000 12       
EnvoTECO2 2996522409.000 12       
Corrected 
Total 
FinROA1 1307.235 11       
FinROA2 1454.382 11       
FinROE1 2063.440 11       
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FinROE2 2431.735 11       
FinDTA .098 11       
FinCEA .017 11       
EnvoTE 31062.667 11       
FinTEUs 233364952526.250 11       
FinTonnes 164957464721308.880 11       
FinNoS 40430.917 11       
EnvoTEC 28966580970.917 11       
EnvoTECO2 96913556.917 11       
a. R Squared = .964 (Adjusted R Squared = .951)                      h. R Squared = .939 (Adjusted R Squared = .916) 
b. R Squared = .967 (Adjusted R Squared = .954)                      i. R Squared = .891 (Adjusted R Squared = .850) 
c. R Squared = .984 (Adjusted R Squared = .978)                       j. R Squared = .621 (Adjusted R Squared = .479) 
d. R Squared = .983 (Adjusted R Squared = .977)                      k. R Squared = .906 (Adjusted R Squared = .871) 
e. R Squared = .976 (Adjusted R Squared = .966)                       l. R Squared = .745 (Adjusted R Squared = .650) 
f. R Squared = .473 (Adjusted R Squared = .276)                       m. Computed using alpha = .05 
g. R Squared = .965 (Adjusted R Squared = .952) 
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5.1.3 Tests of Between-Subjects effects results- Table 10 
 
As the overall F test was significant, this study moved on to check the individual 
dependent variables with separate ANOVA tests. This is called as Tests of 
Between-Subjects effects and was shown in table 10. The idea of performing this 
test was to check whether either of the two DVs or their interaction were 
statistically significant. The significance (P) values in Table 10 indicated that 
change of ownership had a significant effect on the financial and environmental 
performance of PBPL.  
 
FinROA1 (F (3,8) = 72.40; p < .001; partial η2= 0.964) 
 FinROA2 (F (3,8) = 77.80; p < .001; partial η2= 0.967) 
FinROE1 (F (3,8) = 163.60; p < .001; partial η2= 0.984)  
FinROE2 (F (3,8) = 158.41; p < .001; partial η2= 0.983) 
FinDTA (F (3,8) = 106.77; p < .001; partial η2= 0.966) 
FinCEA (F (3,8) = 2.40; p < .144; partial η2= 0.473) 
FinTEUs (F (3,8) = 41.04; p < .001; partial η2= 0.939) 
FinTonnes (F (3,8) = 21.80; p < .001; partial η2= 0.891) 
 FinNoS (F (3,8) = 4.40; p < .042; partial η2= 0.621)  
EnvoTE (F (3,8) = 73.14; p < .001; partial η2= 0.965) 
EnvoTEC (F (3,8) = 25.78; p < .001; partial η2= 0.906)  
EnvoTECO2 (F (3,8) = 7.81; p < .009; partial η2= 0.745) 
As a follow-up test to MANOVA, the Tests of Between-Subject Effects (one-way 
ANOVAs) on each of the twelve dependent variable proxies was conducted (a step-
down analysis). Accordingly, all of the variables were statistically significant 
except one variable FinCEA (P< .144) with effect sizes (partial η2) ranging from a 
high of 0.984 (FinROA1) to a low of 0.473 (FinCEA). According to Gelman and 
Stern (2006) “not significantly different does not necessarily mean as they are not 
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different. Gelman and Stern (2006) and Keppel and Wickens (2004) suggested 
when to report the main effect of the differences of a data set. Also, this study 
performed the Tests of Between-Subjects Effects without the variable FinCEA 
which indicated a non-significant test value at the first instance. This  evidenced 
even without the indicator FinCEA, the overall results of the Tests of Between-
Subjects Effects were still significant. The second Tests of Between-Subjects 
Effects without FinCEA is in Appendix 4. 
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Table 11.       Tukey HSD Post-hoc test                          Multiple Comparisons 
 
Dependent 
Variable (I) Ownership (J) Ownership 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
FinROA1 State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 1.6767 1.96724 .829 -4.6231 7.9765 
Pty-12/13/14 -21.7633* 1.96724 .000 -28.0631 -15.4635 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.9133* 1.96724 .000 -23.2131 -10.6135 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -1.6767 1.96724 .829 -7.9765 4.6231 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.4400* 1.96724 .000 -29.7398 -17.1402 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.5900* 1.96724 .000 -24.8898 -12.2902 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 21.7633* 1.96724 .000 15.4635 28.0631 
State-08/09/10 23.4400* 1.96724 .000 17.1402 29.7398 
Pty-15/16/17 4.8500 1.96724 .141 -1.4498 11.1498 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 16.9133* 1.96724 .000 10.6135 23.2131 
State-08/09/10 18.5900* 1.96724 .000 12.2902 24.8898 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.8500 1.96724 .141 -11.1498 1.4498 
FinROA2 State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 .8500 2.00427 .973 -5.5684 7.2684 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.3567* 2.00427 .000 -29.7750 -16.9383 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.5367* 2.00427 .000 -24.9550 -12.1183 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -.8500 2.00427 .973 -7.2684 5.5684 
Pty-12/13/14 -24.2067* 2.00427 .000 -30.6250 -17.7883 
Pty-15/16/17 -19.3867* 2.00427 .000 -25.8050 -12.9683 
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Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 23.3567* 2.00427 .000 16.9383 29.7750 
State-08/09/10 24.2067* 2.00427 .000 17.7883 30.6250 
Pty-15/16/17 4.8200 2.00427 .153 -1.5984 11.2384 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 18.5367* 2.00427 .000 12.1183 24.9550 
State-08/09/10 19.3867* 2.00427 .000 12.9683 25.8050 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.8200 2.00427 .153 -11.2384 1.5984 
FinROE1 State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 3.3133 1.66069 .266 -2.0048 8.6314 
Pty-12/13/14 -26.2900* 1.66069 .000 -31.6081 -20.9719 
Pty-15/16/17 -21.8300* 1.66069 .000 -27.1481 -16.5119 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -3.3133 1.66069 .266 -8.6314 2.0048 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.6033* 1.66069 .000 -34.9214 -24.2852 
Pty-15/16/17 -25.1433* 1.66069 .000 -30.4614 -19.8252 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 26.2900* 1.66069 .000 20.9719 31.6081 
State-08/09/10 29.6033* 1.66069 .000 24.2852 34.9214 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4600 1.66069 .104 -.8581 9.7781 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 21.8300* 1.66069 .000 16.5119 27.1481 
State-08/09/10 25.1433* 1.66069 .000 19.8252 30.4614 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4600 1.66069 .104 -9.7781 .8581 
FinROE2 State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 1.7367 1.83164 .781 -4.1289 7.6022 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.3767* 1.83164 .000 -35.2422 -23.5111 
Pty-15/16/17 -24.9533* 1.83164 .000 -30.8189 -19.0878 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -1.7367 1.83164 .781 -7.6022 4.1289 
Pty-12/13/14 -31.1133* 1.83164 .000 -36.9789 -25.2478 
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Pty-15/16/17 -26.6900* 1.83164 .000 -32.5556 -20.8244 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 29.3767* 1.83164 .000 23.5111 35.2422 
State-08/09/10 31.1133* 1.83164 .000 25.2478 36.9789 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4233 1.83164 .151 -1.4422 10.2889 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 24.9533* 1.83164 .000 19.0878 30.8189 
State-08/09/10 26.6900* 1.83164 .000 20.8244 32.5556 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4233 1.83164 .151 -10.2889 1.4422 
FinDTA State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 -.0133 .01414 .784 -.0586 .0320 
Pty-12/13/14 .1633* .01414 .000 .1180 .2086 
Pty-15/16/17 .1800* .01414 .000 .1347 .2253 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 .0133 .01414 .784 -.0320 .0586 
Pty-12/13/14 .1767* .01414 .000 .1314 .2220 
Pty-15/16/17 .1933* .01414 .000 .1480 .2386 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 -.1633* .01414 .000 -.2086 -.1180 
State-08/09/10 -.1767* .01414 .000 -.2220 -.1314 
Pty-15/16/17 .0167 .01414 .656 -.0286 .0620 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 -.1800* .01414 .000 -.2253 -.1347 
State-08/09/10 -.1933* .01414 .000 -.2386 -.1480 
Pty-12/13/14 -.0167 .01414 .656 -.0620 .0286 
FinCEA State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 .0133 .02728 .959 -.0740 .1007 
Pty-12/13/14 .0633 .02728 .172 -.0240 .1507 
Pty-15/16/17 .0500 .02728 .326 -.0374 .1374 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -.0133 .02728 .959 -.1007 .0740 
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Pty-12/13/14 .0500 .02728 .326 -.0374 .1374 
Pty-15/16/17 .0367 .02728 .563 -.0507 .1240 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 -.0633 .02728 .172 -.1507 .0240 
State-08/09/10 -.0500 .02728 .326 -.1374 .0374 
Pty-15/16/17 -.0133 .02728 .959 -.1007 .0740 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 -.0500 .02728 .326 -.1374 .0374 
State-08/09/10 -.0367 .02728 .563 -.1240 .0507 
Pty-12/13/14 .0133 .02728 .959 -.0740 .1007 
EnvoTE State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 -43.00* 9.542 .009 -73.56 -12.44 
Pty-12/13/14 69.00* 9.542 .000 38.44 99.56 
Pty-15/16/17 78.00* 9.542 .000 47.44 108.56 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 43.00* 9.542 .009 12.44 73.56 
Pty-12/13/14 112.00* 9.542 .000 81.44 142.56 
Pty-15/16/17 121.00* 9.542 .000 90.44 151.56 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 -69.00* 9.542 .000 -99.56 -38.44 
State-08/09/10 -112.00* 9.542 .000 -142.56 -81.44 
Pty-15/16/17 9.00 9.542 .784 -21.56 39.56 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 -78.00* 9.542 .000 -108.56 -47.44 
State-08/09/10 -121.00* 9.542 .000 -151.56 -90.44 
Pty-12/13/14 -9.00 9.542 .784 -39.56 21.56 
FinTEUs State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 -125964.00* 34444.576 .027 -236267.66 -15660.34 
Pty-12/13/14 -270763.00* 34444.576 .000 -381066.66 -160459.34 
Pty-15/16/17 -352324.67* 34444.576 .000 -462628.32 -242021.01 
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State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 125964.00* 34444.576 .027 15660.34 236267.66 
Pty-12/13/14 -144799.00* 34444.576 .013 -255102.66 -34495.34 
Pty-15/16/17 -226360.67* 34444.576 .001 -336664.32 -116057.01 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 270763.00* 34444.576 .000 160459.34 381066.66 
State-08/09/10 144799.00* 34444.576 .013 34495.34 255102.66 
Pty-15/16/17 -81561.67 34444.576 .161 -191865.32 28741.99 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 352324.67* 34444.576 .000 242021.01 462628.32 
State-08/09/10 226360.67* 34444.576 .001 116057.01 336664.32 
Pty-12/13/14 81561.67 34444.576 .161 -28741.99 191865.32 
FinTonnes State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 -4284335.00* 1224007.902 .033 -8204039.16 -364630.84 
Pty-12/13/14 -9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 -13696191.83 -5856783.51 
Pty-15/16/17 -5818339.67* 1224007.902 .006 -9738043.83 -1898635.51 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 4284335.00* 1224007.902 .033 364630.84 8204039.16 
Pty-12/13/14 -5492152.67* 1224007.902 .009 -9411856.83 -1572448.51 
Pty-15/16/17 -1534004.67 1224007.902 .614 -5453708.83 2385699.49 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 5856783.51 13696191.83 
State-08/09/10 5492152.67* 1224007.902 .009 1572448.51 9411856.83 
Pty-15/16/17 3958148.00* 1224007.902 .048 38443.84 7877852.16 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 5818339.67* 1224007.902 .006 1898635.51 9738043.83 
State-08/09/10 1534004.67 1224007.902 .614 -2385699.49 5453708.83 
Pty-12/13/14 -3958148.00* 1224007.902 .048 -7877852.16 -38443.84 
FinNoS State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 128.00* 35.724 .029 13.60 242.40 
Pty-12/13/14 65.33 35.724 .328 -49.07 179.73 
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Pty-15/16/17 49.00 35.724 .548 -65.40 163.40 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -128.00* 35.724 .029 -242.40 -13.60 
Pty-12/13/14 -62.67 35.724 .359 -177.07 51.73 
Pty-15/16/17 -79.00 35.724 .200 -193.40 35.40 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 -65.33 35.724 .328 -179.73 49.07 
State-08/09/10 62.67 35.724 .359 -51.73 177.07 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.33 35.724 .966 -130.73 98.07 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 -49.00 35.724 .548 -163.40 65.40 
State-08/09/10 79.00 35.724 .200 -35.40 193.40 
Pty-12/13/14 16.33 35.724 .966 -98.07 130.73 
EnvoTEC State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 54506.33* 15043.714 .028 6331.07 102681.60 
Pty-12/13/14 107463.33* 15043.714 .000 59288.07 155638.60 
Pty-15/16/17 116978.67* 15043.714 .000 68803.40 165153.93 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 -54506.33* 15043.714 .028 -102681.60 -6331.07 
Pty-12/13/14 52957.00* 15043.714 .032 4781.73 101132.27 
Pty-15/16/17 62472.33* 15043.714 .014 14297.07 110647.60 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 -107463.33* 15043.714 .000 -155638.60 -59288.07 
State-08/09/10 -52957.00* 15043.714 .032 -101132.27 -4781.73 
Pty-15/16/17 9515.33 15043.714 .919 -38659.93 57690.60 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 -116978.67* 15043.714 .000 -165153.93 -68803.40 
State-08/09/10 -62472.33* 15043.714 .014 -110647.60 -14297.07 
Pty-12/13/14 -9515.33 15043.714 .919 -57690.60 38659.93 
EnvoTECO2 State-05/06/07 State-08/09/10 -771.33 1433.993 .947 -5363.48 3820.82 
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Pty-12/13/14 3994.33 1433.993 .090 -597.82 8586.48 
Pty-15/16/17 4902.67* 1433.993 .037 310.52 9494.82 
State-08/09/10 State-05/06/07 771.33 1433.993 .947 -3820.82 5363.48 
Pty-12/13/14 4765.67* 1433.993 .042 173.52 9357.82 
Pty-15/16/17 5674.00* 1433.993 .018 1081.85 10266.15 
Pty-12/13/14 State-05/06/07 -3994.33 1433.993 .090 -8586.48 597.82 
State-08/09/10 -4765.67* 1433.993 .042 -9357.82 -173.52 
Pty-15/16/17 908.33 1433.993 .918 -3683.82 5500.48 
Pty-15/16/17 State-05/06/07 -4902.67* 1433.993 .037 -9494.82 -310.52 
State-08/09/10 -5674.00* 1433.993 .018 -10266.15 -1081.85 
Pty-12/13/14 -908.33 1433.993 .918 -5500.48 3683.82 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square (Error) = 3084502.250. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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5.1.4 Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests results- Table 11 
 
Lastly, a series of Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference post-hoc tests were 
performed (table 11) in order to examine individual mean difference comparisons 
across four 3-year time periods that represent two independent variable groups of 
ownership (state and private) and all 12 dependent variable performance evaluation 
ratios. These four 3-year time periods comprise of two pre-privatisation time 
periods and two post-privatisation time periods. Firstly, the time period is pre-
privatisation 05/06/07 (normal public ownership operations) and transitional pre-
privatisation 08/09/10 (public ownership operations in the transition towards 
privatisation). Secondly, the post-privatisation transitional period 12/13/14 and the 
normal privatisation ownership operations 15/16/17. 
Before the interpretation of the outcome of the Multiple Comparison tests in table 
10, it is important to recall that as mentioned at the beginning, this study was based 
on the theory of the firm which describes that private ownership is superior to 
public ownership and therefore, privatisation brings financial success to State 
Owned Enterprises. Based on this notion, this study interpreted the outcome of the 
Multiple Comparison tests as the performance of private ownership versus the 
performance of state ownership.  
Therefore, it is important to extract the outcome of the post-hoc results in Table 9 
cautiously, such as starting from each proxy to private ownership (2 periods; post-
privatisation- 12/13/14 and 15/16/17), then to state ownership (2 periods; pre-
privatisation 05/06/07 and 08/09/10) direction. Precisely, important information 
has been highlighted in table 9. Mean difference and the significance (P) value 
should be followed by the dependent and independent variables. 
For instance, proxy FinROA1 has a statistically significant difference with a 
significance of P=0.001 < 0.05=α during the Pty 12/13/14 period against 
State05/06/07 and State08/09/10 periods. The positive difference is depicted by the 
mean differences of 21.76 and 23.44 respectively, which is the result FinROA1 
financial performance means for Pty12/13/14 being greater than the FinROA1 
financial performance means for State05/06/07 and State08/09/10 periods. On the 
contrary, it is possible to interpret as FinROA1 has a negative difference in 
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State05/06/07 against Pty 12/13/14 and Pty15/16/17 periods as they have mean 
differences of -21.76 and -16.91 respectively. (The mean difference of State 
08/09/10 against Pty 12/13/14 period is -23.44). In brief, ROA1 has statistically 
significantly higher financial performance differences during both Pty period 3 and 
4, compared to the financial performance in period 1 and 2. Overall, ROA1 financial 
performance during private ownership is statistically significantly different than 
state ownership. As the ROA1 ratio has EBIT as its denominator, this financial 
performance ratio excludes the source of funding from expenses.  Therefore, the 
significant higher financial performance differences under private ownership relate 
to operational incomes and other expenses achieved during private ownership. 
ROA2 includes interest expense, therefore the source of funding is included in the 
performance.  Consequently, the significant difference relates to operational 
incomes and other expenses, including interest expense.  Therefore, the lack of 
interest expense for private ownership also has contributed to the significant 
financial performance differences using private ownership as identified by ROA2. 
During the Pty period 3, the FinROA2 proxy has the mean values against State 
period 1 and 2 as 23.36 and 24.21 whereas, Pty period 4 the mean difference of 
FinROA2 against State periods 1 and 2 are, as 18.54 followed by 19.39. ROA2 has 
a statistically significant difference during both period 3 and 4, compared to period 
1 and 2. Overall, during the private ownership ROA2 is statistically significantly 
different than state ownership. 
FinDTA however, has negative mean values during both period 3 and 4 of Pty 
compared to the periods 1 and 2 of State. They are as, -0.163, -0.177, -0.18, and -
0.193 and may reflect the funding source disparity between State and Pty; as 
identified by ROA2. The reasons for these decreases have been addressed during 
the interview sessions and the results are discussed in the qualitative analysis 
section. However, overall, FinDTA mean difference is statistically significantly 
lower during both period 3 and 4, compared to period 1 and 2. Overall, during the 
private ownership periods, the FinDTA differences in means are statistically 
significantly lower than during the state ownership periods. 
The levels of the significance of FinCEA during Pty periods against State periods 
are not statistically significant.   As an observation for an insignificant difference, 
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it is noted that FinCEA also has negative comparison mean values during both Pty 
periods against State periods; -0.633, -0.50, -0.500, and -0.0367. Further, the levels 
of the significance of FinCEA during Pty periods against State periods are 
statistically insignificant. The reasons for these insignificances and negative mean 
differences are the continued investments strategy and assets devaluation practice. 
These reasons will be discussed extensively in the qualitative analysis below.  
FinTEUs of PBPL is statistically significantly larger difference during both periods 
of private ownership than to both periods of state ownership. Comparatively, the 
significance of the higher ratio for total container throughputs is noticeable after 
the privatisation periods.  This result may have some impact on the ROA1 relate to 
increased operational incomes and lower other expenses achieved during the 
private ownership. 
FinTonnes ratio of PBPL during the private ownership (during period 3 and 4) was 
a statistically significantly larger difference than to the state ownership periods 
(both period 1 and 2). Further, the FinTonnes value in period 4 in private ownership 
was decreased relatively, and significantly to period 3 in private ownership period. 
Overall, the FinTonnes ratio means of PBPL under private ownership have 
statistically significant mean differences than to state ownership. 
While FinNoS of PBPL did not have any statistical mean differences during its 
private ownership period compared to state ownership period, there was a 
significant means difference between periods 1 and 2 of State ownership.  The 
results show a lower number of ships were processed during the State ownership 
transitional period (period 2) compared to the normal State ownership period 1. 
Therefore, FinNoS was statistically insignificant under the transitional private 
ownership period and the normal private ownership period compared to state 
ownership. However, a comparison across periods 2, 3 and 4, that while statistical 
insignificance, there was a diminishing number of ships processed in period 3 
compared to period 2 but an increase occurred during the period 4 under private 
ownership. This could be due to the recent investments on latest technology such 
as NCOS and Blockchain at PBPL. Overall, the FinNoS mean value differences 
during private ownership was statistically insignificant than compared to state 
ownership. 
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The Mean differences of EnvoTEC from the two State-owned periods (State 
05/06/07 and State 08/09/10) to the two private ownership periods show that there 
are positive significant differences between the EnvoTEC means.  Therefore, the 
post-hoc results show that the energy consumption during the State-owned periods 
was higher than during the private ownership periods.  Interestingly, a comparison 
of EnvoTEC mean differences periods for State 08/09/10 and State 05/06/07 
reveals a decrease in energy consumption during the State 08/09/10 (transitional) 
period. This statistically significant decrease in energy consumption trend 
continued from State 08/09/10 (transitional) through both private ownership 
periods but the decrease in energy consumption trend between private ownership 
Pty12/13/14 and Pty15/16/17 periods is not statistically significant.  
Mean differences in EnvoTE during both periods of Pty were negative while the P-
values interestingly were significant. These negative mean differences cannot be 
considered as decreased situations of performance as EnvoTE represents the Total 
number of Employees where the lower the number, the higher the level of 
productivity of the firm. Therefore, the EnvoTE of PBPL during both period 3 and 
4 of the private ownership was statistically significantly different than the state 
ownership period 1 and 2.  
Likewise, the mean differences of EnvoTEC proxy during both Pty periods were 
negative while the P-values were significant. Again, these were due to a result of 
the decline of the use of total energy consumption of the firm during the Pty periods 
compared to State periods.  The decline of energy usage increased the level of the 
environmental performance of PBPL.  
Further, the mean differences of the EnvoTECO2 proxy which represented the total 
emissions of CO2 in table 11 indicated that the negative mean values for the total 
CO2 emission under the normal private ownership period (Pty15/16/17), has 
declined compared to the two State ownership periods. Also, the negative mean 
values for the total CO2 emission under the transitional private ownership period 
(Pty12/13/14) was significant at P <1 (Sig = 0.090), which may be due to the 
slowness of changes during the operational transitional to privatisation 
(Pty12/13/14) period. Further, during these two private ownership periods, the P-
values of EnvoTECO2 were non-significant to the standard alpha value of P= 0.05 
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but the negative mean differences between Pty15/16/17 and Pty12/13/14 is 
indicative of a continuing but not statistically significant decreasing CO2 emissions 
trend. Overall, EnvoTECO2 has statistically significantly difference under private 
ownership in both periods 3 and 4, compared to the state ownership in period 1 and 
2. Overall, during the private ownership EnvoTECO2 was statistically significantly 
different than state ownership. 
As mentioned in section 3.3, performance indicators, any increase or decrease in 
the level of consumption in the energy consumption or total emissions of CO2 
measures may be attributed to an increase (or decrease) level of operations (e.g., 
total container throughput or the number of full-time equivalent employees).  
Additional ratios were calculated using the level of consumption in the energy 
consumption or total emissions of CO2 as the numerator and total container 
throughput or the number of full-time equivalent employees as the denominator.   
These ratios controlled for any changes in the level of operations and were included 
in a MANOVA to identify any potential impact on the results reported for the level 
of consumption in the energy consumption or total emissions of CO2.  The analyses 
produced significant MANOVA results (Pillai's Trace: sig = 0.003; tests of 
between-subjects effects: EnvoTEC sig = 0.000, EnvoTEC/FinTUE ratio sig = 
0.000, EnvoTEC/FinTonnes ratio sig = 0.000, EnvoTECO2 sig = 0.009, 
EnvoTECO2/FinTUE sig = 0.000, EnvoTECO2/FinTUE sig = 0.008).  
Furthermore, the post-hoc tests included in Appendix 4, produced similar 
significant results for the three environmental consumption performance measures 
and either similar or improved total emissions of CO2 results for the two ratios that 
controlled for any changes in operations compared to the total emissions of CO2 
measure.  Therefore, the analysis produced two significant environmental 
performance results while controlling for change in the level of operations across 
the 12 years. 
The test outcome revealed that all Tukey’s HSD test mean comparisons were 
statistically significant (P<0.05) after the privatisation of PBPL except two 
indicators (FinCEA and FinNoS)3. Accordingly, after privatisation PBPL had not 
                                               
3 The purpose of this study was to examine a single firm’s operation across 12 years where there 
have been two ownership types for the operation. The limitations by examining the performance of 
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statistically significantly increased its investment intensity (FinCEA) and the 
number of ships (FinNoS) they served compared to the state ownership period. 
However, the majority of the indicators which represented the financial 
performance reported statistical significance. In other words, when comparing the 
financial and environmental performance of PBPL under private ownership, to 
PBPL under state ownership, the performance proxies indicated a significant 
increase in the financial and environmental performance of PBPL under private 
ownership.  
Homogeneous subsets 
 
Dividing the control group into subset1 and mnemonic A and B groups into subset 
2 and 3, the homogeneous subsets (subsets are in Appendix 3 from page 187 to 
193)  showed the groups with same and different means of the sample dataset. 
Compared to the state ownership, ROA1 significantly increased after the 
privatisation (period 3 and 4), Also, indicators such as ROA2, ROE1, and ROE2 
increased right after the privatisation (during period 3 and 4). Next, FinDTA ratio 
significantly decreased after privatisation. This was due to the change of the capital 
structure of PBPL after the privatisation. Again, the homogeneous subset for 
FinCEA showed that overall, there was no statistically significant difference in 
financial performance between pre and post-privatisation periods. However, 
comparatively, there was a slight decrease in the FinCEA indicator during the post-
privatisation periods.  
FinTEUs showed an increased statistical significance of financial performance after 
privatisation. This increase was gradual as it started from period 1 and then it raised 
up to its maximum during the 4th period under private management. Introduction 
of new technology and other operational investments during private ownership 
were the main reasons for this gradual increase in the FinTEUs. Simultaneously, 
FinTonnes increased considerably. There was a positive relationship between the 
                                               
one company with a quantitative analysis is to provide some basis for the collection of information 
using a qualitative research design. Therefore, this analysis was to provide a direction for further 
investigated data collection through interviews. Consequently, not achieving some expected 
statistical outcomes was not considered to be a significant limitation to this study because, the 
qualitative data would provide a more robust explanation of these violation of the expected 
outcomes. 
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FinTEUs and FinTonnes as when one ratio increased, the other also increased. The 
number of ships (FinNoS) also increased after the privatisation but compared to the 
first period of state ownership, this increase during the private ownership was 
insignificant. However, it was important to examine why the number of ships did 
not increase while both the number of TEUs and the number of tonnes increased.  
This was because, during the private ownership, the management extended and 
automated quays and their operations, and as a result, the port was able to cater 
long vessels in the port than ever before. Therefore, even when FinTEUs and 
FinTonnes increased still the new management was able to increase the 
performance, serving a smaller number of ships with more capacity.   
EnvoTE showed that the number of total employees was reduced after privatisation. 
Also, EnvoTEC and EnvoTECO2 homogenous subsets showed their decreased 
values after privatisation. Decrease values of total energy consumption and total 
emissions of Carbon mean that the firm had participated less in polluting the 
environment under private ownership. 
5.2 Interview results 
 
This section was narratively analysed according to the deductive method which 
started from the hypothesis, examination, and then ended in a logical conclusion.  
The question of this study was to investigate what extent privatisation had impacted 
upon the financial and environmental performance of PBPL. This was stipulated 
upon the theory of firms which stated that a firm exists to maximise profits. Also, 
this theory was supported by stakeholder theory which asserts that the shareholders 
of a firm would undertake social responsibility actions in addition to the 
conventional motivation of profit maximisation.  The former theory defines that the 
purpose of the shareholders of a firm is to maximise profits while the latter states 
that the purpose is not only profit maximisation but also addressing the 
stakeholders’ expectations as well. What should then be the purpose of State 
seeking to privatise its State-Owned Enterprises?  Should it be to maximise 
shareholders’ profits or meeting stakeholders ‘expectations? Because of this 
contradiction, which has emerged from the literature repeatedly, this study 
investigated the impact of privatisation on the financial and environmental 
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performance with reference to the Port of Brisbane Proprietary Limited (PBPL) 
assuming that there was no mean difference in the financial and environmental 
performance of Port of Brisbane under either private or state ownership.  
During the first part of the quantitative analysis of this study, it was revealed that 
there was a difference in the financial and environmental performance of PBPL 
before and after its privatisation. Further, the MANOVA analysis concluded that 
the difference occurred when private ownership managed the business during the 
period between 2012 and 2017. The purpose of having these interviews with some 
selected employees of PBPL was to investigate the reasons for the mean differences 
in the financial and environmental performance of PBPL during the private 
ownership period between 2012 and 2017. 
The interviews were held under 6 categories. They were as; 
1. Financial 
2. Port operations and pollutions 
3. Land reclamation 
4. Infrastructure and environmental  
5. Dredging  
6. Community relations 
The purpose of dividing the interview topics as above was to seek reasons for the 
differences in the financial and environmental performance of the firm. Information 
related to the financial performance was garnered from the financial statements and 
the interviews focused on relating that information to the environmental 
performance of the company. Once the raw data were gathered under those topics, 
then they were categorised under the two variables; financial and environmental 
performance.  
ROA and ROE were statistically significantly increased after privatisation. 
 
Compared to the pre-privatisation period, the ROA and ROE ratios for both EBIT 
and EBT were increased during the post-privatisation period. This was mainly due 
to the remarkable decline of the interest expenses after the privatisation of PBPL. 
A decline of interest expenses indicated the pre-privatisation operations had been 
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funded by external loans whereas, the post-privatisation operations had been 
funded by equity. This phenomenon was a result of a change of the capital structure 
of the firm which happened due to the change of ownership of PBPL. The effect of 
the change of the capital structure of the firm has been shown by MANOVA 
analysis above, indicating the differences of dependent variables (ROA1+ ROA2 
and ROE1 +ROE2) over time.  
 
Before the privatisation (under the state ownership), PBPL had had extremely low 
numbers of ROAs over the years which were always less than 10% though, for the 
first time, the proxy went up about in 10% right after the privatisation. This was 
basically due to the increase of both profits and assets of PBPL under private 
ownership. Assets were increased after 2014 as the firm had invested on new major 
projects. These projects were as; Nonlinear Channel Optimisation Simulator 
system (NCOS Online system), port drive upgrade, Brisbane International Cruise 
Terminal, future port expansion works and offsite stormwater management 
projects. More details about these projects will be described in different sections of 
this chapter below.  
 
Simultaneously, the total book value of the assets of PBPL had been considerably 
reduced after privatisation, from 2012 until 2014. According to the notes of the 
financial reports of the company, this could be the impairment/ written down of 
assets of PBPL after its privatisation. A value reduction of assets lowered the value 
at which the assets were carried on the books as changes in the assets or market 
conditions may reduce their current market values. Also, book value reduction was 
a non-cash charge. These were reported as expenses in PBPL’s reports. As a result, 
their return on assets decreased right after the privatisation. This increased net profit 
numerator and decreased total assets denominator combination depicted a higher 
value of ROA of PBPL. Also, the decreased values of assets (assets impairment 
during the post -privatisation) declined at the latter period of the post privatisation. 
The ROA value of PBPL before the privatisation was a single number. For instance, 
by 2010, it was below 1%.  However, to the first time, PBPL reported its two-digits 
ROA value right after the privatisation; 20% in 2012 and then it reached to its 
highest; 30% by 2013 and after that, the value declined to 21% by 2017. Therefore, 
compared to the state ownership performance, there was a significant increase of 
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ROA under private ownership though, within the private ownership, the increased 
ROA of PBPL had gradually declined during the study period. 
 
An increased ROA value had increased the ROE as well. This may be either the 
increase of total revenues after privatisation or the new management of PBPL was 
making better reinvestment decisions. A reduction of interest expenses as the 
numerator and an increase of equity as the denominator change the integer of the 
ratio. Consequently, the ROE of PBPL had increased under private ownership. An 
increase of ROE indicated that the firm generated an increased percentage of profits 
on every dollar invested by its shareholders. When compared with the performance 
of PBPL under state ownership, the ROE values under private ownership were 
increased between 2012 and 2017. Before privatisation, the ROE value of PBPL 
was a single digit though with the change of ownership, it became a two-digit value 
since 2012. This was mainly due to the increase in the equity of the firm (change 
of capital structure).  The new owners of PBPL were Q-Port Holdings which 
comprised four of the largest and most experienced infrastructure investors in the 
world suggesting that their experience may make them better at managing 
investments than the State.  
 
The other important change in PBPL’s financial activities was that after the 
privatisation, the firm’s total liabilities were increased while the total assets were 
impaired which was in addition to the new investments on assets. These changes 
resulted in a decline in the ROE of PBPL even under private ownership. In other 
words, compared to the state ownership period, it was true that ROE of PBPL was 
increased during the post=privatisation period though there was a decline of ROE 
even during the private ownership because under the private ownership, PBPL’s 
liabilities were increased while the assets were impaired.    
 
In order to distinguish the above-mentioned differences in ROA and ROE, this 
study calculated EBIT which excludes pre-privatisation operating expenses that do 
not exist within the post-privatisation operational expenses. Lease payments and 
the other interest expenses were not included in the pre-privatisation operating 
expenses and these have been explained under the notes of PBPL’s financial 
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reports.  A closer comparison of the financial reports of PBPL revealed that the net 
profit of the firm gradually increased during private ownership.  
 
Leverage (FinDTA) was statistically insignificant after privatisation. 
 
There was an increase of the leverage during the private management though it was 
not statistically significant because the capital expenditure of PBPL had suddenly 
increased after 2014 with the investments of the Port Drive and local road network 
upgrade project and the use of world’s most advanced Under-Keel Clearance 
(UKC) system in the sea channel. These were revealed during the interviews that 
PBPL had grown and acquired assets especially after 2014. Accordingly, the 
greater portion of assets of PBPL was financed by equity than debts. Before the 
privatisation, PBPL had had a higher degree of leverage (FinDTA). For instance, 
during the state ownership of PBPL the average leverage ratio from 2005 to 2010 
was 0.48 whereas this number was 0.30 during the private ownership from 2012 to 
2017. Under the private management, PBPL showed a deteriorated financial risk 
profile and this means the firm would be able to pay its debts. However, this did 
not imply that PBPL had limited borrowings or debts because the financial reports 
show that their total debts (total liabilities) slightly increasing over time during the 
private management. This may be due to the write-down of Plant, Property and 
Equipment (PP&E) of PBPL after the privatisation. Relatively, the numbers of total 
debts after the privatisation did not exceed the numbers of total debts before the 
privatisation. As mentioned above, prior to privatisation, the average amount of 
leverage was about 48%. This means that about 48% of PBPL’s assets were 
financed by the creditors or debts while the other 52% was financed by the 
government. During post-privatisation, PBPL had maintained an average of 30% 
leverage rate (70% of assets were financed by the private owners whereas the other 
30% was by creditors/debts). Comparatively, this lower leverage ratio was more 
favourable for PBPL, as the higher the leverage ratio, the more the risk the firm 
has.  
 
Investment intensity (FinCEA) was not statistically significant after privatisation. 
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Even though there was a decrease of the values of FinCEA (which is positive), still 
it was statistically insignificant from MANOVA outcome due to the low 
reservation of finance on capital expenditure and the revaluation of fixed assets 
during the post-privatisation. It has been seen that the capital expenditure to acquire 
or upgrade PBPL’s fixed assets such as expenditures on property, plant or 
equipment had not been reserved during the first period of the private management 
(3rd  period, 2012-2014).  This can be seen even in the notes for accounts area of 
the financial reports during this period. Simultaneously, the new management had 
revaluated the fixed assets of PBPL. 
Investment intensity of PBPL was higher before the privatisation and then it 
decreased gradually during the second period (4th period of the analysis) of private 
ownership of PBPL. As per the interviews, this was due to two major investments 
that PBPL had done after privatisation, especially in 2015/16. A comment for the 
land reclamation section is provided below to highlight the value the company put 
on these types of activities. 
1. Port Drive upgrade- a $110 million upgrade to Port Drive and the local road network, 
delivering safer and more efficient port roads. This will ensure the PBPL continues to meet 
the needs of industry and customers as trade grows 
 As a part of the original privatisation contract, PBPL had to complete the AUS 
$110 million worth Port Drive project by August 2018. This investment included 
4.2 kilometers of duplication of Port Drive; a construction of new overpass, an 
advanced connector access, a few entry/exit accesses to surrounded highways, and 
a new shared path. At the end of the completion, this project adds values to the 
stakeholders as the longest pre-cast and pre-stressed concrete bridge in Australia. 
Also, it is the largest EME2 (Enrobés á Module Elevé) asphalt placement which is 
the latest French technology of building heavy load bearing roads, in Australia. 
Further, this project was incorporated with PBPL’s offsite stormwater management 
projects and in 2018, this project was awarded as the “Excellent” sustainability 
rating for its design by the Infrastructure Sustainability Council of Australia.  
2. The use of world’s most advanced Under-Keel Clearance (UKC) system in 
the sea channel- As a part of the Nonlinear Channel Optimisation Simulator 
System (NCOS Online system), UKC is probably the most sophisticated, safest 
and accurate clearing forecast systems in the world.  
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These acquisitions may increase the dropped investment intensity (higher value of 
FinCEA) during the second period of privatisation (2015-2017). In addition to that, 
the firm had invested on Nonlinear Channel Optimisation Simulator System 
(NCOS Online security system), Brisbane International Cruise Terminal (BICT), 
future port expansion projects, and offsite stormwater projects.  The impact of new 
investments showed on PBPL’s financial reports as the total assets on the balance 
sheets from 2015 to 2017 were increased. Even though, the new investments of 
PBPL after privatisation, had slightly increased its revenues, while such 
investments had decreased operational expenses especially in 2015 and in 2016. 
This was not strange as Psarouthakis (2013) explained, usually the anticipated gains 
from a privatised firm would take a few years as the transition of a privatised firm 
may take one year or more.  
Further, the decline of the total number of employees affected to lower the 
investment intensity ratio. During the state ownership the average employment of 
PBPL was 314 during 2005 and 2010. This created PBPL a considerable amount 
of labour cost which affected to increase the investment intensity number. 
However, during the private ownership from 2012 to 2017, PBPL had a significant 
labour redundant averaging 200 employees per annum and as a result of it, the cost 
of labour too declined. Consequently, the investment intensity of PBPL declined 
under private management. 
Overall, the assets impairment of PBPL and absence of major investment during 
the first three years after privatisation were the major reasons for the increase of 
ROA and ROE and the decline of leverage and investment intensity of PBPL under 
private ownership. When the net carrying values (acquisition cost- accumulated 
depreciation) of assets are greater than the future undiscounted cash flow, firms 
usually, impair their assets. This could happen when there are changes in 
regulations and business climate or technological changes within a firm. With the 
privatisation process, PBPL had regulations, business climate changes and 
technological changes in the firm and as a result, the new ownership impaired its 
assets. The new management had reported assets impartment losses in their income 
statements each year. Due to an impairment, long term assets on the balance sheet 
declines, creating a deferred tax asset. Also, an impairment loss in the income 
statement reduces the shareholders’ equity resulting in a lower debt to equity ratio.  
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A decrease in the book value of assets reduces the firm’s net income. Consequently, 
a decrease in the carrying amount of assets declines ROA and ROE in the particular 
year. A lower assets value and smaller depreciation expenses increase the future 
net income and current and future fixed assets turnover. This will also, decrease the 
debt to assets ratios (leverage) as well. However, cashflow based ratios will remain 
unaffected. 
Total Container Throughputs (TEUs) were statistically mounted. 
 
The number of TEUs of PBPL in 2005 doubled at the end of the survey period as 
it reached its maximum number of containers handled during the year 2017. The 
TEUs increased evidently in each year right from the beginning of the privatisation 
and until the end of the study period 2017. The heavy investments on new 
technology by private ownership after 2014, was the main reason for the growth of 
the TEUs of PBPL during the post-privatisation. All in all, private ownership of 
PBPL was adequately able to increase its port operations. Below are some interview 
findings for the rapid increase of TEUs of PBPL after privatisation.  
 
According to the interviews, the game changer of PBPL’s financial and 
environmental performance under the private ownership was the implementation 
of the new Nonlinear Channel Optimisation Simulator System (NCOS) in the port 
precinct which boosted the capacity of larger vessels handling facilities of the port 
without compromising safety. The application increased the operational flexibility, 
environmental protection protocols, and the efficiency of port operations while 
adding value to its customers. For instance, in 2017, the port welcomed the longest-
ever 347 metre, container ship; ‘Susan Maersk’ to its quays with a capacity of 
9500TEU.  According to the port records, PBPL experienced a significant uplift in 
the number of large cargo vessels calling due to the introduction of NCOS. 
Typically, the calling number of deep drafted bulk carrier ships above 14 metres 
was tripled while the calling number of carries above 13 metres was doubled. The 
application of NCOS has led the firm to win the Innovative Support Services award 
in 2017 and the Smart Infrastructure award in 2018.  
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The other most important reason for the increased performance of PBPL was that 
the port implemented a new decentralised digital ledger technology system called 
‘Blockchain’ which connects its way through banking business and technology 
firms internationally. This sophisticated system can hold information as a database 
while sharing and continually reconciling facilities. Also, when the privatisation 
deal was negotiated, the new ownership of PBPL entered into an agreement with a 
condition of investing AUS $ 110 million to upgrade the Port Drive and other local 
road network projects which have already been finished. Additionally, the extended 
and dedicated freight and rail connection to the port was another reason to enhance 
the accessibility to the port precinct. These upgraded Port Drive, local road network 
and extended rail and freight connections to the port have significantly reduced the 
travel time of trucks, movers and trains lowering the traffic congestions, road 
accidents and environmental pollutions around Brisbane city and its vicinity 
suburbs.    
 
According to the Transport and Main Road Minister of Queensland, Mark Baily, 
PBPL handles around $50 billion in international trade annually, provides business 
opportunities to 70 entrepreneurs while supporting thousands of jobs to the 
community. Adding to it, he claimed that as more than 3.1 million of vehicles travel 
on port roads annually, therefore, it is vital to invest in road, rail and waterside 
infrastructure which would support the growth of State. Further, the minister stated 
that this is a typical example of private industry working with the state to deliver a 
project which will benefit all Queenslanders in a way of saving their time and 
money (Lannunzio, 2018).  
 
Total Trade Throughput has been increased after privatisation. 
 
As described above, there were many reasons for the increase in the number of 
Total Container Throughputs (TEUs) after the privatisation of PBPL. With the 
increase of TEUs of PBPL, the total tonnage was increased gradually right after 
privatisation.  In addition to the above-mentioned reasons for the increase of TEUs 
which even affected to increase the total throughputs of PBPL, there were some 
other reasons the study had revealed during the interview sessions. One important 
reason was that during this period, PBPL had exported a considerable number of 
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agricultural products due to the improvements in the agricultural sector in 
Queensland. Agriculturally favourable weather, extensive research and 
developments and new investments in the agricultural sector, new settlements in 
Queensland, proper irrigational and water management systems during the period, 
increased government assistance in the agriculture sector, increased investments in 
the offsite stormwater management projects, and increased demand for the 
Queensland based agricultural products in the local and international markets were 
some of the  determinants of the development of the Queensland agriculture sector 
(DAF 2018). 
 
 According to the reports of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, in 2016, 
the contribution of the Agriculture and food industries was $19.87 billion-Gross 
Value of Production (GVP), Horticulture $4.5 billion GVP, livestock and livestock 
products-$9.3 billion GVP. A 3.6% of State economy was from the agriculture 
industry. These industries produce around $ 20 billion in output annually and half 
of which was exported, providing more than 17% of Queensland’s exports of 
goods.  Growth in total agricultural volumes accelerated to 1.1% per year since 
2006–07. 
 
The number of ships handled has been increased after the privatisation of PBPL.  
 
The above-mentioned reasons which enhanced the total TEUs, and the total 
tonnages of PBPL also involved in enhancing the total number of ships handled in 
PBPL after its privatisation. Other than that, there were some other reasons for these 
increases were found during the interview sessions. Compulsory pilotage service 
for the ships that have an overall length of 50 metres or above encouraged the 
shipping lines to accommodate the precinct more than ever before. Maintaining a 
24-hour listening watch on VHF channel 12 and confirming the Estimated Time of 
Arrival (ETA) of a ship two hours before via the channel, PBPL had provided value 
-added services to its stakeholders.  
 
Also, for the safety purpose, the new management of PBPL launched a 24 hours 
Vessels Traffic Service called REEFVTS in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait 
areas. Further, the use of Mudmaster vessel expedited the dredging and drying 
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process allowing more ships to be served at the precinct. The significance of this 
Mudmaster was that this dredging vessel had advanced technology to remove mud, 
and silts efficiently while protecting the flora and fauna in the area. Moreover, 
PBPL had a partnership with the University of Queensland to investigate sediment 
transport pathways in Moreton Bay. This included monitoring and assessing the 
dredged material placement area in the Mud Island.  All these facilities encouraged 
the shipping lines to visit the port while providing them with the highest safety for 
the ships and their contents. As a result, these initiatives were awarded by the 
Australian Shipping and Maritime medal for the environmental transport in 2016. 
A quote from the interviewee from the dredging department highlights the 
importance of these activities.  
We have seen reductions in emissions amongst many of our key measurables. We have in 
place a Target Zero program that is focusing on reducing our resource use and emissions to 
zero by the year 2030. We have a number of initiatives already in place including renewable 
energy, fuel management and upgrades to our dredging fleet to improve fuel economy and 
reduce emissions. 
 
An increase of TEUs, an increase in the number of ships to the port and an increase 
in the number of tonnages shipped through the port have an interrelation to each 
other. Therefore, a reason which affected to change one of the above would affect 
to change the others as well. 
The theory implication of these differences of financial ratios of PBPL is as 
explained by the theory of the firm, in correspondence to the increased profits, 
PBPL had increased its ROA, ROE, TEUs, tonnage, and the number of ships and 
had decreased its leverage and investment intensity. Therefore, the financial 
purpose of maintaining the port business by Q-Port Holdings shareholders (PBPL) 
is to maximise its profits.  
A decline of the total number of employees of PBPL after privatisation. 
The total employee number of PBPL was significantly high and increased before 
privatisation and it reached its maximum of 378 by 2009. Before the privatisation 
process, in 2010, PBPL had had 338 of full-time employment. After the 
privatisation, it gradually decreased until it reached its lowest 187 by the end of the 
survey period 2017. According to Megginson et al (1994), and Megginson and 
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Netter (2001), most privatised firms cut the number of employees’ jobs with the 
purpose of enhancing the labour productivity right after transition. It was evident 
that during state ownership, PBPL had a high number of employees especially 
during the second period of state ownership (from 2008 to 2010) with an average 
of 354 employees. After privatisation, the average total number of employees was 
significantly lower at 200. The decline of the total number of employment increased 
the heavy use of modern technology in the port operations which in return created 
a difference in the financial performance of PBPL.    
 
  The study was unable to determine the full labour demography (male and female 
numbers of employees) of PBPL for the pre-privatisation period. However, below 
are the full-time employee demographic statistics of PBPL for the second period of 
the private ownership of PBPL.  
 
2014-   Male- 142  Female – 29= 191  (4:1) 
2015-  Male- 142 Female- 49= 191 (3:1) 
2016-  Male- 158 Female- 53= 211 (3:1) 
2017-  Male- 140 Female- 47= 187 (3:1) 
 
As an equal employment opportunity provider by its HR policies, the company had 
provided opportunities for both males and females, although according to the above 
statistics the female participation in PBPL was still insignificant during the private 
ownership. The average of male to the female ratio which was 3:1 is not a balanced 
workforce as required in Australia under the Equal Opportunity for Women in the 
Workplace Amendment Bill 2012. While the specific industry sector stats are not 
available, Scutt (2018) provides male to female statistics that reveals there are some 
industry sectors where the male to female employment where an ‘imbalance’ 
occurs. According to the bill issued by the Federal Register of Legislation, 
Australian Ports may have a similar specific workplace gender imbalance  
 
Also, more information about a labour retrenchment was not revealed during the 
interviews, though the analyses of PBPL financial reports clearly depict the gradual 
increase of the total number of employees under state control and the gradual 
decrease of that number during the private ownership. This phenomenon would be 
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accepted by the theory of the firm as profits-oriented firms are normally concerned 
with their labour productivity though, under stakeholder theory, the firm should be 
responsible for its employees and their career prospects. Even though privatisation 
offers opportunities for the redistribution of wealth, a labour retrenchment increases 
the unemployment rate and opens gaps in economic distribution. According to 
Megginson and Netter (2001), labour retrenchment is an unresolved issue in 
privatised firms. It would be important if this study was able to investigate the 
labour retrenchment at PBPL, the compensation they had been paid and the socio-
economic issues they suffer after their job cut, though the interviews were unable 
to divulge such sensitive information. 
 
Total energy consumption ratio has been declined.  
MANOVA analysis revealed that the Total Energy Consumption ratio was 
significantly decreased after the privatisation of PBPL. Energy consumption is vital 
to a port as a healthier energy consumption would balance the environmental 
challenges with economic demands. Also, it would be important in port operations 
and port related activities. This low energy consumption practice of a port is called 
as the “Greenport” concept. During the interviews, it was revealed that PBPL had 
developed and had been working on an action plan to encourage energy efficiency 
solutions in order to achieve success in its operations after privatisation.  
 
 Firstly, PBPL installed an energy monitoring system in the port precinct and its 
terminal to assess current energy consumption and its costs. Accordingly, the port 
identified the energy consumption sources to discover its energy reduction 
potentials. The commissioner of the Department of the Environment and Energy 
advised PBPL the importance of the formulation of energy and reduction plan at 
the process level, in order to coordinate energy efficiency actions. This helped the 
port to demonstrate success terminals which encouraged PBPL to apply for energy 
efficiency certificates from recognised bodies to gain a competitive edge. These 
initiatives led PBPL to formulate long-term sustainability strategies in order to 
assist port and terminals to meet future energy needs. Also, low maintained energy 
consumption by a port assists the government to formulate energy efficiency 
strategies and policies for the future. 
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There were many projects and programs for a better environment which had been 
taken by private ownership. However, some of them had been initiated by state 
ownership before the privatisation process. For instance, PBPL had an 
Environmental Management System (EMS) which was externally certified to 
ISO14001 in May 2000 (Before the privatisation). The system is audited every three 
(3) years for re-certification and surveillance audits are conducted annually.  
 
The firm’s Environmental Management System (EMS) was sophisticated as it 
concentrated on air and water quality, marine ecology (seagrass and mangroves), 
seawall, weeds, solar, fauna, and shorebirds. Therefore, the firm made decisions on 
top of the sustainability concept which related to the environment, society and 
economy. There were extensive monitoring programs in place to manage all 
processes and systems. Key operational areas of PBPL were measured by indexes 
such as Land Use Plan (LUP), Operational Environmental Management Plan 
(OEMP), State Planning Policy (SPP), and Construction Environmental 
Management Plan (CEMP). Also, the private management was conducting some 
regular programs such as Mangrove Health Monitoring Program (MHP), Seagrass 
Monitoring Program (SMP), and Land Reclamation process/Survey and in addition 
to those, the firm was considering the feedback of the community through the 
Community Consultative Committee (CCC).  
In order to comply with the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System 
(NGERS), the firm also had a thorough tracking of fuel through vessel logs and 
fuel purchasing records. The company had a fuel management process in addition 
to the mechanical and technical upgrading of its dredging fleets such as Ken Harvey 
and TSHD Brisbane. Most importantly, PBPL used renewable energy in order to 
reduce the high level of energy consumption. Those systems and procedures were 
accurately maintained and as a result of proper maintenance, PBPL had achieved 
an enhanced environmental performance than pre-privatisation era.  
The other environmental programs PBPL conducted were; the Land Use Plan 
(LUP), the Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP), the 
Operational Environmental Management Plan (OEMP), Healthy Waterways 
Erosion and Sediment Control toolkit, stormwater management design which 
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complies with the State Planning Policy (SPP), offsite stormwater management and 
quality investment payment scheme were some of its other important projects.  
 
The Land Use Plan (LUP) is the primary and the most comprehensive instrument 
of PBPL which regulates the development of Brisbane core port land under the 
Transport Infrastructure Act 1994, approved by the Queensland State Government. 
This LUP came into effect in February 2014, under the private ownership of PBPL. 
According to the LUP, there were 4 strategic themes in its environmental 
management process. They were; economic development, essential facilities and 
infrastructure, natural environment and amenity, community and character. The 
LUP consists of five development use codes and three development standard codes. 
The development use codes focused on the land use activities whereas the 
development standard codes focused on the technical aspects of development 
proposals. According to the interviews, basically, the plan provides a strategic 
framework for the development activities on core port land identifying preferred 
land use outcomes. The plan illustrates strategies of port’s infrastructure 
requirements, while working as a statutory document approved by the government 
with all the inputs from the Brisbane City Council, Community Consultative 
Committee, and industry stakeholders. As Freeman (1984) explained in his 
stakeholder theory, a firm has the responsibility of operating in the interest of not 
only the shareholders but also all its stakeholders. Accordingly, PBPL has been 
performing well after its privatisation as the firm has shown concerns about the 
expectations of shareholders as well as the stakeholders.  
 
Moreover, PBPL engages in a number of offsite storm water management projects 
partnered with the Queensland government (Department of Environmental and 
Heritage Protection, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and 
Planning, Department of Science, Information, Technology and Innovation), Plan- 
future, Alluvium, BMT WBM ( a leading consulting firm in mechanical, water and 
environmental engineering, maritime, and hydraulics), Griffith University 
(Australian Rivers Institute), Healthy Land and Water, Mulgowie Farming 
Company, and Lockyer Valley Regional Council in stabilizing and rehabilitating 
eroded creek bank along Laidley Creek.  
 
 
108 
 
Queensland waterways and environment face significant issues of sediments runoff 
which impact the water quality and ecosystem health of Moreton bay and Brisbane 
River. According to the survey reports of PBPL and the Department of 
Environmental and Heritage Protection and the interview information received, it 
has been revealed that each year approximately 400000 tonnes of sediments come 
from lower Brisbane River in the Lockyer Valley. Heavy rains in the valley area 
bring sediments from catchments through degraded creeks with dirty water which 
then transfer those sediments to Brisbane river and into Moreton Bay. According 
to the interview sessions, news articles and other reports by the Department of 
Environmental and Heritage Protection, the devastating Queensland floods in 2013 
had brought and deposited more than 2 million tonnes of sediments and silts in the 
port’s navigational channels in the Moreton bay leading the port to close all its 
operations for more than 3 days requiring extensive maintenance dredging works 
to safely reopen the channels. The comment from the community relations section 
highlights the basis on which decisions were made.  
All of our decisions are made with environmental, social and economic considerations. All 
our development assessments elements of sustainability in construction and operation. 
PBPL have an extensive list of monitoring programs to manage the surrounding 
environment and have numerous community programs to ensure the local communities are 
involved with PBPL decisions and developments. 
The relevance of the offsite storm water treatment projects is that such projects 
prevent the sediment runoff into Moreton bay resulting in saving a considerable 
amount of energy consumption on dredging, bed levelling, and other marine 
operations which are important to maintain safe navigable depths of the port’s 
navigational channel. As interviewees mentioned, dredging and bed levelling 
activities are cost-effective. Also, they are highly regulated and are subject to strict 
State and Commonwealth operational and environmental legislations.  
After the devastation, PBPL found the most effective way of treating sediment and 
silt runoff was to improve overall waterway health in order to reduce future flood 
events which would stop port operations. As per the interviewees, that key finding 
was expedited by the extensive research which suggested that tackling debris and 
sediment pollutions at their sources would deliver the most effective environmental 
outcomes. Consequently, PBPL had started conservations and invested 
considerably on Healthy waterways and Catchments projects with the expectation 
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of continuing the port activities and operations even during floods without 
turbulences.  
Even though the firm has achieved a significant improvement of environmental 
performance after the privatisation, it was revealed during the interviews that the 
firm still does not work with the Queensland Climate Adaptation Strategy Q-CAS. 
Since the state ownership, the firm had an air quality monitoring program (2003-
2011). This long-term air quality monitoring program values were compared 
against the Air Quality National Environmental Protection Measure (NEPM) 
guideline values. Under the state management, the firm had had roadside 
monitoring programs between 2006 and 2008 though, it was abandoned after the 
privatisation. Instead, the firm had started a new real Time Monitoring Program in 
2013 and its results were compared against the National Environmental Protection 
Measure (NEPM) guideline values. However, the firm has been continuing the Nest 
Boxes Program (NBP) up to date and this program provides habitats and physical 
buffers for native as well as immigrant species. Also, some other critics about the 
environmental practices of PBPL will be discussed in the CO2 emission section 
below.  
Total Emission of CO2 Tonnes had significantly reduced after privatisation. 
It was revealed by the MANOVA analysis that the total emission of CO2 tonnes of 
PBPL had significantly reduced after its privatisation. According to MANOVA 
analysis, there was an average of 12460 tonnes of CO2 annually emitted during 
2012 and 2017 (post-privatisation). This number was 17962 tonnes (annual 
average) during the state ownership between 2005 and 2010. Basically, the average 
difference of CO2 emissions of PBPL between pre and post-privatisation was 6958 
tonnes. The least emission under the state ownership which was 15514 tonnes was 
reported in 2010 and the maximum; 21490 tonnes were reported during 2008. There 
was a sudden decline in the CO2 emission right after the privatisation and it was 
13725 tonnes for the year 2012. For the next three years, this number was below 
12000 tonnes annually until it rose up again over 12000 tonnes in 2016 and 2017.  
As many of the interviewees revealed, the main reasons for these changes are as 
below. Air quality monitoring programs (2003-2011), Real-Time Monitoring 
Programs (2013), thorough log tracking and purchase records of fuel usage in 
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compliance to the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS), 
considerations of the feedback of the community and other stakeholders through 
Community Consultative Committee (CCC), Mangrove Health Monitoring 
Program, comprehensive Environmental Management System (EMS), ISO 14001 
certification and its audit process, complying with the National Guidelines for 
Dredging (NAGD), adherence to the Environmental Relative Activities (ERA) 
required by the Queensland Environmental Protection Act 1994, complying with 
the National Environmental Protection Measures (NEPM), “Target-Zero by 2030” 
emission program, complying with the RAMSAR convention to protect seabirds, 
extensive research on coastal seascapes for commercial fisheries productions, 
complying with State Planning Policy (SPP), parented with Japan-Australia 
Migratory Bird Agreement (JAMBA) and China-Australia Migratory Bird 
Agreement (CAMBA), complying with the department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection (DEHP), complying with the Environmental Protection (Air) 
Policy 2008, partnered with the Queensland Wader Study Group (QWSH) to 
protect seabirds, and  shorebird monitoring programs are some of them. 
However, in 2016, both total emission of CO2 and total energy consumption ratios 
of PBPL were higher than to the values in any other years between 2010 and 2017. 
The interviewees revealed this was due to the Port Drive upgrade project conducted 
by PBPL in 2015/16. However, according to the Land Use Plan 2015, the purpose 
of upgrading the port drive was to reduce the impact of the largest landside CO2 
emission source (container handling equipment) recommended by both 2007/08 
and 2010 environmental surveys. However, it is expected to yield the positive 
outcomes of port drive upgrade in future.  
During the discussions, the authorities emphasised that they undertake landside and 
waterside emissions inventory and air quality modelling in the precinct though, it 
should be mentioned here that the last Landside Emission Survey was done in 2010 
which was before the change of ownership of PBPL. Since then, no recent survey 
has been conducted.  Also, there was a previous survey in 2007/2008 done by PBPL 
under the state ownership, and its recommendations were as below.  
o Required new and updated emission estimation methods for different 
transport modes to the port area. 
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o Required further examination and analysis of Cargo Handling Equipment 
(CHE) activity data to verify emission standard equivalences of the CHE 
equipment in the country.  
o Required the port to review CHE emission factor models in the USA, Japan 
and Europe 
o Required a driver survey 
o Required a sophisticated calculation of truck emissions 
o Required a thorough examination on the contribution to N2O emissions 
from rails as the current value was very high (50%) 
o Required to review overseas models 
Also, the report revealed that container handling equipment in the port precinct was 
the largest landside emission. However, according to the interview information, 
PBPL has not taken any actions for the above-mentioned recommendations.  
It is noteworthy to mention that the interviewees of PBPL asserted that they have 
not performed any benchmarking to compare the use of natural resources by PBPL 
compared to other ports in Australia. According to the interviews, PBPL had the 
overall CO2 measurements though it did not have measurement, reporting and 
verification process in monitoring and reducing non-CO2 and Green House Gas 
(GHG) such as Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6). One reason for not having 
or measuring these gases could be that PBPL does not comply with ISO 14064-1 
which is for the global standard for developing Carbon footprints and GHG 
Protocol. However, ports such as Rotterdam and Oslo measure their carbon 
footprints and as a result, those ports have become one of the most efficient ports 
in the world (WPCI, 2010). 
As revealed during the interviews, PBPL does not disclose its CO2 emissions or 
reduction initiatives. The interviewees stated that the firm has an emission target 
though, PBPL does not obtain any third-party verification of CO2 emissions. PBPL 
has CO2 emission action plans (such as NPI and NGERS), a responsible person, 
and energy effective designs (solar on operations base buildings and Practical 
Completion Inspection-PCI, Greenstar rated buildings). Also, PBPL does not have 
the technology to improve truck and cargo handling equipment efficiency. The 
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other initiatives that PPBPL does not have are, shore-side power availability for 
ships, measures to minimise train/truck/ship waiting times, and policies for carries 
to reduce emissions. The firm has waste reduction targets, facilities for ship waste 
disposal, policies and measurements against targets though, it does not have 
policies for public disclosure of performance. Further, the interviewees stated that 
the firm does not have policies to manage wastewater, no measures of wastewater 
management and water conservation and public disclosure of information. 
Moreover, they asserted that the firm does not have oil and water separator at the 
precinct.  
According to the interviews, the land reclamation process of PBPL had not 
identified some important things such as the potential risks, benefits or impacts of 
chemical use reduction targets, policies and procedures for the reduction of 
construction equipment noise, storages for hazardous goods, disposal of regulated 
waste (fuel, oil, chemicals and sewage), rubbish, general waste and site clean-up, 
impacts on flora and fauna.  
As a summary, PBPL had environmental programs since state ownership though, 
such programs were more regulated and emphasised under the private management 
and this led the firm to achieve a significant environmental performance after its 
privatisation. As a result, the firm won the Healthy Waterways award-2016, 
Australian Engineering Excellence award-2016, Australian Shipping and Maritime 
Industry award-2016. As stakeholder theory states, a firm has the responsibility on 
all stakeholders during its business including the community and the environment. 
Accordingly, the study has been convinced by the reports, interview information 
and sites observations that under the private ownership, PBPL engaged its business 
in a responsible manner not only to its shareholders but also to all its stakeholders. 
However, the firm has significant environmental performance initiatives yet to 
commence.  
5.3 Chapter summary 
 
A MANOVA test was run to check the null hypothesis of no group mean difference 
in the sample after the privatisation of PBPL, in order to determine to what extent 
has privatisation impacted upon the financial and environmental performance of 
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PBPL. There were no outliers in the data set as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. 
All financial and environmental data of PBPL were normally distributed during 
both state and private ownership as assessed by Shapiro-Wilks test (p >0.05). 
Multivariate tests result of MANOVA was statistically significant and the Pillai’s 
Trace value for the independent variable showed a significant value and therefore, 
the null hypothesis of no group mean difference in the sample was therefore 
rejected. The null hypothesis; homogeneity of variances, of Levene’s test of 
Equality of Variances was accepted as the variances of the two groups are equal. 
However, out of twelve in two occasions, the test satisfied the homogeneity of 
variances among the data. According to the literature, this situation is neglected as 
the literature explains that such a difference is possible in a small number of 
observations in a sample. Also, if the normality assumption (here the Shapiro-Wilks 
test results) is satisfied then such insignificance can be ignored. Also, the graphical 
method; Q-Q plots here show the normality of distribution. Further, if the 
Multivariate test already has proven that there is a difference between groups, the 
conclusion can be drawn on the Multiple Comparisons test results of MANOVA. 
Additionally, a new Levene’s test with trimmed data is attached to Appendix 3 
section. Therefore, this study would not intend to correct for this violation using an 
adjustment to the degree of freedom with the support of a t-Test such as Welch-
Satterthwaite method. Multiple Comparisons test showed an overall statistical 
significance of the difference of ten out of twelve indicators. Except for the number 
of ships and the investment intensity of PBPL all other selected performance 
indicators have statistical significance during the private ownership. This has been 
precisely explained by the Homogeneous subsets and qualitative interview 
outcomes. Therefore, comparatively, the financial and environmental performance 
of PBPL under private ownership overwhelmed the state ownership as the results 
of the test show that those differences laid in the private ownership periods of 
PBPL. 
The qualitative analysis has used the significant and non-significant results of 
MANOVA as an investigative analysis tool to frame the open-ended questions to 
gather the reasons for such differences from interviewees. Overall, both the 
financial and environmental performances of PBPL were improved during private 
ownership (between 2012 and 2017) compared to state ownership (between 2005 
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and 2010). FinROA and FinROA had been improved in ten times during private 
management than to state management as the change of capital structure of the firm. 
FinDTA also, had an increase during the post-privatisation period though that 
increase was not statistically significant as the new management had not spent on 
major investments during the first three years right after the privatisation. They had 
heavily invested in acquiring long term assets after 2014. Investment intensity 
(FinCEA) values of PBPL were considerably higher before the privatisation and it 
reduced gradually during the post-privatisation periods. However, it had become 
statistically insignificant as both the low reservation of capital expenditure during 
the first three years after privatisation and the revaluation of fixed assets by the 
private ownership.  
Total Container Throughputs (TEUs) had been statistically increased during private 
ownership because the new management had heavily invested in new technology 
during 2014 and 2017. Also, Total Trade Throughput (FinTonnes) and the total 
number of ships have been increased after privatisation. One reason for these 
increases is that the heavy investment of private ownership on the port operations 
after privatisation was forefront. There was a decline in the total number of 
employees of PBPL after privatisation as PBPL had redundant employees after the 
change of ownership of PBPL in 2011. The total energy consumption ratio and the 
total Emission of CO2 values of PBPL after privatisation had been significantly 
reduced as the private ownership of PBPL had been practising significant 
environmental protection and conservation policies and procedures in their daily 
operations.  
In conclusion, both the financial and environmental performances of PBPL have 
been improved during private ownership than it was owned by the State. Also, the 
improvement had begun after 2014 and it can be expected more positive outcomes 
in future.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This research has investigated the impact of privatisation on the financial and 
environmental performance of Port of Brisbane under pre and post-privatisation 
conditions. Thus, based on the theory of the firm and stakeholder theory, this study 
investigated the potential impact of privatisation of PBPL.  Using twelve indicators 
which represented both financial and environmental performance as dependent 
variables, this study performed quantitative MANOVA tests and qualitative 
interview sessions in order to determine the impact of the change of ownership of 
PBPL on its financial and environmental performance. The two variables; financial 
and environmental were represented by 12 indicators. Prior to conduct MANOVA, 
tests (i.e., Shapiro-Wilks test, Mahalanobis Distance test, Pearson correlation, Q-Q 
plots analysis, Scatterplot matrices, and Levene’s F test) were conducted to satisfy 
the MANOVA assumptions of the selected dataset. 
A one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis to prove that there 
were no changes in the financial and environmental performance of Port of 
Brisbane under either private ownership or state ownership. A statistically 
significant MANOVA effect was obtained by, Pillai’s Trace=0.003α, F (24, 9) = 
6.55, P<0.05; Pillai’s Trace =2.84, Partial η2 0.95. However, it was still unclear 
where the difference lies. Therefore, the study performed Multiple Comparison 
Tuckey’s post-hoc test for the areas of differences and found that both financial and 
environmental performance of PBPL under private ownership was better than to 
state ownership.  
 
As the overall multivariate test was statistically significant, this study concluded 
that the respective effect of change of ownership of PBPL from state ownership to 
private ownership has statistically significantly changed the financial and 
environmental performance of the firm. However, there were some indicators 
which violated the completion of MANOVA tests assumptions, and therefore, this 
study cannot reject the null hypothesis. Instead, the null hypothesis of ‘no 
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differences in the financial and environmental performance of Port of Brisbane 
under either private ownership or state ownership’, has not been accepted as true.   
This situation aligns with the theory of the firm as PBPL performs and makes 
decisions to maximise profits creating as much of a gap between its revenues and 
costs under private ownership after the privatisation. However, the magnitude of 
profit maximisation of PBPL after privatisation is not significant as the theory of 
the firm expects and therefore, this can be concluded as PBPL’s goal is to maximise 
profits in the long-term and not in the short-term. This is because, the firm adheres 
to stakeholder theory as the private management is aware of a strong focus on profit 
maximisation would yield with a level of risk in regarding public perception and a 
loss of goodwill between PBPL, investors, consumers, government and the public. 
The interview sessions revealed that private sector management had undoubtedly 
led to cut costs, heavily depended on modern technology in port operations and 
environmental protection initiatives. Private ownership actively participated in 
protecting the environment including not only flora and fauna but also most of the 
hinterlands attached to the Brisbane River while actively engaged in profit-seeking 
port operation activities. The guiding lights for these were an amalgamation of the 
competition, the recognition of the goals that represent the public interest by the 
private management and the obligations of the privatisation agreement. However, 
in this study, both qualitative and quantitative analyses did not focus on the link 
between the compensation of private managers and the improved financial and 
environmental performance of PBPL. 
The private management of PBPL has invested more capital (not borrowed money) 
on Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) during the period. This approach is 
supported by stakeholder theory which demonstrates that stakeholders to not react 
well when companies over rely on borrowings. Also, PBPL has used new 
technology in their port operations during the period and this involved in enhancing 
the TEUs, the number of ships served, and the total tonnage handled. Also, the 
sustainability concept of private management of PBPL sufficed to increase 
environmental performance after privatisation. It has been revealed during the 
interviews that the implementations of environmentally friendly policies and 
procedures at the port precinct have been forced by the heavy use of new 
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technology especially after 2015 and the port management had to comply with the 
standards of the service and technology providers of state-of-the-art technology in 
order to subscribe to their services. The increase of using new technology had 
reduced the total number of employments of PBPL after privatisation and as a 
result, the productivity of the human resources had been improved during the 
private ownership. 
The success of profits maximisation of PBPL lays on the perfect balance between 
the heavy cost-cutting and the considerable amount of capital investment on assets 
of PBPL by the private management. Such a perfect balance between cost cutting 
and investment on assets did not hurt PBPL’s the short -run profits but would assist 
with the long-run viability of the firm signifying the difference of the ownership 
between the government and the private sector of PBPL. Profit maximisation aligns 
with the goals of stakeholder theory suggesting that PBPL has been focused on 
improving profitability to meet the needs of stakeholders and to ensure the 
continuing success of the company. PBPL privatisation process involved the 
displacement of one set of state management entrusted by the shareholders 
(government-ministry) with another set of private management who may have 
answered to a completely different set of shareholders (the stakeholders). At the 
beginning, private ownership of PBPL may not have compunction about adopting 
profit-making business strategies or corporate practices which create sustainable 
port service though, the private management was heavily influenced by the terms 
and conditions of the PBPL privatisation agreement, corporate governance 
(consonance), accountability, the competitions created by the vicinity ports, the 
advantages of the geographical location of PBPL, and organisational mechanism 
(financial strength of the new investors) As a result, PBPL ensured its business 
affairs and operational activities in meeting its financial, operational and 
environmental strategic objectives in order to achieve long term sustainability.  
For this, it was revealed in the interview sessions that the new management of 
PBPL had generated a sharp increase in its shareholder value through correct 
market anticipations of improvements in performance, heavy use of modern 
technology in port operations and services, and general managerial effectiveness. 
These might come from the elimination of unnecessary staff employed during the 
state ownership and the cessation of unprofitable port activities inherited from state 
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ownership. Therefore, it is important to research thoroughly, under what conditions 
did private management of PBPL perform in the public’s interest while maximising 
profits in a sustainable manner. 
Additionally, the firm was in contract with the government to implement new 
policies and procedures in order to achieve and maintain the rules and regulations 
of the government and other assessment bodies. As a result, the company had 
reduced its total energy consumption and the total Carbon emissions levels after 
privatisation. Also, the contribution to the conservation of flora and fauna around 
the port precinct, and managing wetlands were immense. Even though, there were 
some environmental performance activities available for PBPL to concern. 
Measurements to report and verify Green House Gas (GHG) and actions for 
achieving ISO 14064-1 which was for the global standard for developing Carbon 
footprints and GHG Protocol were some of the initiatives that PBPL could consider 
in future. This is also aligned with stakeholder theory, in that, achieving these goals, 
has provided assurance to one of the major stakeholders (the government) that they 
are able to meet the agreed targets and achieve positive environmental impacts.  
Overall, it was interesting that some of the stakeholders’ responsibilities especially 
the environment and the public had been emphasised by the private management 
of PBPL after privatisation. This could be a typical example of  a privatised firm, 
which seemed to operate under stakeholder theory after privatisation while 
generating profits.    
Therefore, this study concluded that overall, both financial and environmental 
performance of PBPL were improved due to the change of ownership of PBPL.  It 
was evident that the port’s throughputs, during the private ownership was increased 
incredibly and this indicated as the financial and operational performance of PBPL 
were increased during 2012 and 2017. However, as per Talley (2007), it was 
doubtful to conclude as PBPL has reached its optimum throughput (economic or 
engineering) during this period unless the study revealed the actual throughput of 
PBPL.   
6.1 Limitations of the study 
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As a case study, this research performed a single-port evaluation approach and the 
findings of this study cannot be necessarily applicable to all privatised ports in 
Australia unless the same political and environmental situations arise. Also, some 
argue that case studies are narrow fields of investigation and the results cannot be 
generalised or extrapolated to fit an entire population. Also, as PBPL has 
procedures of no public disclosure of performance some information cannot be 
accessed and it would be an issue for the methodology and conclusion. However, 
to overcome this limitation, the study followed various strategies including 
interview sessions and cross-sectional data refereeing through various sources. If 
this study could have an opportunity to select more environmental performance 
indicators which could perhaps balance the selection of criteria in between the 
financial and environmental performance, and then the outcome may be more 
significant.  
Further, some of the unsatisfied MANOVA assumptions and their impact on the 
study could be the most important limitation of this research. When the assumptions 
were not satisfied, the study has always conducted any available option as an 
alternative.  Accordingly, tests such as Levene’s, Multiple Compression tests and 
Test of Between-subject Effect tests have a second analysis in Appendix 3 and 4 as 
when the indicators did not satisfy the test assumptions, the study has selected the 
second-best option in order to satisfy the test assumptions. In a situation when some 
of the indicators did not satisfy the test hypothesis, while the majority does, the 
study has chosen to represent the outcome of the majority indicators. This situation 
can be justified as being this a case study (single firm’s performance), some of the 
assumptions could not be met when analysing differences of variables by a general 
testing method such as MANOVA.  
While the MANOVA results provide support for improvements in performance 
occurring during the private sector ownership, it should be acknowledged that there 
may be a possible “history effect”;  there improvements in these measures may 
have occurred regardless of ownership change.  However, this would require an 
examination of another port that has remained in government ownership to provide 
a benchmark, which is beyond the scope of this Master’s thesis project. 
6.2 Suggestions and recommendations 
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Shleifer (1998), suggests the social goals that private ownership fails to address, 
can be handled by state regulations and contracting without resort to state 
ownership. Further, he states that whether regulated or not, the benefits of private 
delivery of many goods and services are just beginning to be realised and public 
interests can probably be provided cheaper and attractively by private ownership 
than state ownership. This study’s finding, therefore, suggests a model of 
evaluating the impact of privatisation based on stakeholder theory.  
Also, it should be interesting to conduct future research based on the real purpose 
of the privatisation is as the profit maximisation or the stakeholder satisfaction or a 
combination of both as suggested under the ethical branch of stakeholder theory. In 
other words, it would be worth to investigate what makes the government to 
privatise its firms. That is the decision to privatise a firm motivated by the theory 
of the firm or stakeholder theory (either ethical branch or managerial branch), or is 
it possible for both to occur simultaneously? Also, it is important for future studies 
to test the model from this study for a multi-port performance evaluation approach 
on the same topic with reference to other ports in Australia such as Port of 
Melbourne and Fremantle. If this future multi-port performance evaluation research 
is conducted, it could be significant as an Australian multiport analysis would 
reveal a comparison of the performance or the efficiency of the selected major ports 
in Australia.  
Further, it has been revealed during the interview sessions that PBPL does not have 
adequate environmental protection procedures for Greenhouse Gas (GHG), energy, 
construction equipment noise, storage of hazardous goods, chemical use reduction 
targets, and policies to manage water. It could be, therefore vital to research on the 
economic, environmental, social cost and benefits of waste and waste related 
activities of PBPL. Also, it is important to study on anti-incumbency of PBPL 
privatisation issues related to trade unions, corporate social responsibilities, 
protecting stakeholders’ and shareholders’ rights and PBPL’s preparedness to 
address those issues. Again, this study emphasises PBPL, the importance of taking 
partnership in the Queensland Climate Adaptation Strategy (Q-CAS) as being 
instrumental in the development of the Queensland climate strategy would ensure 
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the betterment of diverse economies, landscapes and communities in the State. 
Also, apart from this study, none of the empirical research in Australia has studied 
the environmental impact of privatisation of any industry including ports. 
Extending the scope of future studies to include the environmental impact of 
privatisation of any industry including ports would be warranted and timely. 
Moreover, in future privatisation of state-owned assets, the intervention of 
government after the privatisation process, and the terms and conditions of the 
privatisation agreement with the new management can be suggested as two 
fundamentals of achieving the success of privatised SOEs. If these conditions were 
not met, continued state involvement may likely be necessary. In conclusion, the 
simple transfer of ownership from state ownership to private ownership will not 
necessarily reduce the costs, enhance the quality of services, and improve 
performance. 
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APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEW LINES OF ENQUIRY 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND 
TOOWOOMBA CAMPUS 
Interview Lines of Enquiry 
Interview of Privatised Enterprise 
Interviewer’s instruction: 
The objective of this research is to examine how privatisation has been implemented in Port of 
Brisbane Proprietary Limited (PBPL) and its impact on the financial operational and environmental 
performance. In this interview, we are interested in exploring the effect of privatisation on the 
performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) particularly, in relation to profitability, investment, 
port operations, employment, and environmental management. Information obtained here will be 
treated strictly confidentially and your name will not be used in any publications or reports.  
COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
Participant’s background information-Nadene Perry- Environmental Advisor 
Has the respondent been working in the firm both before and after privatisation? 
Yes…………………………… No…No……………………. 
1. What relationship with the community does PBPL have? 
PBPL has an active and positive relationship with our community. We have quarterly 
meetings through our Community Consultative Committee (CCC) where we received 
feedback and continually improve our operations to minimize impacts on our local 
community.  
 
Notes- N says that CCC grants local NGOs and charities funding of up to $2500. 
 
Contacted Hemmant Flexible Learning; one of the community learning Centres to reassure 
their grants for the year 2017, to operate 'Besty the coffee Cart and established a pop-up 
cinema enterprise, though they haven’t replied yet (Did not reply). 
 
2. What are the other organisations you working with in?  
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PBPL works with numerous organisations ranging from government, NGOs and 
universities.  
Notes- For instance; The Smith Family, PA research Foundation, Crime Stoppers, 
Queensland University of Technology-QUT -International Laboratory for Air quality and 
Health, Research on intermodal terminal Systems 
 
Also, Volunteer Marine Rescue, Tangalooma Eco Marines, Moreton Bay Environmental 
Education Centre and Yulu-Burri-Ba Aboriginal Corporation for Community Health. 
 
3. How does PBPL facilitate the trade and economic growth of the state while contributing to 
protecting, enhancing and sustaining the environment people and the community? 
All of our decisions are made with environmental, social and economic 
considerations. All our development assessments elements of sustainability in 
construction and operation. PBPL have an extensive list of monitoring programs to 
manage the surrounding environment and have numerous community programs to 
ensure the local communities are involved with PBPL decisions and developments. 
Notes- Offsite storm water management projects- partnered with the Queensland 
government-(Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, Department of 
Infrastructure, Local government and Planning, Department of Science, Information 
Technology and Innovation), Planfuture, Alluvium, BMT WBM-(BMT WBM is a leading 
edge consultancy in mechanical, maritime, water and environmental engineering and 
hydraulics), Griffith University (Australian Rivers Institute), Healthy Waterways and 
Catchments, and Mulgowie Farming Company, Lockyer Valley Regional Council-In  
stabilising and rehabilitating eroded creek bank along Laidley Creek – 
Awards won 
• 2016 Healthy Waterways Awards - Sustainable Water Management Award and the 
Minister’s Grand Prize 
• 2016 Australian Engineering Excellence Awards - Queensland Environmental Excellence 
Award 
• 2016 Australian Shipping and Maritime Industry Awards - Environmental Transport 
Awards 
  , Port drive and local road network upgrade- $110 million, Air quality monitoring 
programmes, provide habitat and physical buffers for native species-nest boxes, Weed 
Surveys, maintaining mangrove ecosystems in Moreton Bay, Mangrove health assessments 
programmes, Research on Coastal Seascapes for Commercial Fisheries Production, In 
2014- Future Port Expansion Seawall Ecological Assessment, Following the RAMSAR 
convention to protect seabirds, also to protect seabirds, PBPL partnered with the 
Queensland Wader Study Group (QWSG), 2017 Shorebird Monitoring Report, provide 
habitat to migratory shorebirds under the Japan Australia Migratory Bird Agreement 
(JAMBA) and the China Australia Migratory Bird Agreement (CAMBA),  
4. What are the community welfare programmes, initiatives or grants does PBPL contribute to? 
https://www.portbris.com.au/Community/Partnerships/  
Notes- as above in Q 2,  
 
5. What does the company expect from such programmes? 
 
PBPL expect the company to link to PBPLs organizational values of safety, people, 
innovation, integrity and accountability. Provide a platform for PBPL to 
communicate its commitment to being socially and environmentally responsible and 
engage with its stakeholders such as customers, government, environment and 
community groups. 
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Note- to comply with the government regulations, to bring stakeholder, community and 
government output together 
DREDGING DEPARTMENT 
Participant’s background information-Michael Linde- Environmental Advisor 
Has the respondent been working in the firm both before and after privatisation? 
Yes…………………………… No………No………………. 
 
1. What are the ground improvement techniques that PBPL uses to speed up the consolidation 
of the dredged mud and deep deposits of soft clay which underlie the area? 
PBPL has trialed the use of a Mudmaster to speed up the drying process. The 
Mudmaster moves over the mud via the use of rotating scrolls, which turns the mud 
and speeds the drying process. Once the mud is dry the ponds are overlain with 2 of 
clean sand. Wick drains are then installed across the site to allow the dredged mud 
and in-situ soft clays to consolidate.  
 
2. What are the issues needed to be addressed during the process? 
Management of tail water, large amounts of planning works prior to works starting, 
appropriate mitigation, acid sulphate soils, identifying, monitoring and managing 
potential environmental values as well as flora and fauna.  
 
3. Does the company operate under an Environmental Management System? Yes 
 
4. How is the EMS of PBPL certified? 
PBPL’s EMS was externally certified to ISO14001 in May 2000. The system is audited 
for re-certification every three (3) years and surveillance audits are conducted 
annually. 
 
5. What does PBPL environmental policy specify about the protection of environment? 
https://www.portbris.com.au/About/Stateernance/Business-Policies/  
 
Notes- Environment Policy 
 
“The Health & Safety, Environment and Quality Policies outline our commitment to 
minimising harm to persons, property, process and the environment, and to continuous 
improvement of our planning and practices” 
Environmental- we will ensure we protect our environment by incorporating environmental 
considerations into all decision making. We will meet all our obligations and ensure continual 
improvement in our environmental performance by, at a minimum, adopting the following 
principles- 
• Develop measurable environmental objectives and targets, including prevention 
of pollution, through a risk-based approach to environmental management 
• Conduct regular reviews of the company’s environmental performance and 
implement improvements as required 
• Keep up-to-date of trends in technology, regulations and community attitudes and 
adapt and innovate in response to a rapidly changing society, including planning 
for climate change 
• Provide adequate resources, equipment and training for employees at all levels 
to fulfil their responsibilities in relation to the environment and their work 
practices 
• Implement systems, standards and processes to enable all activities to be carried 
out with regard to our environmental responsibilities 
• Report internally on all the company’s environmental performance measured 
against environmental objectives and targets 
• Strategically promote the outcome of selected environmental and sustainability 
initiatives and results of monitoring programs 
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In practice- Include environmental and climate change considerations in our decision-making 
and business planning  
♣ Assess and seek to eliminate or minimise the environmental impacts of all of our 
activities  
♣ Identify and, where appropriate, implement opportunities for environmental 
improvement and enhancement of local biodiversity and ecosystems  
♣ Identify and report to senior management and the Board environmental hazards, 
near misses, incidents and impacts, and corrective/preventative actions taken  
♣ Ensure compliance with all applicable environmental laws, regulations, policies 
and procedures  
♣ Maintain our ISO 14001 accreditation and associated environmental management 
systems  
♣ Strive to use resources efficiently and sustainably, minimise waste and prevent 
pollution  
♣ Monitor and protect our land and the surrounding environment from contamination  
♣ Monitor our environmental performance  
♣ Maintain emergency, fire protection and security systems and facilities to protect 
the environment 
For these we partner with people/ organisations-with appropriate skills and experience to carry out 
their work in a manner that is compatible with sound environmental performance and this policy  
♣ Engage and partner with relevant key stakeholders in relation to government policy, 
the company’s activities, particularly in relation to significant proposed development 
projects, and in relation to broader environmental/sustainability initiatives that affect 
the port’s business  
♣ Employees, contractors and visitors who work at or make use of company facilities, 
have an obligation to operate in a manner that fulfils the organisation’s environmental 
obligations and requirements 
 
6. Does PBPL conduct an Environmentally Relevant Activity (ERA) which requires an 
Environmental Authority under the Queensland Environmental Protection Act 1994? Yes  
7. How do you manage dredging and dredged material? 
• Pre-dredging survey to determine where dredging is required to allow continued safe 
access to the Port 
• Sediment sampling and analysis of sediment to be dredged to determine suitability 
for offshore disposal – sediment that meets the requirements of the NAGD is placed 
at the Mud Island Dredged Material Placement Area, unless it is required for 
beneficial reuse PBPL’s reclamation area.  All sand dredged from the shipping 
channels is beneficially reused at the reclamation areas. 
• TSHD Brisbane or the Ken Harvey, both dredging vessels operated by PBPL, are 
used to conduct dredging under approvals issued by various regulatory bodies and 
are operated in accordance with vessel and site-specific environmental management 
plans. 
• The reclamation areas are also managed in accordance approvals issued by 
regulatory bodies and an approved environmental management plan. 
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8. Are emissions to air, water and soil within the restrictions set locally and internationally? 
PBPL Monitoring air quality 24/7 from multiple areas around the port. We compare 
our data against the NEPM guidelines to ensure compliance. 
https://www.portbris.com.au/Environment/Air-Quality/  
 
Note- Due to various operations, dust issue is forefront of all issues, Dust is a component 
of particulate matter (PM) in the air. PM is characterised by particle size and 
composition. The particle size ranges from 0.005μm to 100μm and the particles are 
typically categorised into two size classes. (μm- means micrometer or micron),  
PM10 coarse particulate matter (10μm – 2.5μm in aerodynamic diameter) 
Bulk materials handled on bare surfaces can result in dust levels within the PM10 range. PM10 
particles are derived from suspension and re-suspension of dust, soil and other material from 
roads, farming, mining, and dust storms. 
PM2.5 fine particulate matter (<2.5 – 0.1μm in aerodynamic diameter) 
This is derived from combustion processes (petrol and diesel vehicle, wood burning, coal burning 
for power etc.) and industrial activities (such as cement plants, paper mills, steel mills) 
POB-PBPL- conducts a few air quality monitoring programmes from 1999 to 2017 
1. Long-term programme from 2003-2011- Results demonstrate that the dust 
deposition measured at the port is generally within the Air Quality National 
Environmental Protection Measure (NEPM) guideline values 
2. Road-side monitoring projects-To check the impact of road transport corridors 
on air quality- from 2006-2008-Results show no indication of a prominent 
source of fine dust particles from PBPL activities 
3. Real-time monitoring project on 2013- at three locations within the port 
precinct, PM10 and PM2.5 measurements were collected through an e-sampler 
and a 24-hour average was calculated for each site to compare against the 
NEPM guidelines to ensure compliance 
 
9. Have emissions, changed since privatisation? Why? Yes, we have seen reductions in 
emissions amongst many of our key measurables. We have in place a Target Zero 
program that is focusing on reducing our resource use and emissions to zero by the 
year 2030. We have a number of initiatives already in place including renewable 
energy, fuel management and upgrades to our dredging fleet to improve fuel economy 
and reduce emissions. 
 
10. What are the arrangements you have taken to ensure that development occurs 
sustainably? Technical guidelines apply to all developments - 
https://www.portbris.com.au/Property/Land-Use-Planning/  
 
Note- PBPL manages developments at the precinct through the Brisbane Port Land Use Plan (LUP) 
2015 which complies with State legislation requirements, PBPL technical guidelines & 
infrastructure plans. LUP has been developed and reviewed with community inputs and stakeholder 
expectations and then approved by the State in order to assure that PBPL development activities 
are sustainable and responsive to the legislative changes and industry suitability   
 
11. How do you comply with the key components of GBRMPA (Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Authority) requirements? We do not work with GBRMPA as the Port of Brisbane 
is not within the Great Barrier Reef area 
 
12. How do you work with GBRMPA’s industry specific position papers (about shipping and 
ports) and guidelines? We do not work with GBRMPA as the Port of Brisbane is not 
within the Great Barrier Reef area 
 
13. What steps you have taken to improve management of dredge material disposal? 
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UQ partnership including project to investigate sediment transport pathways in the 
Moreton Bay, including the Mud Island Dredged Material Placement Area.  UQ 
partnership also includes projects looking into dust suppression in reclamation areas. 
 
14. What shipping safety initiatives you have taken? Safety is in the forefront of everyone’s 
minds at the port 24/7. Our most recent shipping safety initiative is our non-linear, 
channel optimization simulator (NCOS) 
 
Notes- NCOS- Since August 2017- PBPL has worked with DHI and FORCE Technology 
to use the Port’s 90km shipping channel as a ‘living laboratory’ to develop the worlds’ 
most advanced under keel clearance technology – NCOS Online (Nonlinear Channel 
Optimisation Simulator system). 
 
NCOS Online is world-leading software that provides a seven-day detailed forecast of a 
vessel’s under keel clearances (UKC) and environmental conditions with a web interface, 
allowing for dynamic vessel scheduling. (Under-keel clearance (UKC) means the minimum 
clearance available between the deepest point on the vessel and the bottom in still water. 
 
Its introduction means PBPL and key stakeholders including the Harbour Master can more 
safely and accurately determine the UKC required to cater for larger vessels, providing 
safety and flexibility benefits for customers. 
 (“Its introduction means the port can more safely and accurately determine the UKC 
required to cater for larger vessels, providing safety and flexibility benefits for customers 
and reducing the need for additional, expensive dredging). 
 
NCOS Online is the only vessel UKC forecast system in the world to have the same high 
level of accuracy as a Full Mission Bridge Ship Simulator. It combines state-of-the-art 
technology with decades of operational port experience and leverages the ability to do 
quick field trials to ensure an accurate and reliable operational solution. 
 
By incorporating forecast and real time environmental data, vessel specifications and 
transit information, NCOS Online allows vessels of all classes to maximise its cargo and 
sailing windows while maintaining optimal safety. It is compatible with any vessel design 
and size. 
 
Benefits- Since NCOS went ‘live’ at the Port of Brisbane in August 2017, the number of 
deep drafted bulk carriers above 14.0m calling at the Port draft has tripled and deep 
drafted containers above 13.0m has more than doubled (as at May 2018) 
 
Operational since 1 August 1 2017, NCOS has already helped Port of Brisbane welcome 
the longest-ever container ship to visit Queensland, the 9500TEU, 347m long Susan 
Maersk. 
 
Awards- 1. Smart Infrastructure Award – Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2018 
2. Innovative Support Services Award – Dredging and Port Construction Innovation 
Awards (DPC)-2017 (London) 
3. Port of Brisbane was named the 2017 Australian Port of the Year. 
FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT 
Participant’s background information- Jessica Rudd-Infrastructure Coordinator 
Has the respondent been working in the firm both before and after privatisation? 
Yes…………………………… No………No………………. 
 
1. How do you define the company accounting systems in keeping and managing accounts 
and financial data?  As same as to most sophisticated transport company accounting 
systems. Did not mention which software or any accounting systems they use. 
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2. What changes in the financial department/ systems/ practices/ strategies have occurred 
after the privatisation – Did not answer the question 
 
3. How do you facilitate trade and economic growth of PBPL while protecting, enhancing 
and sustaining the environment people and the community? All of our decisions are made 
with environmental, social and economic considerations. All our development 
assessments elements of sustainability in construction and operation. PBPL have an 
extensive list of monitoring programs to manage the surrounding environment and 
have numerous community programs to ensure the local communities are involved 
with PBPL decisions and developments. 
 
Notes- Offsite storm water management projects- partnered with the Queensland 
government-(Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, Department of 
Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning, Department of Science, Information 
Technology and Innovation), Planfuture, Alluvium, BMT WBM, Griffith University 
(Australian Rivers Institute), Healthy Waterways and Catchments, and Mulgowie Farming 
Company, Lockyer Valley Regional Council-In  stabilising and rehabilitating eroded creek 
bank along Laidley Creek – 
Awards won 
• 2016 Healthy Waterways Awards - Sustainable Water Management Award and the 
Minister’s Grand Prize 
• 2016 Australian Engineering Excellence Awards - Queensland Environmental Excellence 
Award 
• 2016 Australian Shipping and Maritime Industry Awards - Environmental Transport 
Awards 
  , Port drive and local road network upgrade- $110 million, Air quality monitoring 
programmes, provide habitat and physical buffers for native species-nest boxes, Weed 
Surveys, maintaining mangrove ecosystems in Moreton Bay, Mangrove health assessments 
programmes, Research on Coastal Seascapes for Commercial Fisheries Production, In 
2014- Future Port Expansion Seawall Ecological Assessment, Following the RAMSAR 
convention to protect seabirds, also to protect seabirds, PBPL partnered with the 
Queensland Wader Study Group (QWSG), 2017 Shorebird Monitoring Report, provide 
habitat to migratory shorebirds under the Japan Australia Migratory Bird Agreement 
(JAMBA) and the China Australia Migratory Bird Agreement (CAMBA),  
 
4. Is PBPL an equal employment opportunity provider? How is this managed?   
Yes, through HR policies. 
 
5. What is the demography of male and female employees (direct) of PBPL? 
Apologies, we don’t have access to earlier data. 
 
2005 -,  2006 -,  2007 -,  2008 -,  2009 -, 2010 -, 2012-207,  2013-205,   
2014-184(49F,142M= 191), 2015-186, (49F, 142M= 191) 2016-184 (53F,158M=211)  
2017- 187 
Notes- As shown in brackets according to the final accounts, PBPL had sent to the Auditor 
General shows different numbers of employees.  
7. If there are any differences in employment over the years, what could be the reason for it? Any 
labour retrenchment, compensation after privatisation?  No 
8. How do you monitor and measure the key areas of PBPL’s operations related to the environment? 
Environment index (measure and report all key environmental metrics) 
Notes- Land Use Plan (LUP), The Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP), The 
Operational Environmental Management Plan (OEMP), The Healthy Waterways Erosion and 
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Sediment Control toolkit, Stormwater management design complies with the State Planning Policy 
State interest - Water Quality (SPP), The Offsite Stormwater Quality Investment Payment,  
The sites should be managed to achieve the requirements of the Department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection (DEHP) Environmental Protection (Air) Policy 2008 as a minimum 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEPARTMENT 
Participant’s background information-Jessica Rudd (Infrastructure & Environmental 
Coordinator & Craig Wilson- Environmental Manager 
Has the respondent been working in the firm both before and after privatisation? 
Yes…………………………… No…No……………………. 
1. How do you facilitate trade and economic growth of PBPL while protecting, enhancing 
and sustaining the environment, people and the community? 
All of our decisions are made with environmental, social and economic considerations. All 
our development assessments elements of sustainability in construction and operation. 
PBPL have an extensive list of monitoring programs to manage the surrounding 
environment and have numerous community programs to ensure the local communities are 
involved with PBPL decisions and developments. 
 
2. What changes to the ecological footprint value each year from 2006 to 2016? No data 
available  
3. How do you contribute to sustainable habitats and a green built environment? Our Land 
Use Plan requires incorporation of principles of sustainability. 
Note-check the answer for the question number 8-environmental index, 
FURTHER- the lands used by PBPL for the purposes such as industrial, transport operations, 
marine infrastructure, retail/commercial, and environmental buffers are overseen and 
managed by PBPL under Land Use Plan which represent the inputs of the community, 
stakeholders and the State regulations. 
The plan is approved and gazetted in accordance with the requirements of the Transport 
Infrastructure Act 1994 (TIA). 
LUP outlines key land uses, trade projections and future infrastructure requirements, dividing 
port land into specific development precincts, This includes a few 'Codes' - which specify the 
development requirements for each development.  
Also includes a 'Contributions Schedule' and 'Priority Infrastructure Interface Plan’ - which 
specify infrastructure charges and a range of plans/figures/drawings which help to spatially 
communicate the development vision for core port lands. 
The LUP has 5 development “use” codes and three development “standards” codes 
5 use codes are applied to land use activities whereas three standards codes are used as 
technical aspects of the individual development proposals.  
5 Development use code-  
Port Development Codes-to decide whether the development is ‘core port infrastructure’ or 
‘port related development - : wharves, loading and unloading facilities, terminals, warehouses 
or freight depots, motor vehicle processing activities, storage and distribution activities, special 
industry and general warehouses activities 
Commercial Code- to identifies the specific nature of commercial development on core port 
lands and their particular architectural and urban design requirements- building design and 
articulation requirements are in accordance with port’s central and commercial use purposes 
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Land Preparation Code- to ensure any land preparation works achieve a satisfactory 
environmental performance standard and they are carried out safely and efficiently around 
operational port activities- pre-loading, surcharging, transitional movements of sand, mud and 
other quarry material and any relevant and supporting infrastructure i.e. pipelines, gantries, 
booster units and conduits 
Reconfiguration Code- to regulate relevant reconfigurations of core port lands protecting 
access and ensuring connection to relevant services for each parcel of land resulting from 
reconfiguration, 
Three land use types- 
Port industry- terminals, Wharves/loading and unloading areas, Transport infrastructure, 
Dredge material rehandling, Port operational and support services 
 Commercial- Port Central, Commercial uses and ancillary services 
Environment- Conservation/buffers, investigations, and open spaces  
4. What are the carbon footprint values since privatisation? No data to provide 
Note-a sub question asked. ‘Do you record carbon Footprint figures?’ -Yes, but data are 
unavailable at the moment.  
5. 
Issue Measurement Item Yes No How 
GHG Measurement, 
reporting & 
verification 
Do you measure your overall CO2 
measurements? 
x  Through estimation 
techniques (NPI, 
NGERS) 
  Do you monitor and reduce your non-
CO2 and GHG emissions? 
 
   
Note 
N2O emission by Rail 
transport was the 
highest % (50%) 
according to the 
2010 survey 
Methane (CH4)  x 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O)  x 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCS)  x 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCS)  x 
Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6)  x 
  Do you disclose your CO2 emissions 
and/ or communicate your CO2 
emissions reduction initiatives? Please 
describe 
 x  
  Do you obtain third party verification of 
CO2 emissions? If yes, provide the third-
party verification firm. 
 x  
 Management 
systems 
Do you have CO2 emission reduction 
targets? If yes, what are they? 
x  Target Zero – Zero 
landside emissions 
by 2030 
  Is there a designated committee or 
individual responsible for CO2 emission 
reduction? 
x   
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  Do you have an action plan for 
carbon/energy management?  
x   
  Does the committee/ person 
responsible for meeting the goals have 
a clear incentive to do so (e.g. KPI)? 
x   
 Energy 
Efficiency 
Have you adopted any energy-effective 
design features for your buildings? 
Please describe.  
x  Solar on Ops base 
building, BMT 
buildings and PC1. 
Greenstar rated 
buildings. 
  Have you adopted any technology or 
measures to improve the energy? 
x   
 
6. 
Category Issue Yes No 
GHG and Energy Technology or measure for reefer energy efficiency  x 
 Technology to improve truck and cargo handling equipment efficiency  x 
 Renewable energy sources x  
 Shore-side power available for ships  x 
 Measures to minimise train/truck/ship waiting times  x 
 Policies or incentives for carriers to reduce emissions  x 
 What are the mode splits for onward transfer of freight x  
SO2 Do you use low-sulfur fuel in equipment x  
NO2 Any emission control technology or measures 
How often? 
What are they 
Do you have engine replacement policy or plan 
 x 
Waste Waste reduction targets x  
 Waste management policy x  
 Periodical measurement against targets x  
 Public disclosure of performance  x 
 Facilities for ship waste disposal x  
Water Policies to manage wastewater  x 
 Do you have oil and water separator?  x 
 Policies on storm water management X  
 Approach to managing toxic spills X  
 Water consumption reduction targets x  
 Water conservation technologies x  
 Periodic measurement of wastewater management and water 
conservation 
 x 
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 Public disclosure of performance  x 
Chemicals Chemicals management plan x  
 Chemical use reduction targets  x 
 Employee training on handling, disposal and emergencies x  
Environmental 
Management 
System 
Environmental policies x  
 PIs there a process for identifying top issues x  
 Top five issues x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Environmental targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x  
 Responsible committee or designated individual x  
 Internal training x  
 ISO 14001 x  
 Third-party verification of environmental impacts x  
 Green procurement policies   
Biodiversity Process to manage and track impacts x  
 Policies or measures to minimise impacts x  
Community Track and manage noise x  
 Technology or measures to reduce noise pollution x  
 Track and manage light x  
 Technology or measures to reduce light pollution x  
 Proactive energy with local community x  
 Top community issues 
 
 
 
 
x  
 
7. What storm water treatment systems do you use? Water sensitive urban design (bio 
retention basins, litter baskets etc.) and our offsite storm water procedure (more 
information found on our website https://www.portbris.com.au/Environment/Water-
Quality/ ) 
Note- check previous answers 
8. What are the arrangements you have taken to ensure that development occurs sustainably 
and does not impact on the environment? PBPL undertakes a development approval 
process, within this process there are Construction Environmental Management Plans 
and Operational Environmental Management Plans that need approval before 
development works can begin.  
Notes- check the answer above for Q 8 and the answer for Q 3 (Infrastructure and 
Environmental Department) 
Land Use Policy-LUP 
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9. How do you comply with its key components of GBRMPA (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority) requirements? N/A - We do not work with GBRMPA as the Port of Brisbane is 
not within the Great Barrier Reef area 
10. How do you work with GBRMPA’s industry specific position papers (about shipping and 
ports) and guidelines? As above  
11. What steps you have taken to improve management of dredge material disposal? UQ 
partnership including project to investigate sediment transport pathways in the Moreton 
Bay, including the Mud Island Dredged Material Placement Area.  UQ partnership also 
includes projects looking into dust suppression in reclamation areas. 
Notes- activities upstream of the Port to help reduce sediment run off into the Brisbane River 
and Moreton Bay such as Offsite Stormwater Project,  
In operation of a fleet of vessels to conduct these essential operations such as TSHD Brisbane, 
Ken Harvey; a clamshell dredger, The Sea Lion/Alan M; a bed levelling spread 
Dredging is highly regulated and is subject to strict State and Commonwealth operational and 
environmental legislations 
12. What are the shipping safety initiatives you have taken? Safety is in the forefront of 
everyone’s minds at the port 24/7. Our most recent shipping safety initiative is our non-
linear, channel optimization simulator (NCOS) 
Note- non-linear, channel optimization simulator (NCOS) Check the answer for Q 14 Dredging 
Department 
Compulsory pilotage for every ship that is 50m LOA or more, or any ship if directed by the 
Harbour Master) (LOA Length overall (LOA, o/a, o.a. or oa) is the maximum length of a vessel's 
hull measured parallel to the waterline. This length is important while docking the ship)  
Pilotage is done by a privately-operated company, Brisbane Marine Pilots Pty Ltd- Brisbane 
Marine Pilots maintains a 24-hour listening watch on VHF channel 12,  
ETA at the boarding ground should be confirmed at least two hours before arrival by calling 
'Brisbane Harbour' on VHF channel 12-The estimated time of arrival (ETA) is the time when a 
ship is expected to arrive at the port. 
24-hours in service of THE GREAT BARRIER REEF AND TORRES STRAIT VESSEL 
TRAFFIC SERVICE (REEFVTS) to prevent collisions or incidents, 
LAND RECLAMATION 
Participant’s background information- Michael Linde-Environmental Advisor 
Has the respondent been working in the firm both before and after privatisation? 
Yes…………………………… No……No…………………. 
1. How do you facilitate trade and economic growth of PBPL while protecting, enhancing and 
sustaining the environment, people and the community? All of our decisions are made with 
environmental, social and economic considerations. All our development assessments 
elements of sustainability in construction and operation. PBPL have an extensive list of 
monitoring programs to manage the surrounding environment and have numerous 
community programs to ensure the local communities are involved with PBPL decisions 
and developments. 
 Notes- Check below-Q3 
 
 
144 
 
2. How do you adhere to environmental protection with Future Port Expansion? We operate 
under an Environmental Management Plan for our reclamation area.  
 Note-Check below-Q3 
3. What are the recent Port Development projects? (Or ongoing Port Development projects)  
      Brisbane International Cruise Terminal 
Port Drive upgrade 
Future Port Expansion (FPE) area 
            Offsite storm water management projects 
NCOS Online (Nonlinear Channel Optimisation Simulator system) 
Notes- @ Brisbane International Cruise Terminal – south-east Queensland’s first mega cruise ship 
terminal is being constructed at Luggage Point 
• PBPL received government approval in October 2017 
• On completion, the facility will be able to cater to cruise vessels of all sizes including mega 
cruise ships – vessels longer than 270 metres 
• It is important to Queensland because, it is the ‘missing link’ in Brisbane’s tourism 
infrastructure that is needed to ensure the State can attract and support the world’s largest 
cruise ships, Also, internationally, vessels are increasing in size and by 2020 it is estimated 
that around 60% of the cruise vessels calling in Australia will be mega cruise ships. 
Currently, there is no dedicated cruise facility in south-east Queensland able to 
accommodate mega cruise ships – these vessels currently call at Brisbane’s main cargo 
port.  
@ Port Drive upgrade- a $110 million upgrade to Port Drive and the local road network, delivering 
safer and more efficient port roads. This will ensure the PBPL continues to meet the needs of 
industry and customers as trade grows 
• upgrades will include the duplication of Port Drive, the construction of a four-lane 
overpass over the Port Drive and Kite Street intersection,  
• upgrades to the Tanker Street/Osprey Drive road network as well as the duplication of 
Lucinda Drive Bridge on Fisherman Islands 
• benefits for the port and local community- Safer and more direct access to the Whyte Island 
boat ramp- A separated shared path from the existing Port of Brisbane Motorway cycle 
path through to Port Gate, - Improved access to the Moreton Island ferry terminal 
@ Future Port Expansion (FPE) area – A 230 hectare of Future Port Expansion (FPE) area on 
Fisherman Islands will provide new port land and increased quay line. It is one of the largest 
reclamation activities in the southern hemisphere, equivalent in size to 200 football grounds. FPE 
activities are undertaken in accordance with PBPL’s Land Use Plan (LUP), All work is completed 
under strict environmental management plans that include regular water quality and dust 
monitoring 
This project includes geotechnically engineered sea wall and divided into a number of paddocks 
which are being progressively reclaimed over the long-term. Typically, material is progressively 
placed in the FPE and followed by ground improvement works to create land.  
 A range of innovative techniques in place. For instance, scroll technology to improve the strength 
of reclaimed material and sand capping without having to place equipment directly on a reclaimed 
paddock (Scroll Technology- spiral compressor to compress reclaimed material and sand capping 
in order to minimise the risks of working on soft reclaimed ground and improve the efficiency of 
reclamation and ground improvement activities.   
@ Offsite storm water management projects- in the Lockyer Valley 
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In 2016, PBPL provided $500,000 to fund the pilot project and following its success, committed an 
additional $500,000 to continue the project, taking our total commitment to $1 million over three 
years. 
We worked closely with a range of partners to implement the offsite storm water project including 
the Queensland Government, Healthy Land and Water, and Mulgowie Farming Company. 
In total, the work has rehabilitated approximately 950m of degraded creek bank along Laidley 
Creek – adjoining some of the region’s most valuable horticultural land. It also involved re-planting 
approximately 4000 native trees and grasses and constructing two cross-bed grade control 
structures.  
@ NCOS Online (Nonlinear Channel Optimisation Simulator system) 
NCOS Online is world-leading software that provides a seven-day detailed forecast of a vessel’s 
under keel clearances (UKC) and environmental conditions with a web interface, allowing for 
dynamic vessel scheduling. PBPL & the Harbour Master now can more safely and accurately 
determine the UKC required to cater for larger vessels, providing safety and flexibility benefits for 
customers. 
NCOS Online is the only vessel UKC forecast system in the world to have the same high level of 
accuracy as a Full Mission Bridge Ship Simulator. It combines state-of-the-art technology with 
decades of operational port experience and leverages the ability to do quick field trials to ensure 
an accurate and reliable operational solution. 
By incorporating forecast and real time environmental data, vessel specifications and transit 
information, NCOS Online allows vessels of all classes to maximise its cargo and sailing windows 
while maintaining optimal safety. It is compatible with any vessel design and size. 
The software has an easy-to-use interface, tailored to accommodate the specific requirements of the 
multiple user groups including the Harbour Master, VTS, pilots and port operations. 
In August 2017, the number of deep drafted bulk carriers above 14.0m calling at the Port draft has 
tripled and deep drafted containers above 13.0m has more than doubled (as at May 2018) due to 
the use of NCOS. Smart Infrastructure Award – Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2018, 
Innovative Support Services Awdard – Dredging and Port Construction Innovation Awards 2017 
(London) 
4. Is the use of natural resources by PBPL reasonable compared to other ports in Australia?   
We haven’t done any benchmarking. 
5. Has the use of natural resources changed? No. 
 
6. Is the land reclamation process allowing a reasonable bio-diversity related to the marine 
flora and fauna?  Yes, since the development of our reclamation area sea grass has 
expanded by 400ha, for more information please visit: 
https://www.portbris.com.au/Environment/Marine-Ecology/ our website also has a 
list of our monitoring reports.  
 
Notes- mangrove health- The most recent mangrove health monitoring was conducted in 
2017- 
 
2016 Seagrass Monitoring Program (SMP)- results-  
The Port of Brisbane Seagrass Monitoring Program (SMP) was developed in 2002 to 
monitor the effects of FPE construction and operation.  
 
The Fisherman Islands area supports seagrass meadows of high biodiversity value. 
PBPL undertakes routine monitoring of seagrass meadows adjacent to the port at 
Fisherman Islands, Manly and Cleveland. SMP intends to provide port management with 
information on the condition and status of seagrass meadows, and to identify whether 
there is any evidence that port operations are affecting seagrass meadows. 
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The study involves 
• A review of previous seagrass monitoring assessments to identify long-term changes in 
seagrass meadow extent • Field surveys to describe patterns in seagrass meadow 
distribution and assemblage structure along depth gradients, and patterns of change in 
time and space • Mapping of seagrass meadow distribution and extent based on field 
surveys and interpretation of satellite and aerial imagery 
 
7. Has the biodiversity changed? As above  
 
Note- key findings of the 2016 SMP survey 
 
*Zostera muelleri formed dense meadows in the intertidal and shallow subtidal waters 
*Halophila ovalis, H. spinulosa, H. decipiens and/or Halodule uninervis formed sparse 
mono-specific and 
mixed meadows in subtidal waters at all sites 
*Seagrass depth range (SDR) for Z. muelleri (a function of water quality and availability 
of suitable substrates) was higher at Fisherman Islands (-1.65 and -2.43 m) and Manly (-
2.12 and -2.16 m) than Cleveland (-0.74 and -1.02 m) 
 
*Since the commencement of the SMP, seagrass meadows at Manly have displayed the 
largest losses 
and gains in extent, most likely in response to cyclic changes in water quality conditions 
*The distribution of Halophila spinulosa declined in 2016 at the Manly and Cleveland 
control sites, 
whereas the distribution of this species expanded over time at Fisherman Islands 
 
8. Has the land reclamation process identified potential risks, benefits or impacts?  
 
Potential impact Yes No Remarks 
Release of pollutants to waterways x   
Construction equipment noise  x  
Dust generation x  Undertaken research with UQ to minimize 
the dust  
Storage of hazardous goods (fuel, Chemicals  x  
Disposal of regulated waste (fuel, oil, 
chemicals & sewage) 
 x  
Rubbish, general waste and site clean up  x  
Impacts upon flora and fauna  x  
Other activities which may impact on the 
environment 
x   
 
9. Has PBPL identified those risks or areas of activities that have or can have impact/s on the 
environment? Yes  
 
10. How often has PBPL done a landside emissions survey after 2010?  None 
Notes- The last landside emission was before the privatisation-2010 
11. What is the project scope of the last survey? Landside and waterside emissions in 2010 
12. What are the key findings of the survey? 
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https://www.portbris.com.au/getmedia/cbac55e2-d81e-4141-8231-64592a207708/2010-
06-30-FINAL-REPORT-Landside-Emissions-Inventory-for-the-Port-of-Brisbane-
Precinct-2007-2008-REPORT.pdf 
Notes- The findings and recommendations of the report 
* new and updated emission estimation methods for different transport modes to the Port area 
For Cargo Handling Equipment-CHE 
*Needed further examine and analysis of Cargo Handling Equipment activity (CHE) data in the 
port area to verify emission standard equivalencies of the CHE equipment used in Australia 
* Port needed to review CHE emission factor models in Europe, Japan and the US 
For Trucks 
*To widen the data pool including the vehicle registration information to analyse more accurately 
*Driver Surveys 
*Needs more detailed and accurate calculation of truck emissions 
For Rails 
*Thorough examination on the contribution to N2O emission (Nitrous Oxide) from Rail as the 
value is very high (50%) 
* To perform a review of available overseas rail emission factor models 
13. What is the largest (main) landside source of emissions? Container handling 
equipment. 
Note- According to the 2010 survey, Rail transport is the main landside source of emission which 
accounted 50% 
14. How do you work with the Q-CAS (The Queensland Climate Adaptation Strategy)? We 
do not work with the Queensland Climate Adaptation Strategy  
 
15. Since when PBPL a Q-CAS Partners?  As above  
 
16. What are the arrangements you have taken to ensure that development occurs sustainably 
and does not impact unacceptably on matters of national environmental significance? We 
have an extensive list of monitoring programs 
(https://www.portbris.com.au/Environment/ ) we operate under environmental 
management plans. Before any development occurs, there is a significant amount of 
planning involved that identified any impacts on the surrounding environment and 
how to mitigate the impacts.  
Notes- Air Quality-Monitoring programmes-  
Long Term-2003-2011- Air quality values compared against the Air Quality National 
Environmental Protection Measure (NEPM) guideline values 
Roadside monitoring programme-2006-2008 
Real Time monitoring programme- 2013-results compared against the National Environmental 
Protection Measure (NEPM) guideline values 
Nest Boxes Programme- 
Provide habitat and physical buffers for native species- installed a number of nest boxes in two 
buffer areas, along Pritchard Street and Wynnum North Road 
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A Nest Box audit report is available online at  
https://www.portbris.com.au/getmedia/fbeefd8a-1701-4230-b956-d5f86b6945ea/2017-
09-25-Nest-Box-Audit-Report.pdf 
PORT OPERATIONS & POLLUTION 
Participant’s background information- Craig Wilson-Environmental Manager  
Has the respondent been working in the firm both before and after privatisation? 
Yes…………………………… No…No……………………. 
 
1. What do you understand about the magnitude and source of emissions? Good 
understanding. Undertaken both Landside and Waterside Emissions Inventory and 
air quality modelling. 
 
2. What emissions are linked with port operations? Various gas and particulate emissions. 
 
3. How do you prioritise future emission reduction measures? Through our management 
planning process. 
 
4. What are the trends of port emissions over time (between 2006 to 2016)? General 
decrease. 
5. When was the last time PBPL did an emission survey? 2010 
Notes- before privatisation- No survey has been done after privatisation 
6. According to the Emission survey/s (If there are more surveys than one, then figures 
yearly) Non 
7. How do Ocean-going vessels account for the waterside fuel use and emissions? Significant 
8. How do dredgers account for the waterside fuel use and emissions? 
Fuel usage is tracked via vessel logs and fuel purchasing records – emissions are 
reported via NGERS. 
 
9. How do tugs account for the waterside fuel use and emissions? N/A 
 
10. Do Container vessels account for the waterside fuel use and emissions? Yes  
 
11. If yes, then how? (annual %) Not specifically know (shipping is counted as a whole) 
 
12. What are the steps that have been taken to monitor Cruise ships waterside fuel use and 
emissions? N/A 
13. How do Tankers contribute to waterside fuel use and emissions? N/A 
 
14. What is the dominant emission source in the port precinct (since 2006 to 2016)? 
Commercial shipping. 
15. What is the Total Energy Consumption of Gigajoule each year within the precinct? (since 
2005 to 2017) 
2005-265556,  2006-263158,  2007- 262570,  2008 -258849,  2009 - 222208,  
2010 – 198708, 2012 – 181321,  2013 – 148143, 2014 – 151430, 2015–152483, 
2016 – 185028, 2017-174837 
 
16. How many tonnes of CO2 released each year within the precinct? (since 2005 to 2017) 
 
2005- 17025, 2006 – 16951, 2007 – 18752, 2008 – 21490,  2009 – 18038, 
2010 – 15514,  2012 -13725,  2013 – 11516,  2014- 11504,  2015 – 11565, 
2016 – 13604, 2017-12851 
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17. What is the largest landside source of emissions?  
Non-road equipment, including cargo and bulk handling equipment 
 
18. How do you balance environmental responsibilities with the trade impacts associated with 
the port? Through our EMS. 
19. Are you aware of The Queensland Climate Adaptation Directions Statement? Yes  
 
20. If yes, do you follow its directions? and how? Incorporate principles into our 
management and planning - Note-Already answered as they do not work with the Q-CAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2- Q-Q PLOTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCES 
 
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 1 of ROA1 
 
                                    
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 2 of ROA2 
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Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 3 of ROE1 
                                     
 
 
 
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plots 4 of ROE2 
                                      
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 5 of DTA 
                                     
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 6 of CEA 
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Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 7 of TE 
                                     
 
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 8 of TEUs 
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Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 9 of Tonnes 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 10 of NoS 
                                     
 
Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 11 of TEC 
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Ownership=State-05/06/07 
Normal Q-Q plot 12 of TE CO2 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 13 of ROA1 
                                      
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 14 of ROA2 
                                      
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
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Normal Q-Q plot 15 of ROE1 
                                     
 
 
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 16 of ROE2 
                                     
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 17 of DTA 
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Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 18 of CEA 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 19 of TE 
                                     
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 20 of TEUs 
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Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 21 of Tonnes 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 22 of NoS 
                                     
 
Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 23 of TEC 
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Ownership=State-08/09/10 
Normal Q-Q plot 24 of TE CO2 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 25 of ROA1 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 26 of ROA2 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
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Normal Q-Q plot 27 of ROE1 
                                    
 
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 28 of ROE2 
                                    
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 29 of DTA 
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Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 30 of CEA 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 31 of TE 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 32 of TEUs 
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Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 33 of Tonnes 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 34 of NoS 
                                     
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 35 of TEC 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-12/13/14 
Normal Q-Q plot 36 of TE CO2 
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Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 37 of ROA1 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 38 of ROA2 
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Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 39 of ROE1 
                                     
 
 
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 40 of ROE2 
                                     
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 41 of DTA 
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Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 42 of CEA 
                                     
 
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 44 of TEUs 
               
                      
 
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 45 of Tonnes 
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Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 46 of NoS 
                                    
 
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 43 of TE 
 
 
Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 47 of TEC 
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Ownership=Pty-15/16/17 
Normal Q-Q plot 48 of TE CO2 
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APPENDIX 3 TRIMMED MANOVA TESTS (FINCEA &  FINTEUS) 
 
Multivariate Testsa  (without FinCEA and FinTEUs) 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerd 
Intercept Pillai's Trace 1.000 1748.034b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 13984.270 .993 
Wilks' Lambda .000 1748.034b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 13984.270 .993 
Hotelling's Trace 13984.270 1748.034b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 13984.270 .993 
Roy's Largest Root 13984.270 1748.034b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 13984.270 .993 
Ownership Pillai's Trace 2.853 7.252 24.000 9.000 .002 .951 174.054 .995 
Wilks' Lambda .000 11.734 24.000 3.502 .021 .986 242.826 .820 
Hotelling's Trace . . 24.000 . . . . . 
Roy's Largest Root 1065.445 399.542c 8.000 3.000 .000 .999 3196.334 1.000 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownership 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
d. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
 
 
  
 
 
167 
 
                      Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Trimmed FinCEA and FinTEUs) 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerk 
Corrected 
Model 
1 1260.794a 3 420.265 72.396 .000 .964 217.189 1.000 
FinROA2 1406.177b 3 468.726 77.788 .000 .967 233.365 1.000 
FinROE1 2030.346c 3 676.782 163.599 .000 .984 490.798 1.000 
FinROE2 2391.476d 3 797.159 158.406 .000 .983 475.218 1.000 
FinDTA .096e 3 .032 106.769 .000 .976 320.306 1.000 
FinTonnes 14697912058
9987.530f 
3 489930401
96662.510 
21.801 .000 .891 65.403 1.000 
FinNoS 25116.250g 3 8372.083 4.373 .042 .621 13.120 .658 
EnvoTEC 26250821016
.917h 
3 875027367
2.306 
25.776 .000 .906 77.329 1.000 
EnvoTEC
O2 
72237538.91
7i 
3 24079179.6
39 
7.807 .009 .745 23.420 .898 
EnvoTE 29970.000j 3 9990.000 73.142 .000 .965 219.426 1.000 
Intercept 1 2156.865 1 2156.865 371.549 .000 .979 371.549 1.000 
FinROA2 1964.288 1 1964.288 325.988 .000 .976 325.988 1.000 
FinROE1 4458.307 1 4458.307 1077.71
2 
.000 .993 1077.712 1.000 
FinROE2 3927.701 1 3927.701 780.487 .000 .990 780.487 1.000 
FinDTA 1.833 1 1.833 6110.02
8 
.000 .999 6110.028 1.000 
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FinTonnes 12355167825
036366.000 
1 123551678
25036366.0
00 
5497.80
0 
.000 .999 5497.800 1.000 
FinNoS 11558144.08
3 
1 11558144.0
83 
6037.68
6 
.000 .999 6037.686 1.000 
EnvoTEC 53606433639
0.083 
1 536064336
390.083 
1579.12
1 
.000 .995 1579.121 1.000 
EnvoTEC
O2 
2899608852.
083 
1 289960885
2.083 
940.057 .000 .992 940.057 1.000 
EnvoTE 740033.333 1 740033.333 5418.18
2 
.000 .999 5418.182 1.000 
Ownership 1 1260.794 3 420.265 72.396 .000 .964 217.189 1.000 
FinROA2 1406.177 3 468.726 77.788 .000 .967 233.365 1.000 
FinROE1 2030.345 3 676.782 163.599 .000 .984 490.798 1.000 
FinROE2 2391.476 3 797.159 158.406 .000 .983 475.218 1.000 
FinDTA .096 3 .032 106.769 .000 .976 320.306 1.000 
FinTonnes 14697912058
9987.600 
3 489930401
96662.530 
21.801 .000 .891 65.403 1.000 
FinNoS 25116.250 3 8372.083 4.373 .042 .621 13.120 .658 
EnvoTEC 26250821016
.917 
3 875027367
2.306 
25.776 .000 .906 77.329 1.000 
EnvoTEC
O2 
72237538.91
7 
3 24079179.6
39 
7.807 .009 .745 23.420 .898 
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EnvoTE 29970.000 3 9990.000 73.142 .000 .965 219.426 1.000 
Error 1 46.440 8 5.805      
FinROA2 48.205 8 6.026      
FinROE1 33.095 8 4.137      
FinROE2 40.259 8 5.032      
FinDTA .002 8 .000      
FinTonnes 17978344131
321.332 
8 224729301
6415.167 
     
FinNoS 15314.667 8 1914.333      
EnvoTEC 2715759954.
000 
8 339469994.
250 
     
EnvoTEC
O2 
24676018.00
0 
8 3084502.25
0 
     
EnvoTE 1092.667 8 136.583      
Total 1 3464.099 12       
FinROA2 3418.670 12       
FinROE1 6521.748 12       
FinROE2 6359.436 12       
FinDTA 1.932 12       
FinTonnes 12520125289
757680.000 
12       
FinNoS 11598575.00
0 
12       
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EnvoTEC 56503091736
1.000 
12       
EnvoTEC
O2 
2996522409.
000 
12       
EnvoTE 771096.000 12       
Corrected 
Total 
1 1307.235 11       
FinROA2 1454.382 11       
FinROE1 2063.440 11       
FinROE2 2431.735 11       
FinDTA .098 11       
FinTonnes 16495746472
1308.880 
11       
FinNoS 40430.917 11       
EnvoTEC 28966580970
.917 
11       
EnvoTEC
O2 
96913556.91
7 
11       
EnvoTE 31062.667 11       
a. R Squared = .964 (Adjusted R Squared = .951) 
b. R Squared = .967 (Adjusted R Squared = .954) 
c. R Squared = .984 (Adjusted R Squared = .978) 
d. R Squared = .983 (Adjusted R Squared = .977)   e. R Squared = .976 (Adjusted R Squared = .966) 
f. R Squared = .891 (Adjusted R Squared = .850)   g. R Squared = .621 (Adjusted R Squared = .479) 
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h. R Squared = .906 (Adjusted R Squared = .871) i. R Squared = .745 (Adjusted R Squared = .650) 
j. R Squared = .965 (Adjusted R Squared = .952)   k. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons Tests (Trimmed FinCEA & FinTEUs) 
Dependent Variable (I) Ownership (J) Ownership 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 1.68 1.967 .829 -4.62 7.98 
Pty-12/13/14 -21.76* 1.967 .000 -28.06 -15.46 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.91* 1.967 .000 -23.21 -10.61 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -1.68 1.967 .829 -7.98 4.62 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.44* 1.967 .000 -29.74 -17.14 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.59* 1.967 .000 -24.89 -12.29 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 21.76* 1.967 .000 15.46 28.06 
Gov-08/09/10 23.44* 1.967 .000 17.14 29.74 
Pty-15/16/17 4.85 1.967 .141 -1.45 11.15 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 16.91* 1.967 .000 10.61 23.21 
Gov-08/09/10 18.59* 1.967 .000 12.29 24.89 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.85 1.967 .141 -11.15 1.45 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 1.68 1.967 1.000 -5.17 8.52 
Pty-12/13/14 -21.76* 1.967 .000 -28.61 -14.92 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.91* 1.967 .000 -23.76 -10.07 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -1.68 1.967 1.000 -8.52 5.17 
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Pty-12/13/14 -23.44* 1.967 .000 -30.28 -16.60 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.59* 1.967 .000 -25.43 -11.75 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 21.76* 1.967 .000 14.92 28.61 
Gov-08/09/10 23.44* 1.967 .000 16.60 30.28 
Pty-15/16/17 4.85 1.967 .234 -1.99 11.69 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 16.91* 1.967 .000 10.07 23.76 
Gov-08/09/10 18.59* 1.967 .000 11.75 25.43 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.85 1.967 .234 -11.69 1.99 
FinROA2 Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .8500 2.00427 .973 -5.5684 7.2684 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.3567* 2.00427 .000 -29.7750 -16.9383 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.5367* 2.00427 .000 -24.9550 -12.1183 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -.8500 2.00427 .973 -7.2684 5.5684 
Pty-12/13/14 -24.2067* 2.00427 .000 -30.6250 -17.7883 
Pty-15/16/17 -19.3867* 2.00427 .000 -25.8050 -12.9683 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 23.3567* 2.00427 .000 16.9383 29.7750 
Gov-08/09/10 24.2067* 2.00427 .000 17.7883 30.6250 
Pty-15/16/17 4.8200 2.00427 .153 -1.5984 11.2384 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 18.5367* 2.00427 .000 12.1183 24.9550 
Gov-08/09/10 19.3867* 2.00427 .000 12.9683 25.8050 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.8200 2.00427 .153 -11.2384 1.5984 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .8500 2.00427 1.000 -6.1226 7.8226 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.3567* 2.00427 .000 -30.3293 -16.3841 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.5367* 2.00427 .000 -25.5093 -11.5641 
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Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -.8500 2.00427 1.000 -7.8226 6.1226 
Pty-12/13/14 -24.2067* 2.00427 .000 -31.1793 -17.2341 
Pty-15/16/17 -19.3867* 2.00427 .000 -26.3593 -12.4141 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 23.3567* 2.00427 .000 16.3841 30.3293 
Gov-08/09/10 24.2067* 2.00427 .000 17.2341 31.1793 
Pty-15/16/17 4.8200 2.00427 .257 -2.1526 11.7926 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 18.5367* 2.00427 .000 11.5641 25.5093 
Gov-08/09/10 19.3867* 2.00427 .000 12.4141 26.3593 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.8200 2.00427 .257 -11.7926 2.1526 
FinROE1 Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 3.3133 1.66069 .266 -2.0048 8.6314 
Pty-12/13/14 -26.2900* 1.66069 .000 -31.6081 -20.9719 
Pty-15/16/17 -21.8300* 1.66069 .000 -27.1481 -16.5119 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -3.3133 1.66069 .266 -8.6314 2.0048 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.6033* 1.66069 .000 -34.9214 -24.2852 
Pty-15/16/17 -25.1433* 1.66069 .000 -30.4614 -19.8252 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 26.2900* 1.66069 .000 20.9719 31.6081 
Gov-08/09/10 29.6033* 1.66069 .000 24.2852 34.9214 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4600 1.66069 .104 -.8581 9.7781 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 21.8300* 1.66069 .000 16.5119 27.1481 
Gov-08/09/10 25.1433* 1.66069 .000 19.8252 30.4614 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4600 1.66069 .104 -9.7781 .8581 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 3.3133 1.66069 .487 -2.4640 9.0907 
Pty-12/13/14 -26.2900* 1.66069 .000 -32.0673 -20.5127 
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Pty-15/16/17 -21.8300* 1.66069 .000 -27.6073 -16.0527 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -3.3133 1.66069 .487 -9.0907 2.4640 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.6033* 1.66069 .000 -35.3807 -23.8260 
Pty-15/16/17 -25.1433* 1.66069 .000 -30.9207 -19.3660 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 26.2900* 1.66069 .000 20.5127 32.0673 
Gov-08/09/10 29.6033* 1.66069 .000 23.8260 35.3807 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4600 1.66069 .166 -1.3173 10.2373 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 21.8300* 1.66069 .000 16.0527 27.6073 
Gov-08/09/10 25.1433* 1.66069 .000 19.3660 30.9207 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4600 1.66069 .166 -10.2373 1.3173 
FinROE2 Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 1.7367 1.83164 .781 -4.1289 7.6022 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.3767* 1.83164 .000 -35.2422 -23.5111 
Pty-15/16/17 -24.9533* 1.83164 .000 -30.8189 -19.0878 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -1.7367 1.83164 .781 -7.6022 4.1289 
Pty-12/13/14 -31.1133* 1.83164 .000 -36.9789 -25.2478 
Pty-15/16/17 -26.6900* 1.83164 .000 -32.5556 -20.8244 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 29.3767* 1.83164 .000 23.5111 35.2422 
Gov-08/09/10 31.1133* 1.83164 .000 25.2478 36.9789 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4233 1.83164 .151 -1.4422 10.2889 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 24.9533* 1.83164 .000 19.0878 30.8189 
Gov-08/09/10 26.6900* 1.83164 .000 20.8244 32.5556 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4233 1.83164 .151 -10.2889 1.4422 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 1.7367 1.83164 1.000 -4.6354 8.1087 
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Pty-12/13/14 -29.3767* 1.83164 .000 -35.7487 -23.0046 
Pty-15/16/17 -24.9533* 1.83164 .000 -31.3254 -18.5813 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -1.7367 1.83164 1.000 -8.1087 4.6354 
Pty-12/13/14 -31.1133* 1.83164 .000 -37.4854 -24.7413 
Pty-15/16/17 -26.6900* 1.83164 .000 -33.0621 -20.3179 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 29.3767* 1.83164 .000 23.0046 35.7487 
Gov-08/09/10 31.1133* 1.83164 .000 24.7413 37.4854 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4233 1.83164 .253 -1.9487 10.7954 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 24.9533* 1.83164 .000 18.5813 31.3254 
Gov-08/09/10 26.6900* 1.83164 .000 20.3179 33.0621 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4233 1.83164 .253 -10.7954 1.9487 
FinDTA Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -.0133 .01414 .784 -.0586 .0320 
Pty-12/13/14 .1633* .01414 .000 .1180 .2086 
Pty-15/16/17 .1800* .01414 .000 .1347 .2253 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 .0133 .01414 .784 -.0320 .0586 
Pty-12/13/14 .1767* .01414 .000 .1314 .2220 
Pty-15/16/17 .1933* .01414 .000 .1480 .2386 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.1633* .01414 .000 -.2086 -.1180 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1767* .01414 .000 -.2220 -.1314 
Pty-15/16/17 .0167 .01414 .656 -.0286 .0620 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.1800* .01414 .000 -.2253 -.1347 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1933* .01414 .000 -.2386 -.1480 
Pty-12/13/14 -.0167 .01414 .656 -.0620 .0286 
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Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -.0133 .01414 1.000 -.0625 .0359 
Pty-12/13/14 .1633* .01414 .000 .1141 .2125 
Pty-15/16/17 .1800* .01414 .000 .1308 .2292 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 .0133 .01414 1.000 -.0359 .0625 
Pty-12/13/14 .1767* .01414 .000 .1275 .2259 
Pty-15/16/17 .1933* .01414 .000 .1441 .2425 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.1633* .01414 .000 -.2125 -.1141 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1767* .01414 .000 -.2259 -.1275 
Pty-15/16/17 .0167 .01414 1.000 -.0325 .0659 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.1800* .01414 .000 -.2292 -.1308 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1933* .01414 .000 -.2425 -.1441 
Pty-12/13/14 -.0167 .01414 1.000 -.0659 .0325 
FinTonnes Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -4284335.00* 1224007.902 .033 -8204039.16 -364630.84 
Pty-12/13/14 -9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 -13696191.83 -5856783.51 
Pty-15/16/17 -5818339.67* 1224007.902 .006 -9738043.83 -1898635.51 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 4284335.00* 1224007.902 .033 364630.84 8204039.16 
Pty-12/13/14 -5492152.67* 1224007.902 .009 -9411856.83 -1572448.51 
Pty-15/16/17 -1534004.67 1224007.902 .614 -5453708.83 2385699.49 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 5856783.51 13696191.83 
Gov-08/09/10 5492152.67* 1224007.902 .009 1572448.51 9411856.83 
Pty-15/16/17 3958148.00* 1224007.902 .048 38443.84 7877852.16 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 5818339.67* 1224007.902 .006 1898635.51 9738043.83 
Gov-08/09/10 1534004.67 1224007.902 .614 -2385699.49 5453708.83 
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Pty-12/13/14 -3958148.00* 1224007.902 .048 -7877852.16 -38443.84 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -4284335.00* 1224007.902 .048 -8542510.62 -26159.38 
Pty-12/13/14 -9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 -14034663.29 -5518312.05 
Pty-15/16/17 -5818339.67* 1224007.902 .009 -10076515.29 -1560164.05 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 4284335.00* 1224007.902 .048 26159.38 8542510.62 
Pty-12/13/14 -5492152.67* 1224007.902 .012 -9750328.29 -1233977.05 
Pty-15/16/17 -1534004.67 1224007.902 1.000 -5792180.29 2724170.95 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 5518312.05 14034663.29 
Gov-08/09/10 5492152.67* 1224007.902 .012 1233977.05 9750328.29 
Pty-15/16/17 3958148.00 1224007.902 .072 -300027.62 8216323.62 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 5818339.67* 1224007.902 .009 1560164.05 10076515.29 
Gov-08/09/10 1534004.67 1224007.902 1.000 -2724170.95 5792180.29 
Pty-12/13/14 -3958148.00 1224007.902 .072 -8216323.62 300027.62 
FinNoS Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 128.00* 35.724 .029 13.60 242.40 
Pty-12/13/14 65.33 35.724 .328 -49.07 179.73 
Pty-15/16/17 49.00 35.724 .548 -65.40 163.40 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -128.00* 35.724 .029 -242.40 -13.60 
Pty-12/13/14 -62.67 35.724 .359 -177.07 51.73 
Pty-15/16/17 -79.00 35.724 .200 -193.40 35.40 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -65.33 35.724 .328 -179.73 49.07 
Gov-08/09/10 62.67 35.724 .359 -51.73 177.07 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.33 35.724 .966 -130.73 98.07 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -49.00 35.724 .548 -163.40 65.40 
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Gov-08/09/10 79.00 35.724 .200 -35.40 193.40 
Pty-12/13/14 16.33 35.724 .966 -98.07 130.73 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 128.00* 35.724 .043 3.72 252.28 
Pty-12/13/14 65.33 35.724 .629 -58.95 189.61 
Pty-15/16/17 49.00 35.724 1.000 -75.28 173.28 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -128.00* 35.724 .043 -252.28 -3.72 
Pty-12/13/14 -62.67 35.724 .705 -186.95 61.61 
Pty-15/16/17 -79.00 35.724 .348 -203.28 45.28 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -65.33 35.724 .629 -189.61 58.95 
Gov-08/09/10 62.67 35.724 .705 -61.61 186.95 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.33 35.724 1.000 -140.61 107.95 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -49.00 35.724 1.000 -173.28 75.28 
Gov-08/09/10 79.00 35.724 .348 -45.28 203.28 
Pty-12/13/14 16.33 35.724 1.000 -107.95 140.61 
EnvoTEC Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 54506.33* 15043.714 .028 6331.07 102681.60 
Pty-12/13/14 107463.33* 15043.714 .000 59288.07 155638.60 
Pty-15/16/17 116978.67* 15043.714 .000 68803.40 165153.93 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -54506.33* 15043.714 .028 -102681.60 -6331.07 
Pty-12/13/14 52957.00* 15043.714 .032 4781.73 101132.27 
Pty-15/16/17 62472.33* 15043.714 .014 14297.07 110647.60 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -107463.33* 15043.714 .000 -155638.60 -59288.07 
Gov-08/09/10 -52957.00* 15043.714 .032 -101132.27 -4781.73 
Pty-15/16/17 9515.33 15043.714 .919 -38659.93 57690.60 
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Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -116978.67* 15043.714 .000 -165153.93 -68803.40 
Gov-08/09/10 -62472.33* 15043.714 .014 -110647.60 -14297.07 
Pty-12/13/14 -9515.33 15043.714 .919 -57690.60 38659.93 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 54506.33* 15043.714 .041 2171.07 106841.60 
Pty-12/13/14 107463.33* 15043.714 .001 55128.07 159798.60 
Pty-15/16/17 116978.67* 15043.714 .000 64643.40 169313.93 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -54506.33* 15043.714 .041 -106841.60 -2171.07 
Pty-12/13/14 52957.00* 15043.714 .047 621.74 105292.26 
Pty-15/16/17 62472.33* 15043.714 .019 10137.07 114807.60 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -107463.33* 15043.714 .001 -159798.60 -55128.07 
Gov-08/09/10 -52957.00* 15043.714 .047 -105292.26 -621.74 
Pty-15/16/17 9515.33 15043.714 1.000 -42819.93 61850.60 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -116978.67* 15043.714 .000 -169313.93 -64643.40 
Gov-08/09/10 -62472.33* 15043.714 .019 -114807.60 -10137.07 
Pty-12/13/14 -9515.33 15043.714 1.000 -61850.60 42819.93 
EnvoTECO2 Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -771.33 1433.993 .947 -5363.48 3820.82 
Pty-12/13/14 3994.33 1433.993 .090 -597.82 8586.48 
Pty-15/16/17 4902.67* 1433.993 .037 310.52 9494.82 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 771.33 1433.993 .947 -3820.82 5363.48 
Pty-12/13/14 4765.67* 1433.993 .042 173.52 9357.82 
Pty-15/16/17 5674.00* 1433.993 .018 1081.85 10266.15 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -3994.33 1433.993 .090 -8586.48 597.82 
Gov-08/09/10 -4765.67* 1433.993 .042 -9357.82 -173.52 
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Pty-15/16/17 908.33 1433.993 .918 -3683.82 5500.48 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -4902.67* 1433.993 .037 -9494.82 -310.52 
Gov-08/09/10 -5674.00* 1433.993 .018 -10266.15 -1081.85 
Pty-12/13/14 -908.33 1433.993 .918 -5500.48 3683.82 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -771.33 1433.993 1.000 -5760.02 4217.35 
Pty-12/13/14 3994.33 1433.993 .142 -994.35 8983.02 
Pty-15/16/17 4902.67 1433.993 .055 -86.02 9891.35 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 771.33 1433.993 1.000 -4217.35 5760.02 
Pty-12/13/14 4765.67 1433.993 .063 -223.02 9754.35 
Pty-15/16/17 5674.00* 1433.993 .025 685.31 10662.69 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -3994.33 1433.993 .142 -8983.02 994.35 
Gov-08/09/10 -4765.67 1433.993 .063 -9754.35 223.02 
Pty-15/16/17 908.33 1433.993 1.000 -4080.35 5897.02 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -4902.67 1433.993 .055 -9891.35 86.02 
Gov-08/09/10 -5674.00* 1433.993 .025 -10662.69 -685.31 
Pty-12/13/14 -908.33 1433.993 1.000 -5897.02 4080.35 
EnvoTE Tukey HSD Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -43.00* 9.542 .009 -73.56 -12.44 
Pty-12/13/14 69.00* 9.542 .000 38.44 99.56 
Pty-15/16/17 78.00* 9.542 .000 47.44 108.56 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 43.00* 9.542 .009 12.44 73.56 
Pty-12/13/14 112.00* 9.542 .000 81.44 142.56 
Pty-15/16/17 121.00* 9.542 .000 90.44 151.56 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -69.00* 9.542 .000 -99.56 -38.44 
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Gov-08/09/10 -112.00* 9.542 .000 -142.56 -81.44 
Pty-15/16/17 9.00 9.542 .784 -21.56 39.56 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -78.00* 9.542 .000 -108.56 -47.44 
Gov-08/09/10 -121.00* 9.542 .000 -151.56 -90.44 
Pty-12/13/14 -9.00 9.542 .784 -39.56 21.56 
Bonferroni Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -43.00* 9.542 .012 -76.20 -9.80 
Pty-12/13/14 69.00* 9.542 .001 35.80 102.20 
Pty-15/16/17 78.00* 9.542 .000 44.80 111.20 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 43.00* 9.542 .012 9.80 76.20 
Pty-12/13/14 112.00* 9.542 .000 78.80 145.20 
Pty-15/16/17 121.00* 9.542 .000 87.80 154.20 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -69.00* 9.542 .001 -102.20 -35.80 
Gov-08/09/10 -112.00* 9.542 .000 -145.20 -78.80 
Pty-15/16/17 9.00 9.542 1.000 -24.20 42.20 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -78.00* 9.542 .000 -111.20 -44.80 
Gov-08/09/10 -121.00* 9.542 .000 -154.20 -87.80 
Pty-12/13/14 -9.00 9.542 1.000 -42.20 24.20 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 136.583. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa (Trimmed FinCEA & FinTEUs) 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1 Based on Mean 3.432 3 8 .072 
Based on Median 2.114 3 8 .177 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.114 3 2.921 .281 
Based on trimmed mean 3.345 3 8 .076 
FinROA2 Based on Mean 3.108 3 8 .089 
Based on Median 1.955 3 8 .199 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.955 3 3.046 .296 
Based on trimmed mean 3.032 3 8 .093 
FinROE1 Based on Mean 2.586 3 8 .126 
Based on Median .951 3 8 .461 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.951 3 5.520 .478 
Based on trimmed mean 2.447 3 8 .139 
FinROE2 Based on Mean 2.350 3 8 .149 
Based on Median 1.059 3 8 .419 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.059 3 5.204 .442 
Based on trimmed mean 2.253 3 8 .159 
FinDTA Based on Mean .978 3 8 .450 
Based on Median .204 3 8 .891 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.204 3 6.000 .890 
Based on trimmed mean .894 3 8 .485 
FinTonnes Based on Mean 2.328 3 8 .151 
Based on Median 1.276 3 8 .347 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.276 3 4.563 .385 
Based on trimmed mean 2.259 3 8 .159 
FinNoS Based on Mean 1.494 3 8 .288 
Based on Median .330 3 8 .804 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.330 3 4.965 .805 
Based on trimmed mean 1.358 3 8 .323 
EnvoTEC Based on Mean 1.607 3 8 .263 
Based on Median .837 3 8 .511 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.837 3 4.603 .533 
 
 
183 
 
Based on trimmed mean 1.551 3 8 .275 
EnvoTECO2 Based on Mean 1.699 3 8 .244 
Based on Median 1.055 3 8 .420 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.055 3 4.339 .455 
Based on trimmed mean 1.659 3 8 .252 
EnvoTE Based on Mean .359 3 8 .784 
Based on Median .182 3 8 .905 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.182 3 6.323 .905 
Based on trimmed mean .345 3 8 .794 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownership 
 
 
Homogeneous subsets  
Subset 1 
FinROA1 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 2.4800  
Gov-05/06/07 3 4.1567  
Pty-15/16/17 3  21.0700 
Pty-12/13/14 3  25.9200 
Sig.  .829 .141 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 5.805. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
Subset 2 
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FinROA2 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 1.6833  
Gov-05/06/07 3 2.5333  
Pty-15/16/17 3  21.0700 
Pty-12/13/14 3  25.8900 
Sig.  .973 .153 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 6.026. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
Subset 3 
FinROE1 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 4.7600  
Gov-05/06/07 3 8.0733  
Pty-15/16/17 3  29.9033 
Pty-12/13/14 3  34.3633 
Sig.  .266 .104 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 4.137. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subset 4 
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FinROE2 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 3.2067  
Gov-05/06/07 3 4.9433  
Pty-15/16/17 3  29.8967 
Pty-12/13/14 3  34.3200 
Sig.  .781 .151 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 5.032. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
Subset 5  
 
FinDTA 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Pty-15/16/17 3 .2933  
Pty-12/13/14 3 .3100  
Gov-05/06/07 3  .4733 
Gov-08/09/10 3  .4867 
Sig.  .656 .784 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .000. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
Subset 6 
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FinCEA 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 
Pty-12/13/14 3 .0100 
Pty-15/16/17 3 .0233 
Gov-08/09/10 3 .0600 
Gov-05/06/07 3 .0733 
Sig.  .172 
Means for groups in homogeneous 
subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 
.001. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 
3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
Subset 7  
FinTEUs 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Gov-05/06/07 3 793344.33   
Gov-08/09/10 3  919308.33  
Pty-12/13/14 3   1064107.33 
Pty-15/16/17 3   1145669.00 
Sig.  1.000 1.000 .161 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1779643176.000. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
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FinTonnes 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Gov-05/06/07 3 27117548.33   
Gov-08/09/10 3  31401883.33  
Pty-15/16/17 3  32935888.00  
Pty-12/13/14 3   36894036.00 
Sig.  1.000 .614 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 2247293016415.167. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
Subset 9 
 
FinNoS 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 914.00  
Pty-12/13/14 3 976.67 976.67 
Pty-15/16/17 3 993.00 993.00 
Gov-05/06/07 3  1042.00 
Sig.  .200 .328 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1914.333. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
Subset 10 
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EnvoTE 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Pty-15/16/17 3 196.33   
Pty-12/13/14 3 205.33   
Gov-05/06/07 3  274.33  
Gov-08/09/10 3   317.33 
Sig.  .784 1.000 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 136.583. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
Subset 11 
EnvoTEC 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Pty-15/16/17 3 164116.00   
Pty-12/13/14 3 173631.33   
Gov-08/09/10 3  226588.33  
Gov-05/06/07 3   281094.67 
Sig.  .919 1.000 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 339469994.250. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
Subset 12 
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EnvoTECO2 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Pty-15/16/17 3 12673.33   
Pty-12/13/14 3 13581.67 13581.67  
Gov-05/06/07 3  17576.00 17576.00 
Gov-08/09/10 3   18347.33 
Sig.  .918 .090 .947 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 3084502.250. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4- TRIMMED MANOVA TESTS (FINCEA) AND TESTS FOR CHANGES 
IN LEVELS OF OPERATIONS CONTROLS 
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GLM FinROA1 FinROA2 FinROE1 FinROE2 FinDTA FinTEUs FinTonnes FinNoS EnvoTEC 
EnvoTECO2 EnvoTE BY 
    Ownership 
  /METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
  /INTERCEPT=INCLUDE 
  /POSTHOC=Ownership(TUKEY) 
  /PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE ETASQ OPOWER HOMOGENEITY 
  /CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05) 
  /DESIGN= Ownership. 
 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Ownership 1 Gov-05/06/07 3 
2 Gov-08/09/10 3 
3 Pty-12/13/14 3 
4 Pty-15/16/17 3 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Ownership Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 Gov-05/06/07 4.16 .035 3 
Gov-08/09/10 2.48 1.542 3 
Pty-12/13/14 25.92 4.403 3 
Pty-15/16/17 21.07 1.205 3 
Total 13.41 10.901 12 
FinROA2 Gov-05/06/07 2.5333 .16442 3 
Gov-08/09/10 1.6833 1.79879 3 
Pty-12/13/14 25.8900 4.40309 3 
Pty-15/16/17 21.0700 1.20528 3 
Total 12.7942 11.49854 12 
FinROE1 Gov-05/06/07 8.0733 .06658 3 
Gov-08/09/10 4.7600 2.91978 3 
Pty-12/13/14 34.3633 2.24812 3 
Pty-15/16/17 29.9033 1.72155 3 
Total 19.2750 13.69618 12 
FinROE2 Gov-05/06/07 4.9433 .22279 3 
Gov-08/09/10 3.2067 3.46828 3 
Pty-12/13/14 34.3200 2.25781 3 
Pty-15/16/17 29.8967 1.71850 3 
Total 18.0917 14.86832 12 
FinDTA Gov-05/06/07 .4733 .01528 3 
Gov-08/09/10 .4867 .02082 3 
Pty-12/13/14 .3100 .01000 3 
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Pty-15/16/17 .2933 .02082 3 
Total .3908 .09462 12 
FinTEUs Gov-05/06/07 793344.33 72111.913 3 
Gov-08/09/10 919308.33 23374.571 3 
Pty-12/13/14 1064107.33 36493.905 3 
Pty-15/16/17 1145669.00 6345.792 3 
Total 980607.25 145653.684 12 
FinTonnes Gov-05/06/07 27117548.33 819363.855 3 
Gov-08/09/10 31401883.33 1035399.724 3 
Pty-12/13/14 36894036.00 505937.095 3 
Pty-15/16/17 32935888.00 2643821.100 3 
Total 32087338.92 3872484.107 12 
FinNoS Gov-05/06/07 1042.00 34.828 3 
Gov-08/09/10 914.00 54.617 3 
Pty-12/13/14 976.67 55.896 3 
Pty-15/16/17 993.00 18.358 3 
Total 981.42 60.626 12 
EnvoTEC Gov-05/06/07 281094.67 14125.369 3 
Gov-08/09/10 226588.33 30308.835 3 
Pty-12/13/14 173631.33 10685.472 3 
Pty-15/16/17 164116.00 11204.871 3 
Total 211357.58 51315.938 12 
EnvoTECO2 Gov-05/06/07 17576.00 1019.118 3 
Gov-08/09/10 18347.33 2999.985 3 
Pty-12/13/14 13581.67 1111.955 3 
Pty-15/16/17 12673.33 1031.045 3 
Total 15544.58 2968.219 12 
EnvoTE Gov-05/06/07 274.33 7.767 3 
Gov-08/09/10 317.33 10.504 3 
Pty-12/13/14 205.33 14.503 3 
Pty-15/16/17 196.33 12.858 3 
Total 248.33 53.140 12 
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Multivariate Testsa (Trimmed FinCEA) 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerd 
Intercept Pillai's Trace 1.000 1939.625b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 15516.998 .996 
Wilks' Lambda .000 1939.625b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 15516.998 .996 
Hotelling's Trace 15516.998 1939.625b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 15516.998 .996 
Roy's Largest Root 15516.998 1939.625b 8.000 1.000 .018 1.000 15516.998 .996 
Ownership Pillai's Trace 2.831 6.282 24.000 9.000 .004 .944 150.762 .987 
Wilks' Lambda .000 15.304 24.000 3.502 .014 .989 314.066 .902 
Hotelling's Trace . . 24.000 . . . . . 
Roy's Largest Root 4023.633 1508.862c 8.000 3.000 .000 1.000 12070.900 1.000 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownership 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
d. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Trimmed FinCEA) 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerl 
Corrected 
Model 
1 1260.794a 3 420.265 72.396 .000 .964 217.189 1.000 
FinROA2 1406.177b 3 468.726 77.788 .000 .967 233.365 1.000 
FinROE1 2030.346c 3 676.782 163.599 .000 .984 490.798 1.000 
FinROE2 2391.476d 3 797.159 158.406 .000 .983 475.218 1.000 
FinDTA .096e 3 .032 106.769 .000 .976 320.306 1.000 
FinTEUs 219127807118.250f 3 73042602372.750 41.043 .000 .939 123.130 1.000 
FinTonnes 146979120589987.530g 3 48993040196662.510 21.801 .000 .891 65.403 1.000 
FinNoS 25116.250h 3 8372.083 4.373 .042 .621 13.120 .658 
EnvoTEC 26250821016.917i 3 8750273672.306 25.776 .000 .906 77.329 1.000 
EnvoTECO2 72237538.917j 3 24079179.639 7.807 .009 .745 23.420 .898 
EnvoTE 29970.000k 3 9990.000 73.142 .000 .965 219.426 1.000 
Intercept 1 2156.865 1 2156.865 371.549 .000 .979 371.549 1.000 
FinROA2 1964.288 1 1964.288 325.988 .000 .976 325.988 1.000 
FinROE1 4458.307 1 4458.307 1077.712 .000 .993 1077.712 1.000 
FinROE2 3927.701 1 3927.701 780.487 .000 .990 780.487 1.000 
FinDTA 1.833 1 1.833 6110.028 .000 .999 6110.028 1.000 
FinTEUs 11539086945030.746 1 11539086945030.746 6483.933 .000 .999 6483.933 1.000 
FinTonnes 12355167825036366.000 1 12355167825036366.000 5497.800 .000 .999 5497.800 1.000 
FinNoS 11558144.083 1 11558144.083 6037.686 .000 .999 6037.686 1.000 
EnvoTEC 536064336390.083 1 536064336390.083 1579.121 .000 .995 1579.121 1.000 
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EnvoTECO2 2899608852.083 1 2899608852.083 940.057 .000 .992 940.057 1.000 
EnvoTE 740033.333 1 740033.333 5418.182 .000 .999 5418.182 1.000 
Ownership 1 1260.794 3 420.265 72.396 .000 .964 217.189 1.000 
FinROA2 1406.177 3 468.726 77.788 .000 .967 233.365 1.000 
FinROE1 2030.345 3 676.782 163.599 .000 .984 490.798 1.000 
FinROE2 2391.476 3 797.159 158.406 .000 .983 475.218 1.000 
FinDTA .096 3 .032 106.769 .000 .976 320.306 1.000 
FinTEUs 219127807118.250 3 73042602372.750 41.043 .000 .939 123.130 1.000 
FinTonnes 146979120589987.600 3 48993040196662.530 21.801 .000 .891 65.403 1.000 
FinNoS 25116.250 3 8372.083 4.373 .042 .621 13.120 .658 
EnvoTEC 26250821016.917 3 8750273672.306 25.776 .000 .906 77.329 1.000 
EnvoTECO2 72237538.917 3 24079179.639 7.807 .009 .745 23.420 .898 
EnvoTE 29970.000 3 9990.000 73.142 .000 .965 219.426 1.000 
Error 1 46.440 8 5.805      
FinROA2 48.205 8 6.026      
FinROE1 33.095 8 4.137      
FinROE2 40.259 8 5.032      
FinDTA .002 8 .000      
FinTEUs 14237145408.000 8 1779643176.000      
FinTonnes 17978344131321.332 8 2247293016415.167      
FinNoS 15314.667 8 1914.333      
EnvoTEC 2715759954.000 8 339469994.250      
EnvoTECO2 24676018.000 8 3084502.250      
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EnvoTE 1092.667 8 136.583      
Total 1 3464.099 12       
FinROA2 3418.670 12       
FinROE1 6521.748 12       
FinROE2 6359.436 12       
FinDTA 1.932 12       
FinTEUs 11772451897557.000 12       
FinTonnes 12520125289757680.000 12       
FinNoS 11598575.000 12       
EnvoTEC 565030917361.000 12       
EnvoTECO2 2996522409.000 12       
EnvoTE 771096.000 12       
Corrected 
Total 
1 1307.235 11       
FinROA2 1454.382 11       
FinROE1 2063.440 11       
FinROE2 2431.735 11       
FinDTA .098 11       
FinTEUs 233364952526.250 11       
FinTonnes 164957464721308.880 11       
FinNoS 40430.917 11       
EnvoTEC 28966580970.917 11       
EnvoTECO2 96913556.917 11       
EnvoTE 31062.667 11       
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a. R Squared = .964 (Adjusted R Squared = .951) 
b. R Squared = .967 (Adjusted R Squared = .954) 
c. R Squared = .984 (Adjusted R Squared = .978) 
d. R Squared = .983 (Adjusted R Squared = .977) 
e. R Squared = .976 (Adjusted R Squared = .966) 
f. R Squared = .939 (Adjusted R Squared = .916) 
g. R Squared = .891 (Adjusted R Squared = .850) 
h. R Squared = .621 (Adjusted R Squared = .479) 
i. R Squared = .906 (Adjusted R Squared = .871) 
j. R Squared = .745 (Adjusted R Squared = .650) 
k. R Squared = .965 (Adjusted R Squared = .952) 
l. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Multiple Comparisons (Trimmed FinCEA) 
Tukey HSD   
Dependent Variable (I) Ownership (J) Ownership 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 1.68 1.967 .829 -4.62 7.98 
Pty-12/13/14 -21.76* 1.967 .000 -28.06 -15.46 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.91* 1.967 .000 -23.21 -10.61 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -1.68 1.967 .829 -7.98 4.62 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.44* 1.967 .000 -29.74 -17.14 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.59* 1.967 .000 -24.89 -12.29 
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Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 21.76* 1.967 .000 15.46 28.06 
Gov-08/09/10 23.44* 1.967 .000 17.14 29.74 
Pty-15/16/17 4.85 1.967 .141 -1.45 11.15 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 16.91* 1.967 .000 10.61 23.21 
Gov-08/09/10 18.59* 1.967 .000 12.29 24.89 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.85 1.967 .141 -11.15 1.45 
FinROA2 Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .8500 2.00427 .973 -5.5684 7.2684 
Pty-12/13/14 -23.3567* 2.00427 .000 -29.7750 -16.9383 
Pty-15/16/17 -18.5367* 2.00427 .000 -24.9550 -12.1183 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -.8500 2.00427 .973 -7.2684 5.5684 
Pty-12/13/14 -24.2067* 2.00427 .000 -30.6250 -17.7883 
Pty-15/16/17 -19.3867* 2.00427 .000 -25.8050 -12.9683 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 23.3567* 2.00427 .000 16.9383 29.7750 
Gov-08/09/10 24.2067* 2.00427 .000 17.7883 30.6250 
Pty-15/16/17 4.8200 2.00427 .153 -1.5984 11.2384 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 18.5367* 2.00427 .000 12.1183 24.9550 
Gov-08/09/10 19.3867* 2.00427 .000 12.9683 25.8050 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.8200 2.00427 .153 -11.2384 1.5984 
FinROE1 Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 3.3133 1.66069 .266 -2.0048 8.6314 
Pty-12/13/14 -26.2900* 1.66069 .000 -31.6081 -20.9719 
Pty-15/16/17 -21.8300* 1.66069 .000 -27.1481 -16.5119 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -3.3133 1.66069 .266 -8.6314 2.0048 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.6033* 1.66069 .000 -34.9214 -24.2852 
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Pty-15/16/17 -25.1433* 1.66069 .000 -30.4614 -19.8252 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 26.2900* 1.66069 .000 20.9719 31.6081 
Gov-08/09/10 29.6033* 1.66069 .000 24.2852 34.9214 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4600 1.66069 .104 -.8581 9.7781 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 21.8300* 1.66069 .000 16.5119 27.1481 
Gov-08/09/10 25.1433* 1.66069 .000 19.8252 30.4614 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4600 1.66069 .104 -9.7781 .8581 
FinROE2 Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 1.7367 1.83164 .781 -4.1289 7.6022 
Pty-12/13/14 -29.3767* 1.83164 .000 -35.2422 -23.5111 
Pty-15/16/17 -24.9533* 1.83164 .000 -30.8189 -19.0878 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -1.7367 1.83164 .781 -7.6022 4.1289 
Pty-12/13/14 -31.1133* 1.83164 .000 -36.9789 -25.2478 
Pty-15/16/17 -26.6900* 1.83164 .000 -32.5556 -20.8244 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 29.3767* 1.83164 .000 23.5111 35.2422 
Gov-08/09/10 31.1133* 1.83164 .000 25.2478 36.9789 
Pty-15/16/17 4.4233 1.83164 .151 -1.4422 10.2889 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 24.9533* 1.83164 .000 19.0878 30.8189 
Gov-08/09/10 26.6900* 1.83164 .000 20.8244 32.5556 
Pty-12/13/14 -4.4233 1.83164 .151 -10.2889 1.4422 
FinDTA Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -.0133 .01414 .784 -.0586 .0320 
Pty-12/13/14 .1633* .01414 .000 .1180 .2086 
Pty-15/16/17 .1800* .01414 .000 .1347 .2253 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 .0133 .01414 .784 -.0320 .0586 
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Pty-12/13/14 .1767* .01414 .000 .1314 .2220 
Pty-15/16/17 .1933* .01414 .000 .1480 .2386 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.1633* .01414 .000 -.2086 -.1180 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1767* .01414 .000 -.2220 -.1314 
Pty-15/16/17 .0167 .01414 .656 -.0286 .0620 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.1800* .01414 .000 -.2253 -.1347 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1933* .01414 .000 -.2386 -.1480 
Pty-12/13/14 -.0167 .01414 .656 -.0620 .0286 
FinTEUs Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -125964.00* 34444.576 .027 -236267.66 -15660.34 
Pty-12/13/14 -270763.00* 34444.576 .000 -381066.66 -160459.34 
Pty-15/16/17 -352324.67* 34444.576 .000 -462628.32 -242021.01 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 125964.00* 34444.576 .027 15660.34 236267.66 
Pty-12/13/14 -144799.00* 34444.576 .013 -255102.66 -34495.34 
Pty-15/16/17 -226360.67* 34444.576 .001 -336664.32 -116057.01 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 270763.00* 34444.576 .000 160459.34 381066.66 
Gov-08/09/10 144799.00* 34444.576 .013 34495.34 255102.66 
Pty-15/16/17 -81561.67 34444.576 .161 -191865.32 28741.99 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 352324.67* 34444.576 .000 242021.01 462628.32 
Gov-08/09/10 226360.67* 34444.576 .001 116057.01 336664.32 
Pty-12/13/14 81561.67 34444.576 .161 -28741.99 191865.32 
FinTonnes Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -4284335.00* 1224007.902 .033 -8204039.16 -364630.84 
Pty-12/13/14 -9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 -13696191.83 -5856783.51 
Pty-15/16/17 -5818339.67* 1224007.902 .006 -9738043.83 -1898635.51 
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Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 4284335.00* 1224007.902 .033 364630.84 8204039.16 
Pty-12/13/14 -5492152.67* 1224007.902 .009 -9411856.83 -1572448.51 
Pty-15/16/17 -1534004.67 1224007.902 .614 -5453708.83 2385699.49 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 9776487.67* 1224007.902 .000 5856783.51 13696191.83 
Gov-08/09/10 5492152.67* 1224007.902 .009 1572448.51 9411856.83 
Pty-15/16/17 3958148.00* 1224007.902 .048 38443.84 7877852.16 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 5818339.67* 1224007.902 .006 1898635.51 9738043.83 
Gov-08/09/10 1534004.67 1224007.902 .614 -2385699.49 5453708.83 
Pty-12/13/14 -3958148.00* 1224007.902 .048 -7877852.16 -38443.84 
FinNoS Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 128.00* 35.724 .029 13.60 242.40 
Pty-12/13/14 65.33 35.724 .328 -49.07 179.73 
Pty-15/16/17 49.00 35.724 .548 -65.40 163.40 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -128.00* 35.724 .029 -242.40 -13.60 
Pty-12/13/14 -62.67 35.724 .359 -177.07 51.73 
Pty-15/16/17 -79.00 35.724 .200 -193.40 35.40 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -65.33 35.724 .328 -179.73 49.07 
Gov-08/09/10 62.67 35.724 .359 -51.73 177.07 
Pty-15/16/17 -16.33 35.724 .966 -130.73 98.07 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -49.00 35.724 .548 -163.40 65.40 
Gov-08/09/10 79.00 35.724 .200 -35.40 193.40 
Pty-12/13/14 16.33 35.724 .966 -98.07 130.73 
EnvoTEC Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 54506.33* 15043.714 .028 6331.07 102681.60 
Pty-12/13/14 107463.33* 15043.714 .000 59288.07 155638.60 
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Pty-15/16/17 116978.67* 15043.714 .000 68803.40 165153.93 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -54506.33* 15043.714 .028 -102681.60 -6331.07 
Pty-12/13/14 52957.00* 15043.714 .032 4781.73 101132.27 
Pty-15/16/17 62472.33* 15043.714 .014 14297.07 110647.60 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -107463.33* 15043.714 .000 -155638.60 -59288.07 
Gov-08/09/10 -52957.00* 15043.714 .032 -101132.27 -4781.73 
Pty-15/16/17 9515.33 15043.714 .919 -38659.93 57690.60 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -116978.67* 15043.714 .000 -165153.93 -68803.40 
Gov-08/09/10 -62472.33* 15043.714 .014 -110647.60 -14297.07 
Pty-12/13/14 -9515.33 15043.714 .919 -57690.60 38659.93 
EnvoTECO2 Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -771.33 1433.993 .947 -5363.48 3820.82 
Pty-12/13/14 3994.33 1433.993 .090 -597.82 8586.48 
Pty-15/16/17 4902.67* 1433.993 .037 310.52 9494.82 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 771.33 1433.993 .947 -3820.82 5363.48 
Pty-12/13/14 4765.67* 1433.993 .042 173.52 9357.82 
Pty-15/16/17 5674.00* 1433.993 .018 1081.85 10266.15 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -3994.33 1433.993 .090 -8586.48 597.82 
Gov-08/09/10 -4765.67* 1433.993 .042 -9357.82 -173.52 
Pty-15/16/17 908.33 1433.993 .918 -3683.82 5500.48 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -4902.67* 1433.993 .037 -9494.82 -310.52 
Gov-08/09/10 -5674.00* 1433.993 .018 -10266.15 -1081.85 
Pty-12/13/14 -908.33 1433.993 .918 -5500.48 3683.82 
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EnvoTE Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -43.00* 9.542 .009 -73.56 -12.44 
Pty-12/13/14 69.00* 9.542 .000 38.44 99.56 
Pty-15/16/17 78.00* 9.542 .000 47.44 108.56 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 43.00* 9.542 .009 12.44 73.56 
Pty-12/13/14 112.00* 9.542 .000 81.44 142.56 
Pty-15/16/17 121.00* 9.542 .000 90.44 151.56 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -69.00* 9.542 .000 -99.56 -38.44 
Gov-08/09/10 -112.00* 9.542 .000 -142.56 -81.44 
Pty-15/16/17 9.00 9.542 .784 -21.56 39.56 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -78.00* 9.542 .000 -108.56 -47.44 
Gov-08/09/10 -121.00* 9.542 .000 -151.56 -90.44 
Pty-12/13/14 -9.00 9.542 .784 -39.56 21.56 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square (Error) = 136.583. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa (Trimmed FinCEA) 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
FinROA1 Based on Mean 3.432 3 8 .072 
Based on Median 2.114 3 8 .177 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.114 3 2.921 .281 
Based on trimmed mean 3.345 3 8 .076 
FinROA2 Based on Mean 3.108 3 8 .089 
Based on Median 1.955 3 8 .199 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.955 3 3.046 .296 
Based on trimmed mean 3.032 3 8 .093 
FinROE1 Based on Mean 2.586 3 8 .126 
Based on Median .951 3 8 .461 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.951 3 5.520 .478 
Based on trimmed mean 2.447 3 8 .139 
FinROE2 Based on Mean 2.350 3 8 .149 
Based on Median 1.059 3 8 .419 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.059 3 5.204 .442 
Based on trimmed mean 2.253 3 8 .159 
FinDTA Based on Mean .978 3 8 .450 
Based on Median .204 3 8 .891 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.204 3 6.000 .890 
Based on trimmed mean .894 3 8 .485 
FinTEUs Based on Mean 4.385 3 8 .042 
Based on Median .937 3 8 .467 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.937 3 2.905 .523 
Based on trimmed mean 3.995 3 8 .052 
FinTonnes Based on Mean 2.328 3 8 .151 
Based on Median 1.276 3 8 .347 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.276 3 4.563 .385 
Based on trimmed mean 2.259 3 8 .159 
FinNoS Based on Mean 1.494 3 8 .288 
Based on Median .330 3 8 .804 
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Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.330 3 4.965 .805 
Based on trimmed mean 1.358 3 8 .323 
EnvoTEC Based on Mean 1.607 3 8 .263 
Based on Median .837 3 8 .511 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.837 3 4.603 .533 
Based on trimmed mean 1.551 3 8 .275 
EnvoTEC
O2 
Based on Mean 1.699 3 8 .244 
Based on Median 1.055 3 8 .420 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.055 3 4.339 .455 
Based on trimmed mean 1.659 3 8 .252 
EnvoTE Based on Mean .359 3 8 .784 
Based on Median .182 3 8 .905 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.182 3 6.323 .905 
Based on trimmed mean .345 3 8 .794 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownership 
 
Homogeneous subsets- (Trimmed FinCEA) 
Subset 1 
 
1 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 2.48  
Gov-05/06/07 3 4.16  
Pty-15/16/17 3  21.07 
Pty-12/13/14 3  25.92 
Sig.  .829 .141 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 5.805. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
Subset 2 
 
 
205 
 
FinROA2 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 1.6833  
Gov-05/06/07 3 2.5333  
Pty-15/16/17 3  21.0700 
Pty-12/13/14 3  25.8900 
Sig.  .973 .153 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 6.026. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
Subset 3 
FinROE1 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 4.7600  
Gov-05/06/07 3 8.0733  
Pty-15/16/17 3  29.9033 
Pty-12/13/14 3  34.3633 
Sig.  .266 .104 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 4.137. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
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Subset 4 
 
FinROE2 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 3.2067  
Gov-05/06/07 3 4.9433  
Pty-15/16/17 3  29.8967 
Pty-12/13/14 3  34.3200 
Sig.  .781 .151 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 5.032. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
Subset 5 
 
FinDTA 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Pty-15/16/17 3 .2933  
Pty-12/13/14 3 .3100  
Gov-05/06/07 3  .4733 
Gov-08/09/10 3  .4867 
Sig.  .656 .784 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .000. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
Subset 6 
 
FinTEUs 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Gov-05/06/07 3 793344.33   
Gov-08/09/10 3  919308.33  
Pty-12/13/14 3   1064107.33 
Pty-15/16/17 3   1145669.00 
Sig.  1.000 1.000 .161 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1779643176.000. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
Subset 7 
 
FinTonnes 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Gov-05/06/07 3 27117548.33   
Gov-08/09/10 3  31401883.33  
Pty-15/16/17 3  32935888.00  
Pty-12/13/14 3   36894036.00 
Sig.  1.000 .614 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 2247293016415.167. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
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Subset 8 
 
FinNoS 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 
Gov-08/09/10 3 914.00  
Pty-12/13/14 3 976.67 976.67 
Pty-15/16/17 3 993.00 993.00 
Gov-05/06/07 3  1042.00 
Sig.  .200 .328 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are 
displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1914.333. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
Subset 9 
 
EnvoTE 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Pty-15/16/17 3 196.33   
Pty-12/13/14 3 205.33   
Gov-05/06/07 3  274.33  
Gov-08/09/10 3   317.33 
Sig.  .784 1.000 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 136.583. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
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Subset 10 
 
EnvoTEC 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Pty-15/16/17 3 164116.00   
Pty-12/13/14 3 173631.33   
Gov-08/09/10 3  226588.33  
Gov-05/06/07 3   281094.67 
Sig.  .919 1.000 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 339469994.250. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
 
 
Subset 11 
 
 
EnvoTECO2 
Tukey HSDa,b   
Ownership N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Pty-15/16/17 3 12673.33   
Pty-12/13/14 3 13581.67 13581.67  
Gov-05/06/07 3  17576.00 17576.00 
Gov-08/09/10 3   18347.33 
Sig.  .918 .090 .947 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 3084502.250. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 3.000. 
b. Alpha = .05. 
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Appendix 4 continued - Tests for changes in levels of operations controls 
Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Ownership Pillai's Trace 2.838 6.551 24.000 9.000 .003 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
EnvoTEC 26250821016.917 3 8750273672.306 25.776 .000 
EnvoTEC/FinTUEs .084 3 .028 56.026 .000 
EnvoTEC/FinTonnes 6.139E-5 3 2.046E-5 35.900 .000 
      
EnvoTECO2 72237538.917 3 24079179.639 7.807 .009 
EnvoTECO2/FinTUEs .000 3 8.675E-5 28.036 .000 
EnvoTECO2/FinTonnes 1.667E-7 3 5.556E-8 8.333 .008 
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Tukey HSD Post Hoc Tests Ownership Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent 
Variable (I) Ownership (J) Ownership 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
EnvoTEC Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 54506.33* 15043.714 .028 
Pty-12/13/14 107463.33* 15043.714 .000 
Pty-15/16/17 116978.67* 15043.714 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -54506.33* 15043.714 .028 
Pty-12/13/14 52957.00* 15043.714 .032 
Pty-15/16/17 62472.33* 15043.714 .014 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -107463.33* 15043.714 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -52957.00* 15043.714 .032 
Pty-15/16/17 9515.33 15043.714 .919 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -116978.67* 15043.714 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -62472.33* 15043.714 .014 
Pty-12/13/14 -9515.33 15043.714 .919 
EnvoTEC/
FinTUEs 
Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .1095* .01825 .001 
Pty-12/13/14 .1923* .01825 .000 
Pty-15/16/17 .2125* .01825 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -.1095* .01825 .001 
Pty-12/13/14 .0828* .01825 .008 
Pty-15/16/17 .1030* .01825 .002 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.1923* .01825 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0828* .01825 .008 
Pty-15/16/17 .0203 .01825 .694 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.2125* .01825 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -.1030* .01825 .002 
Pty-12/13/14 -.0203 .01825 .694 
EnvoTEC/
FinTonnes 
Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .0031* .00062 .004 
Pty-12/13/14 .0057* .00062 .000 
Pty-15/16/17 .0053* .00062 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -.0031* .00062 .004 
Pty-12/13/14 .0026* .00062 .013 
Pty-15/16/17 .0022* .00062 .028 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.0057* .00062 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0026* .00062 .013 
Pty-15/16/17 -.0003 .00062 .946 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.0053* .00062 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0022* .00062 .028 
Pty-12/13/14 .0003 .00062 .946 
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Dependent 
Variable (I) Ownership (J) Ownership 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
EnvoTECO2 Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 -771.33 1433.993 .947 
Pty-12/13/14 3994.33 1433.993 .090 
Pty-15/16/17 4902.67* 1433.993 .037 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 771.33 1433.993 .947 
Pty-12/13/14 4765.67* 1433.993 .042 
Pty-15/16/17 5674.00* 1433.993 .018 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -3994.33 1433.993 .090 
Gov-08/09/10 -4765.67* 1433.993 .042 
Pty-15/16/17 908.33 1433.993 .918 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -4902.67* 1433.993 .037 
Gov-08/09/10 -5674.00* 1433.993 .018 
Pty-12/13/14 -908.33 1433.993 .918 
EnvoTECO22
FinTUEs 
Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .0022 .00144 .452 
Pty-12/13/14 .0094* .00144 .001 
Pty-15/16/17 .0111* .00144 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 -.0022 .00144 .452 
Pty-12/13/14 .0071* .00144 .005 
Pty-15/16/17 .0088* .00144 .001 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.0094* .00144 .001 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0071* .00144 .005 
Pty-15/16/17 .0017 .00144 .653 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.0111* .00144 .000 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0088* .00144 .001 
Pty-12/13/14 -.0017 .00144 .653 
EnvoTECO22
FinTonnes 
Gov-05/06/07 Gov-08/09/10 .0000 .00007 .957 
Pty-12/13/14 .0003* .00007 .017 
Pty-15/16/17 .0002* .00007 .033 
Gov-08/09/10 Gov-05/06/07 .0000 .00007 .957 
Pty-12/13/14 .0002* .00007 .033 
Pty-15/16/17 .0002 .00007 .067 
Pty-12/13/14 Gov-05/06/07 -.0003* .00007 .017 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0002* .00007 .033 
Pty-15/16/17 .0000 .00007 .957 
Pty-15/16/17 Gov-05/06/07 -.0002* .00007 .033 
Gov-08/09/10 -.0002 .00007 .067 
Pty-12/13/14 .0000 .00007 .957 
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APPENDIX 5. PORTS OF AUSTRALIA 
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APPENDIX 6. A LIST OF PRIVATISED SOES IN AUSTRALIA SINCE 1987 TO 2017 
Year Institute Place Method Category 
Sale 
value $m 
Total 
$m 
 
1987 
 
Belconnen Mall Shopping Complex 
Williamstown Naval Dockyard 
Aus 
Aus 
T/S 
T/S 
Other 
Manu 
  87.00 
102.00 189.00 
 
1988 
 
Commonwealth Accommodation & Catering 
Services 
Defence Services House Corp. Loan Portfolio 
 
 
 T/S 
T/S 
 
 Hous  
Hous 
  15.00 
1515.00 
1530.00 
1989 
 
AMDEL 
 
 
Aus 
 
T/S 
 
Other 
 
  1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1990 
 
Australian Industry Development Corporation-1 
NSW Investment Corp. 
NSW Egg Corporation 
Kooragang Coal Loader 
Newcastle Wharfside Services 
Port Kembla Coal Loader 
Aus 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Lease 
 Fin 
Fin 
Agri 
Port 
Port 
Port 
25.00 
65.00 
18.52 
20.20 
18.00 
2.5 149.22 
 
1991 
 
Australian Defence Force Home Loan Franchise 
Commonwealth Housing Loan Assistance 
Scheme (In the ACT) 
AUSSAT 
State Bank of Victoria 
Commonwealth Bank-1 
Aus 
 
Aus 
Aus 
VIC 
Aus 
T/S 
 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
 Fin 
 
Fin 
Comm 
Fin 
Fin 
42.00 
 
47.00 
504.00 
1300.00 
1311.00 3204.00 
 
1992 
 
Australian Airlines 
Loy Yang B Power Station-1 
Portland Smelter Unit Trust 
State Insurance Office 
Government Insurance Office-GIO 
First State Computing 
NSW Grain Corporation 
Western Basin Berth 3, Port of Newcastle 
Maritime Service Board Sydney Ports -Authority 
pilotage Service 
Glebe Island Berth 1 & 2, Sydney Ports 
Darling Harbour Berth 7 
 
Aus 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
 
 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
Lease 
 
Lease 
Lease 
Lease 
 
 
 
 Avi 
Elec 
Manu 
Fin 
Fin 
Elec 
Agri 
Port 
 
Port 
Port 
Port 
 
 
400.00 
544.00 
171.00 
125.00 
1260.00 
11.00 
110.00 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
2621.00 
 
1993 
 
Commonwealth Bank-2 
Qantas-1 
Snowy Mountains Engineering Corp 
Heatane Gas 
State Insurance Office 
NSW Grain Corp. 
SAGASCO 
State Statet. Insurance Office 
Maritimes Services Board Construction & 
Installation of Signs Business 
MSB Navigation Beacons Business 
MSB Waterfront Construction Services 
 
 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
VIC 
TAS 
NSW 
SA 
WA 
NSW 
 
NSW 
NSW 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
 
T/S 
T/S 
 
 Fin  
Avi 
Elec 
Gas 
Fin 
Other 
Gas 
Fin 
Port 
 
Port 
Port 
1686.00 
665.00 
1.60 
130.00 
42.00 
96.00 
417.00 
165.00 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 3202.60 
1994 
 
Sydney Fish Market 
SA Finance Trust 
Veterinary Laboratories 
Gladstone Power Station   
Enterprises Investments 
Austrust Trustees 
State Bank of NSW 
Moomba-Sydney Pipeline 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories 
Grain Elevators Board 
BASS 
Pipeline Authority of SA 
Government Cleaning Services 
School Furniture Complex 
 
NSW 
SA 
VIC 
QLD 
SA 
SA 
NSW 
Aus 
Aus 
VIC 
VIC 
SA 
NSW 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
 
 Other 
Fin 
Other 
Elec 
Fin 
Other 
Fin 
Gas 
Other 
Other 
Other 
Gas 
Other 
Edu 
5.00 
8.00 
2.00 
750.00 
38.00 
44.00 
250.00 
534.00 
299.00 
52.00 
3.00 
304.00 
n/a 
5.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2294.35 
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1995 
 
Qantas-2 
VicRoads Equipment Supply Division 
TabCorp 
Port of Geelong 
United Energy 
GFE Resources 
Solaris Power 
Powercor 
Eastern Energy 
Citipower 
State Printing Division 
Island Seaway 
Aerospace Technologies of Australia 
Port of Portland 
State Statet. Insurance Office 
Bank West 
Forwood Products- Timber 
Gumly Gumly Irrigation District 
Jemalong Wyldes Plains Irrigation Lts 
Lower Murray Irrigation Areas Ltd 
Murray Irrigation Ltd 
Aus 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
WA 
SA 
Aus 
VIC 
SA 
WA 
SA 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
P/F 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
M/T 
M/T 
M/T 
M/T 
Avi  
Other 
Gamb 
Trans 
Elec 
Other 
Elec 
Elec 
Elec 
Elec 
Other 
Trans 
Manu 
Trans 
Fin 
Fin 
Other 
Agri 
Agri 
Agri 
Agri 
1450.00 
60.00 
609.00 
51.00 
1553.00 
56.00 
950.00 
2150.00 
2080.00 
1575.00 
n/a 
3.00 
40.00 
30.00 
175.00 
900.00 
123.00 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 11805.00 
 
1996 
 
Commonwealth Bank-3 
Commonwealth Funds Management  
 Radio 5 AA  
Sign Services  
State Chemistry Laboratory 
State Clothing  
Yalloum Energy 
Hazelwood Energy Brix 
State Bank of SA 
Aximo Funds Management 
Loy Yang A 
Hay Irrigation District 
Aus 
Aus 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
VIC 
VIC 
SA 
NSW 
VIC 
NSW 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
M/T 
 Fin 
Fin 
Comm 
Other 
Other 
Other 
Elec 
Elec 
Fin 
Fin 
Elec 
Agri 
3390.00 
63.00 
8.00 
0.30 
0.05 
2.00 
2428.00 
2400.00 
720.00 
240.00 
4746.00 
n/a 13997.35 
 
1997 
 
Australian Industry Development Corp.-2 
Commonwealth Bank-4 
Loy Yang B Power Station-2 
Healthcare Linen 
Samcor 
Port Bulk Handling Services 
Suncorp-QLD Industry Development Group 
Suncorp-Metway Ltd 
Powernet 
Brisbane Airport 
Melbourne Airport 
Perth Airport 
Australian National Railways 
Avalon Airport-Geelong 
DASFLEET & Businesses 
Housing Loan Insurance Corp. 
State Gas Pipeline 
Southern Hydro 
Telstra-1 
Sydney Market Authority 
 
Aus 
Aus 
VIC 
WA 
SA 
SA 
QLD 
QLD 
VIC 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
VIC 
Aus 
Aus 
QLD 
VIC 
Aus 
NSW 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
 Fin  
Fin 
Elec 
Other 
Other 
Trans 
Fin 
Fin 
Elec 
Avi 
Avi 
Avi 
Tran 
Avi 
Trans 
Fin 
Gas 
Elec 
Comm 
Fin 
200.00 
1779.00 
1150.00 
14.00 
8.00 
17.00 
698.00 
610.00 
2555.00 
1387.00 
1307.00 
643.00 
95.00 
1.50 
437.00 
108.00 
163.00 
391.00 
14330.00 
0.63 
25893.50 
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1998 
 
Victoria Plantations Corp. 
Adelaide & Parafield Airports 
Darwin, Tennent Creek & Alice Spring Airports 
Australian Multimedia Enterprises 
ANL 
Totalisator Agency Board 
Canberra Airport 
Coolangatta Airport 
Launceston Airport 
Townsville & Mount Isa Airports 
Moorabbin Airport 
Jandakot Airport 
Archerfield Airport 
Dampier-Bunbury Gas Pipeline 
Auscript 
Aluvic 
Australian National Lines 
 
VIC 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
NSW 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
 Other 
Avi 
Avi 
Comm 
Trans 
Gamb 
Avi 
Avi 
Avi 
Avi 
Avi 
Avi 
Avi 
Gas 
Other 
Manu 
Trans 
550.00 
362.00 
110.00 
43.00 
31.00 
1017.00 
65.00 
106.00 
18.00 
16.00 
8.00 
7.00 
3.00 
2303.00 
1.10 
502.00 
21.00 5146.10 
 
1999 
 
Telstra-2 
National Transmission Network 
Ecogen 
QLD Totalisator Agency Board 
V-Line Freight  
Gascor 
ETSA Transmission 
Westar/ Kinetik 
Milinet/ Ikon 
Gasnet 
ADI 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Ltd 
Aus 
Aus 
Vic 
QLD 
VIC 
VIC 
SA 
VIC 
VIC 
VIC 
Aus 
NSW 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
M/T 
Comm 
Elec 
Elec 
Gamb 
Trans 
Gas 
Elec 
Gas 
Gas 
Gas 
Manu 
Agri 
16000.00 
650.00 
360.00 
268.00 
194.00 
29.00 
3500.00 
1630.00 
1970.00 
1025.00 
347.00 
n/a 
25973.00 
 
2000 
 
Removals Australia 
NT Totalisator Agency Board 
Broadcast Australia 
Coleambally Irrigation Ltd 
ElectraNet 
Torrens Island Power Station 
Alinta Gas 
 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
NSW 
SA 
SA 
WA 
 
 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
M/T 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
 Other 
Gamb 
Comm 
Agri 
Elec 
Elec 
Gas 
14.00 
8.00 
650.00 
n/a 
938.00 
295.00 
971.00 672.00 
2001 
 
Essendon Airport 
 
 
VIC 
 
 
T/S 
 
 
 Avi 
 
 
22.00 
 
 
22.00 
 
2002 
 
SA Totalisator Agency Board 
National Rail Corp. & Freight Corp. 
Sydney Airport 
FreightCorp 
Integral Energy Gas Pty Ltd 
Powercoal Pty Ltd 
Aus 
Aus 
Aus 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Gamb 
Trans 
Avi 
Avi 
Gas 
Gas 
44.00 
1050.00 
5588.00 
669.00 
2.10 
323.60 6682.00 
 
2003 
 
Bankstown, Camden & Hoxton Park Airports 
Pacific Power (International) Pty Ltd 
Aus 
Aus 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Other 
Avi 
Elec 
211.00   
 
n/a 211.00 
2004 
Plug & Power (Pacific Solar Pty Ltd) 
Pacific Solar Pty Ltd (Low cost solar cell) 
NSW 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
Elec 
Elec 
n/a 
n/a 
- 
 
2005 
 
Statet. Printing Corp. 
Q stores & CM Solutions 
 
NSW 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
Other 
Other 
5.00  
38.00 
43.00 
 
2006 
 
Telstra-3 
DirectLink 
Allgas Energy 
Sun Retail 
Sun Gas 
Emmlink (Country Energy) 
Aus 
NSW 
QLD 
QLD 
QLD 
NSW 
P/F 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Comm 
Elec 
Gas 
Elec 
Gas 
Elec 
15400.00 
170.00 
535.00 
1200.00 
75.00 
85.00 17465.00 
 
2007 
 
Powerdirect 
Hobart Airport 
ComLand 
Energy Australia Pty Ltd 
QLD 
Aus 
Aus 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Elec 
Avi 
Other 
Gas 
1200.00 
350.00 
165.00 
207.00 1922.00 
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2010 
 
NSW Lotteries 
Country Energy-Gas Network 
QR National 
Port of Brisbane 
NSW 
NSW 
QLD 
QLD 
T/S 
T/S 
P/F 
T/S 
Gamb 
Gas 
Trans 
Trans 
1008.00 
109.00 
6222.00 
2100.00 9439.00 
 
2011 
 
Energy Australia 
Integral Energy & Country Energy-Retail 
Electricity 
WSN Environmental Solutions 
NSW 
NSW 
 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
 
T/S 
Elec 
Elec 
 
Infra 
2035.00 
3250.00 
 
234.00 5519.00 
 
2012 
 
SA Lotteries Commission 
TOTE Tasmania 
Sydney Desalination Plant 
SA 
TAS 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Gamb 
Gamb 
Other 
427.00 
103.00 
2072.00 2602.00 
 
2013 
 
Delta Electricity Power Stations 
Port Botany 
Port Kembla 
Eraring Energy 
Mt. Piper & Wallerawang Power Stations  
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
T/S 
Lease 
Lease 
T/S 
T/S 
Elec 
Port 
Port 
Elec 
Elec 
142.00 
4310.00 
760.00 
657.00 
475.00 6344.00 
 
2014 
 
Port of Newcastle 
Green State Power 
Bayswater & Liddell Power Stations 
Hunter Water Australia 
Colongra Power Station 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
Lease 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
Port 
Elec 
Elec 
Water 
Elec 
1075.00 
72.00 
1505.00 
6.82 
233.00 2891.82 
 
2015 
 
M7 Rental Payments 
Vales Point Power Station 
Kooragang Island Advance Water -Treatment 
Plant 
Transgrid 
NSW 
NSW 
NSW 
 
NSW 
T/S 
T/S 
T/S 
 
Lease 
Other 
Elec 
Water 
 
Elec 
174.20 
21.30 
35.50 
 
10273.00 10504.00 
 
2016 
 
Brown Mountain Hydro Power Station & - 
Cochrane Dam 
AusGrid 
Construction Services Group NSW Public Works 
Pillar Superannuation Administration 
NSW 
 
NSW 
NSW 
 
NSW 
T/S 
 
Lease 
T/S 
 
T/S 
Elec 
 
Elec 
Other 
 
Other 
4.50 
 
16.20 
0.81 
 
35.00 56.51 
 
2017 
 
Titling & Registry of Land & Property Information 
Endeavour Energy  
NSW 
 
NSW 
Lease 
 
Lease 
Other 
 
Elec 
2600.00 
 
7624.00 10224.00 
T/S-Trade Sale, P/F-Public Offer, L-Licence, M/T-Management Transfer 
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin December 1997, Issues Backgrounder NSW 2017 
 
 
 
